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4Foreword
 
The Russia of Power project has now concluded, and this is the resulting final report. The 
report is a continuation of the two previous reports ordered by the Ministry of Defence: 
Russia of Challenges was published in 2008 and Russia of Transformations in 2012. This 
time, the project was also commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Min-
istry of the Interior, while the Ministry of Defence was responsible for administration and 
coordination of the project.
International tensions have increased in recent years, and the security situation has 
weakened in Europe and in Finland’s neighbouring areas. No positive developments on 
this front are currently foreseen. There is talk of a return of the Cold War, increased signif-
icance of nuclear weapons, the end of the rules-based international order, and an end to 
diplomacy.
Through its actions and in its public pronouncements, Russia has shown its disdain for 
the rules-based international order and security. Of course, Russia is only one of many ac-
tors involved in international politics. Public statements made by the current US govern-
ment, the emergence of China as a global power and the future direction of the European 
Union are all creating uncertainty, as are a number of different crisis areas, as well as glob-
al challenges and megatrends. Taken with all these factors, Russia’s efforts to achieve the 
status of an internationally recognised great power are creating instability, and a tendency 
to settle international disputes with power politics may intensify.
For Europe, Russia has been an important energy partner, a market area with increas-
ing potential, a participant in the fight against terrorism, and a seat of rich culture. How-
ever, these positive connotations of Russia have begun to change to somewhat more neg-
ative ones. Russia and its hybrid influence, in a variety of forms, constantly appear in the 
same context, while the perception of the military threat that Russia poses to Europe has 
returned, strengthened. Finland has also come to realise that while there is no imminent 
military threat to Finland, it must prepare for the threat or use of military force. As a mem-
ber of the European Union, Finland would not be able to remain aside if security is under 
threat in the region or elsewhere in Europe. The need for cooperation and dialogue – in-
cluding with Russia – is particularly important.
Events and negative developments in recent years provide cause for increasingly crit-
ical analysis. The Russia of Power project concentrated on analysing Russia under three 
main themes: foreign policy, military defence and internal development. Preparing the re-
port took a year, during which over 40 experts from universities, research institutes and 
various authorities participated in the work of the three thematic groups. As in previous 
similar projects, the participants for this project were chosen on the basis of expertise and 
availability.
The thematic groups were tasked with evaluating the current situation, as well as 
change and continuity factors. They were also given the task of evaluating impact: the im-
pact on Russia’s stability and relations between Finland and Russia, as well as the impact 
on Finland and the region from the perspective of international security. Implementation 
5of the project was supported by a support group made up of representatives of the Min-
istries of Defence, the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as the National Defence Univer-
sity.
The work of the three thematic groups was coordinated by the specific people in charge 
of each group: Jyri Lavikainen, Petteri Lalu and Salla Nazarenko. The thematic groups con-
vened between three and six times, and smaller groups and individual experts undertook 
other independent research work. Further insight came from external experts, who pro-
vided comments or produced background papers, for example. Discussions between the 
thematic groups and cross-analysis of their work also took place at five joint events during 
the project. Hannu Himanen, Arto Mustajoki, Hanna Smith and Timo Valtonen gave pre-
sentations in these joint events. The project also involved foresighting, and this work has 
been compiled by Simo Pesu, assisted by experts in the project, in the final section of this 
report.
The goal of producing the Russia of Power report is to increase awareness and under-
standing of Russia. The project also provided a further boost to the study of Russia with 
a particular focus on security. Students and younger researchers also contributed, allow-
ing them to learn and to gain multifaceted experience. In addition, the work combined re-
search skills and the expertise of civil servants to produce added value, and this kind of co-
operation will be implemented more systematically going forward.
The Russia of Power project was a unique effort. It takes considerable expertise and 
cooperation to fashion a subject this extensive and multi-faceted into a well-founded and 
reader-friendly expert opinion. The report is also a demonstration of Finnish expertise in 
terms of Russia.
The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry for Foreign Affairs extend 
their warmest thanks to all the experts who participated in the work. Thanks are also due 
to those who initiated the joint events and to external commentators for sharing their ex-
pertise, as well as to the project support group for its good cooperation. The list of experts 
on the next page is not exhaustive, as some of the experts did not want their names to be 
included due to the nature of their work or their duties.
The report provides, from the perspective of security, a comprehensive topical view of 
the current situation in Russia, as well as of alternative future scenarios. The report col-
lates the work of its participants: each thematic group produced its own section of the re-
port. Therefore, the views expressed in the report are those of the authors and experts 
and they do not necessarily represent the views of the Finnish government. We leave the 
task of drawing conclusions partly to the reader, and we offer the report to civil servants 
for their use, to researchers for further study, and to anyone interested in Russia.
Terhi Ylitalo
Project coordinator
Ministry of Defence
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7Executive summaries
Russia’s foreign policy
Russia is seeking an international system where great powers have a strong and recognised 
position. Russia is trying to alter the current rules-based international order to suit its in-
terests. These developments are worrying for small countries like Finland that rely on in-
ternational cooperation.
For Russia, international politics is a zero-sum game of power. Russia’s strategy entails 
weakening its adversaries, because a fragmented Western community where the EU and 
NATO are weak will help Russia achieve its goals. From Russia’s perspective, this policy has 
produced concrete results, and Russia has succeeded in increasing its influence.
Russia’s policy towards Finland reflects the broader goals in its foreign and military pol-
icy. There is an asymmetry in the relative strengths of Finland and Russia, as well as a fun-
damental conflict between their security policy interests. It is important to Finland that 
European states retain the right to independently make their own choices related to their 
security.
Finland has navigated the increasingly challenging operating environment by cooper-
ating more closely with its partners and by maintaining a dialogue with Russia. However, 
Finland’s increasing involvement in Western defence arrangements may lead to increased 
criticism and pressure from Russia. Russia is seeking to influence Finnish public debate and 
decision-making in many ways. It is important that Finland also prepares effectively for 
hybrid operations intended to influence society and other wide-ranging security threats.
Russia’s military defence and the resources of the  
defence industry 
The aim of Russia’s military policy is to prevent and resolve conflicts, and to promote the 
political and economic interests of the state. Strategic nuclear weaponry is the key ele-
ment of Russia’s military defence, but alongside it, Russia is developing long-range, preci-
sion-guided, conventional weaponry. The reforms carried out during the past decade have 
reshaped the army, navy and air force – as well as the command and logistics system that 
supports them – into a high-readiness military force in terms of quality and quantity, as ev-
idenced by Russia’s military campaigns in the past few years.
Russia will be able to ensure adequate funding for development programmes for its 
armed forces even if economic growth falls short of expectations. Russia’s state armament 
programme to 2020 has developed the material performance of the armed forces, and 
operational funding has been sufficient for an increase in the number of military exercis-
es. Funding for the next state armaments programme, to 2027, will remain at the current 
level. The funding of Russia’s military defence is flexible; rapid increases or decreases in 
spending are also possible in the next few years.
8Russia’s armed forces will likely achieve the stated goal of having modern armaments 
accounting for 70% of all their armaments by 2020. Not all of the items in the armament 
programme are new. The lifespan of previously acquired materiel has been prolonged, and 
will also be further extended through modernisation in the new armament programme. 
The operations of Russia’s defence industry are hindered by Western sanctions, but also 
by the country’s obsolete structures and corruption. Despite the wishes of the govern-
ment, innovations in the defence industry have not led to significant breakthroughs in ci-
vilian production.
The ability to project military power plays an important role in supporting the external 
and internal stability of the Russian state. Due to the success of reforms in the military and 
military successes, the prestige of the armed forces in the country has strengthened sig-
nificantly. Russia’s stronger military capabilities and repeated use of force in securing and 
pursuing its interests considerably affect the security environment and continue to be a 
significant factor in Finland’s security assessments.
Russia’s internal development 
Legal protection has improved in Russia in terms of legislation, but the lack of a judicial 
system that is truly independent from political interference erodes the people’s trust in 
it. The “power ministries” are well-resourced, but not uniform. The duties of various pub-
lic authorities partly overlap, and corruption is deeply rooted in the system. The power of 
Russia’s president is particularly visible in appointments in the upper echelons of the coun-
try’s internal security system, as well as in its management. President Putin’s current term 
of office will end in 2024, but internal processes relating to the change of power are likely 
to begin before that.
In Russia, the state has been attempting to unite the people under the banner of patrio-
tism as a counterbalance to Western values. However, this has not resulted in any significant 
increase in unity among the people, as their trust in institutions (and in other people) has re-
mained weak. Furthermore, the Russian people now seem to be more prepared to engage in 
public protest than they were a few years ago. The Internet and social media are challenging 
the state’s monopoly over communications. In terms of the economy, no sudden crises are 
foreseen. However, increased discontent and unpopular policies – such as pension reform – 
may put the social contract created by the current government in the 2000s to the test in the 
coming years.
The Russian population is ageing and there is a shortage of people of working age, which 
is sustaining immigration, primarily from Central Asian countries. At the same time, the lack of 
economic reforms is prolonging a situation in which few new, more productive jobs are being 
created. Economic growth in Russia will remain slow, and the country will not become a serious 
economic competitor to the European Union, the United States or China.
From Finland’s point of view, no significant changes are expected in Russia’s domestic poli-
cy. The volume of trade between Finland and Russia is a relatively small part of the overall Finn-
9ish economy. Finland is engaged in effective collaboration with Russian authorities in matters 
such as border security and the Baltic Sea region. However, this collaboration and other types 
of cross-boundary interaction are hindered by the corruption that is prevalent in all areas. It is 
also obvious that Russia’s geopolitical calculations and issues regarding the degree of its long-
term commitment affect the relations between our countries and trust between our institu-
tions. Any major economic or political shocks or natural disasters affecting Russia could also 
impact Finland, both indirectly and directly.
Russia’s futures: drivers for change
This chapter reviews the impacts of possible future scenarios for Russia’s own security and 
the security of its neighbours. The period under review begins in the near future and con-
tinues to the 2040s. The current era of broad changes in the international environment 
challenges us to analyse the future more extensively than merely by describing one possi-
ble course of events, and to discuss our own possibilities to operate on that basis.
Faced with the complex problems of operating environments that are transforming, 
Russia is seeking answers in a strong state, understanding its own starting points, military 
power, and collaboration with the world’s major centres of power (“great powers”). It is 
noteworthy that the potential for environmental disaster and the need to prevent it re-
ceive less attention in the public debate in Russia. Climate change is largely seen as a fac-
tor driving the transformation of the energy market.
The review created four differing development outlooks. None of them individually 
presents a comprehensive view of Russia’s development opportunities; taken together, 
however, they provide a stronger framework for review. These visions of the future differ 
in terms of the level of power and operational capability of the Russian state.
The first, and currently the most likely, development scenario is covered in the passag-
es of this report describing internal, external and military developments. Russia’s current 
situation matches the general outlook for change of an industrialised, highly modernised 
and urbanising society. The ageing population, rapid development of technology and the 
changing state of the environment mean that the economy and social structures must 
adapt to changes. The steep inequality in the country and the fact that ordinary citizens are 
unable to have political influence engender and maintain social tensions, as does a lack of 
trust in the government and its ability to promote economic and social development with-
in the country. Russia is no longer a rapidly growing economy, and its general international 
standing is likely to gradually weaken. No obstacles are predicted to the key shared interest 
between Finland and Russia – collaboration on energy issues – even though developments 
in the energy transformation will, of course, affect this in the long run.
There are also less- and more-favourable development outlooks, which are both 
viewed as possible futures: Development could be weaker than what is currently expected 
as a result of the cumulative effects of multiple negative trends or a single bigger shock, 
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such as widespread environmental collapse. More favourable developments, on the oth-
er hand, could only occur if several favourable trends combine, such as high demand for 
hydrocarbon-based fuels being maintained, but without any major shocks. In this more fa-
vourable development outlook, Finland would need to adapt to Russia’s increased influ-
ence and more active operations outside its borders.
A course of development that sees Russia possibly fragmenting, or even disintegrating, 
is viewed as the least likely outcome: It would require the combined effect of a number of 
negative trends and shocks. However, there are factors in the current course of develop-
ment in the country that could promote such a fragmentation. Strong fluctuations of in-
come in an economy that is dependent on energy trading are an everyday problem. A col-
lapse in oil prices could lead to a prolonged economic crisis, resulting in the government 
(and companies that depend on the state) being unable to continue to pay competitive 
salaries and meet their pension obligations. Fluctuations in income could result in repeat-
ed waves of discontent, destabilising society. The trend of urbanisation is fragmenting the 
state. The power of Russia’s few large cities is increasing at the expense of rural areas and 
smaller “monotowns” that rely on a single industrial employer. The country’s regions con-
tinue to become increasingly divided from each other, which creates possibilities for them 
to strengthen their power relative to that of central government. The brain drain of skilled 
workers to other countries is continuing for the time being, increasing the risk that there 
will not be sufficient skilled workers to support the state in its current form. Such a frag-
mentation would significantly increase security risks for areas bordering Russia, and would 
be likely to result in extensive pressure for change and demands on the resources of Fin-
land’s defence and its concept of comprehensive security.
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1.  Introduction
Russia is seeking the status of an internationally recognised great power. Sergey Lavrov, 
the Foreign Minister of Russia, describes the foreign policy ambition of Russia as follows: 
“Speaking about Russia’s role in the world as a great power, Russian philosopher Ivan Il-
yin said that ‘the greatness of a country is not determined by the size of its territory or the 
number of its inhabitants, but by the capacity of its people and its government to take on 
the burden of great world problems and to deal with these problems in a creative manner. 
A great power is the one which, asserting its existence and its interest ... introduces a cre-
ative and meaningful legal idea to the entire assembly of the nations, the entire “concert” 
of the peoples and states.’ It is difficult to disagree with these words.”1
In January 2014, the political elite of Russia received a New Year’s present from Presi-
dent Putin: the complete works of the well-known Russian philosophers Ivan Ilyin, Nikolai 
Berdyaev and Vladimir Solovyov. Later in the spring, high-ranking civil servants and officials 
of the ruling United Russia party were ordered to take a course in philosophy in order to 
learn the basics of conservative thinking. Putin had already made reference to the thinking 
of Ilyin a few years earlier, and now the political elite was to understand the deeper mean-
ing of the President’s words.
The interpretations of turning points in Russian history or the meaning of the key 
events that have been presented in the President’s speeches give some indication of the 
direction of and basis for Russia’s foreign policy.2 However, this is not a uniform doctrine, 
but rather a selection of ideas that best serve to justify the chosen policies. The Russian 
philosopher Ivan Ilyin (1883–1954) quoted above has gained a prominent position. Putin 
has often borrowed from Ilyin’s doctrines the idea that Russia is an organic entity of its 
own that the West is seeking to subdue and destabilise.3 This thinking forms the frame-
work that is used to justify the choices that Russia makes. The renaissance of conserva-
tive thinking in Russia is, however, only one of a number of factors affecting strategic deci-
sion-making, albeit a major one.
This part of the report, on the foreign policy of Russia, is divided into three parts: The 
first part provides an overall view of foreign policy thinking, as well as the starting points 
and objectives of strategic decision-making in Russia. The second part discusses the prac-
tical ways in which the country is seeking to implement its foreign policy objectives and 
analyses its portfolio of methods. The third part deliberates over the significance of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy objectives and methods from Finland’s perspective.
1 Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: Sergey Lavrov’s article “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical 
Background” for “Russia in Global Affairs” magazine, March 3, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/
asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2124391, accessed 11 February.
2 Eltchaninoff, Michel: Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin, Hurst, London, 2018, 1–2.
3 Ibid. 10, 49–55.
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2.  Premises and objectives of foreign policy
2.1  Strategic decision-making
In Russia, foreign policy decision-making takes place under the auspices of the president, 
and it can occur very quickly when necessary. This concentration of political power in the 
hands of the president leaves room for improvisation and for influence from informal net-
works. To the outside observer, it can appear that strategic decision-making in Russia is 
unpredictable.4 However, this does not mean that Russia is merely reacting to external 
events. As in other countries, strategic decision-making in Russia is influenced by historical 
experience, geographic location and the personalities of the decision-makers, as well as 
tensions between power ministries and security organs.5
The legislative framework of Russia’s strategic decision-making is defined in the coun-
try’s constitution, as well as in the key statutes governing foreign and military policies. Leg-
islation associated with information security and cyber security, in particular, has been re-
formed in the past few years. Although Russia in principle considers international law to be 
an important instrument, it feels entitled to interpret it in line with its strategic interests in 
a similar vein than is often done domestically. For example, when the occupation and ille-
gal annexation of Crimea was already in progress, President Putin quickly received authori-
sation from the State Duma for the use of force in Ukraine.6
The strategic documents essential for foreign policy, such as the Military Doctrine, the 
National Security Strategy, the Foreign Policy Concept and the Concept of Long-Term So-
cio-Economic Development, are another area where the content changes only slowly. The 
purpose of these documents is to communicate Russia’s goals to the outside world, to guide 
the activities of the security authorities and to create a uniform picture of the situation for 
the political elite. All the key documents have been revised since 2014. The timing is an indi-
cation of the importance of the conflict in Ukraine in the background of Russian foreign and 
military policy.7 The annual Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly is of similar impor-
tance to the strategic documents. In these policy speeches, President Putin has set out the 
justification for new approaches and has further specified existing policy guidelines.
4 Monaghan, Andrew: Defibrillating the Vertikal? Putin and Russian Grand Strategy, Chatham House, 2014, 18–20; 
Martikainen, Toivo – Pynnöniemi, Katri – Saari, Sinikukka – Working group of the Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs: Venäjän muuttuva rooli Suomen lähialueilla (Russia’s changing role in Finland’s neighbourhood), Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2016, 19.
5 Johnston, Alastair Ian: Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security, Vol 19, No 4, 1995, 34.
6 Pursiainen, Christer – Forsberg, Tuomas: The Principle of Territorial Integrity in Russian International Law Doctrine. 
The Case of Crimea, 2019, 222–223. In Morris, Sean (ed.): Russian Discourses on International Law. Sociological 
and Philosophical Phenomenon, Routledge, 2019. On Russia’s selective enforcement of law against domestic power 
networks, see, Ledeneva, Alena: Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, 14-15.
7 Pynnöniemi, Katri: Russia’s National Security Strategy: Analysis of Conceptual Evolution, The Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, Vol 31, No 2, 2018a, 241.
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However, the picture that the official public documents paint of the bases for and ob-
jectives of Russian foreign policy is not complete. The decisions are made by a small circle 
of people, and it is difficult for outsiders to obtain any reliable information about the mo-
tives of the different actors. By managing the competition between security authorities, 
President Putin has succeeded in maintaining a strong grip on power.8
The role of the economy
Alongside the political system, the structure of the economy is another important factor 
that affects Russia’s foreign policy. Much of the Russian economy is controlled by the state, 
and no change towards a more market-driven system is on the horizon.9
Resources that are deemed strategic – such as energy infrastructure and major compa-
nies in the energy sector – are controlled by the political elite, allowing them to be used as 
tools to assist in achieving foreign policy goals. In practice, Russia has succeeded in using 
its energy resources to influence the internal politics of its neighbours.10 Changes in energy 
prices on world markets directly impact Russia’s financial resources, because the revenue 
obtained from oil and gas taxation represents roughly half of the total revenues of the fed-
eral budget.11 Russia has been preparing for potentially more meagre times, economically 
speaking, by accumulating large reserves of foreign currencies and by keeping the amount 
of its total external debt very small.
Russia has a modest position in the world economy. The IMF estimates that in 2017, 
the Russian economy was the 18th largest in the world and Russia’s share of global GDP 
was approximately 2 per cent. Russia’s economy is roughly the same size as South Korea’s, 
and less than one-tenth of that of the US. Measured by GDP at purchasing power parity 
per capita, Russia is at roughly the same level as Greece and Latvia.12
Although the Russian state-driven model is not the most efficient in the economic 
sense, it is seen from the Russian perspective to constitute a competitive edge compared 
to Western countries. The controlling position of the state is seen to compensate for Rus-
sia’s weaker economic performance compared to its competitors, and to be necessary to 
strengthen the country’s status as a great power.13
8 A chronological description of competition among the elite in Russia is presented in Peter Reddaway’s book Russia’s 
Domestic Security Wars. Putin’s Use of Divide and Rule Against His Hardline Allies (Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).
9 Wood, Andrew: Putin and Russia in 2018–24: What Next?, Chatham House, 2018, 8.
10 Wigell, Mikael – Vihma, Antto: Geopolitics versus geoeconomics: the case of Russia’s geostrategy and its effects 
on the EU, International Affairs 92 (3), 2016, 615–617; Sipilä, Olli – Lyyra, Satu – Semkin, Nikita – Patronen, Jenni – 
Kaura, Eeva – Sipilä, Esa – Kopra, Jukka – Tynkkynen, Veli-Pekka – Pynnöniemi, Katri – Höysniemi, Sakari: Energia, 
huoltovarmuus ja geopoliittiset siirtymät (Energy, security of supply and geopolitical drifts), Prime Minister’s Office, 
2017, 107.
11 Simola, Heli – Solanko, Laura: Katsaus Venäjän Öljy- ja Kaasusektoriin (Overview of Russia’s oil and gas sector), Bank 
of Finland, BOFIT, 2017, 31.
12 IMF: IMF DataMapper. World Economic Outlook (October 2018). Gross Domestic Product (GDP), https://www.imf.
org/external/datamapper/datasets/WEO/1, accessed 11 February 2019.
13 The basis of this model of thinking is comprehensively discussed e.g. in the book by V.I. Yakunin, V.E: Bagdasaryan 
and S.S Sulakshin: Economic Policy Ideology (Governance and Problem Analysis Centre, 2009).
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2.2  The transformation of global politics from the Russian perspective
Strategic interests
In its strategic documents concerning foreign policy, Russia’s objectives are defined using 
the concepts of “national security” and the “national interest”. National security, by defi-
nition, means the protection of individuals, society and the state against external and in-
ternal threats. “National security” is defined as a situation in which citizens’ constitutional 
rights and obligations can be ensured, along with a sufficient living standard. The foun-
dation of national security rests on three main pillars: the sovereignty of the state, safe-
guarding independence, and administrative and regional unity. Russia extensively utilises 
a variety of methods, both direct and indirect, to strengthen these three pillars. National 
security includes military policy, the security of society and information security, as well as 
the security of the environment, transport and energy.14
Therefore, “national security” means the basic factors that underlie the existence 
of the state, but it also refers to sector-specific phenomena and factors that weaken or 
strengthen the overall security of society. “National interests” means expectations and 
objectives regarding Russia’s position in the international community. In the National Se-
curity Strategy approved in 2015, the national interests were defined as increasing the 
state’s defensive capabilities and preserving the constitutional order, the sovereignty and 
independence of the state, as well as preserving the unity of the state and its regions. Re-
garding the status of Russia in world politics, the objective is to “consolidate its status as a 
leading world power”.15
Threats
The conflict in Ukraine (now in its fifth year) and increasing tensions between great pow-
ers are also reflected in the rhetoric from the Russian leadership. In his speech to the Fed-
eral Assembly of Russia in March 2018, President Putin underlined that Russia’s influence 
in world politics is primarily based on its military power, with nuclear weapons being its 
main manifestation:
“Russia’s growing military power is a solid guarantee of global peace as this power pre-
serves – and will continue to preserve – strategic parity and the balance of forces in the 
world, which, as is known, have been and remain a key factor of international security af-
ter World War II and up to the present day.”16
14	 Pynnöniemi	2018a,	246;	Кремль:	Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, 2015, 6, 
http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40391, accessed 11 February 2019.
15	 Кремль	2015,	30.
16	 Кремль:	Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию, 1 March 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/56957, accessed 11 February 2019.
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According to Russia, world politics is in a state of transition. The global struggle for nat-
ural resources and control over transport routes is intensifying.17 The situation is specifically 
viewed from the perspective of a struggle between countries, where Russia has concerns re-
garding defence of its vast territory and is afraid of losing its status as a great power. Russia’s 
Foreign Policy Concepts that were published in 2013 and 2016 describe the world as having 
entered a period of “civilizational” competition.18 According to Russia, in addition to the ex-
isting crisis hotspots in Africa, the Middle East and the Korean peninsula, areas with no gov-
ernment in control are emerging. This increases the probability of terrorism, antagonism be-
tween adherents to different religions, and ethnic conflicts in the world.19
According to Russia, Western governments are to blame for the increasing tensions 
between great powers. In the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy approved 
in 2015, the US and the European Union are described as being guilty of creating chron-
ic instability in Europe and in the immediate vicinity of Russian borders. It further states 
that moving NATO military infrastructure closer to Russian borders constitutes a threat to 
Russia’s national security. On the other hand, the strategy claims that increasing flows of 
immigrants have “demonstrated ‘the non-viability of the regional security system in the 
Euro-Atlantic Region based on NATO and the European Union’”. 20 Russia estimates that al-
though the probability of a major war (including war waged using nuclear weapons) con-
tinues to be small, the risk of regional conflicts – and of them escalating – is growing.21
One major change in the strategies defined after 2014 concerns the concept of threat. 
The National Security Strategy of 2009 defined threats to national security as follows: “the 
direct or indirect possibility of damage to constitutional rights and freedoms, decent quali-
ty of life and living standards of citizens, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the stable de-
velopment of the Russian Federation, defence and the security of the state.”22 In the strate-
gic documents produced after 2014, the concept of threat is defined as a set of conditions 
and factors that constitute a direct or indirect potential to harm Russia’s national interests. 
Thus, the concept of “threat” is specifically linked to the national interests defined above.23
Furthermore, the National Security Strategy names radical movements, foreign NGOs, 
financial operators and even individuals as actors trying to destroy the unity and territo-
17	 Кремль	2015,	13.
18	 МИД	России:	Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, 2016, 5, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_
policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248,	accessed	11	February	2019;	МИД	
России:	Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, 2013, 13, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/
official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186, accessed 11 February 2019.
19	 Кремль 2015, 18.
20 Pynnöniemi, Katri: The National Security of Russia, 2018b, 45–46. In Raik Kristi – Mika Aaltola – Jyrki Kallio – Katri 
Pynnöniemi The Security Strategies of the US, China, Russia and the EU. Living in Different Worlds, FIIA Report 56, 
https://www.fiia.fi/julkaisu/the-security-strategies-of-the-us-china-russia-and-the-eu, 2018.
21	 Кремль:	Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, 2014, 10; 11, http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/
files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf, accessed 11 February 2019.
22	 Кремль:	Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года, 2009, 6, http://kremlin.
ru/supplement/424, accessed 11 February 2019.
23	 Pynnöniemi	2018a,	244;	Кремль	2015,	6.
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rial integrity of Russia, to destabilise its domestic political and social situation, to incite a 
“colour revolution”, and to harm the religious and moral values of Russia.24 The threat of 
externally controlled revolution is repeated in a number of strategic documents. In the 
Military Doctrine revised in 2014, this threat is included in the definition of military risks. 
Accordingly, it is a case of an activity aimed at violently altering the constitutional order of 
the Russian Federation, destabilising the country’s domestic political and social situation, 
and disrupting the function of the state’s administrative bodies, important governmental 
or military facilities, and the information infrastructure of the Russian Federation.25
The governing elites of Russia have taken steps to stave off these threats. The powers 
of the security organs have been increased, and social media channels are now more tight-
ly controlled. Criticism of governmental authorities is often defined as a security threat. 
The Russian ruling elites believe themselves to be irreplaceable in terms of guaranteeing 
the security and survival of the country.26 State policies, both internal and external, are of-
ten justified through a narrative that simplifies and magnifies threats, portraying Russia as 
a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile forces aiming to destroy the country.
The concept of sphere of influence in Russian foreign policy
Russia defines its security in a way that decreases security for other countries. Russia does 
not merely want to defend its own borders; it also wants to be able to defend the borders 
of its “sphere of influence”. This is evidenced e.g. by Russia’s Military Doctrine, according 
to which Russia opposes the military presence of other countries even at the borders of 
Russia’s allies.27 Therefore, Russia has a constant need to project military power to areas 
where it believes that it has “privileged interests”.28 This term means that other countries 
should take into account the defensive, economic and political interests of Russia in their 
political decisions.
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation states that Russia reserves the 
right to pre-empt the emergence of conflicts in the territories of its neighbouring coun-
tries.29 This notion provides the legitimising framework for Russia’s actions during the wars 
in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2014). Russia justified its military actions in these 
conflicts by referring to the need to defend Russians in accordance with the political com-
24	 Кремль	2015,	43.
25	 Кремль	2014,	13(а).
26 This thinking is reflected in the statement made by Vyacheslav Volodin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Administration, at a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2014, in which he said that there is no Russia if 
there is no Putin. See, for example, the Moscow Times: ‘No Putin, No Russia,’ Says Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff, 23 
October 2014, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/no-putin-no-russia-says-kremlin-deputy-chief-of-staff-40702, 
accessed 11 February 2019.
27	 Кремль	2014,	12(в).
28	 Кремль:	Интервью Дмитрия Медведева российским телеканалам, 31 August 2008, http://kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/1276, accessed 11 February 2019.
29	 МИД	России	2016,	3(е).
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mitment of the Responsibility to Protect, adopted by member states of the UN.30 Russia’s 
attitude towards Responsibility to Protect is conflictual, however, and in the Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2013, Russia still opposed its use as justification for interventions and consid-
ered it to be an action violating state sovereignty.31 However, Russia itself has intervened 
when it has suited its foreign policy interests.32 In the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, the 
wording has become tougher. Instead of opposing interventions based on the Responsibil-
ity to Protect, Russia seeks to prevent them.33 It is noteworthy that in the section discuss-
ing the prevention of conflicts, the Foreign Policy Concept does not differentiate between 
former Soviet states and other countries neighbouring Russia, such as Finland.
In Russia’s view, its sphere of influence covers the area of the former Soviet Union, 
apart from the Baltic States. It pays particular attention to areas that are linguistically or 
culturally Russian, or that are otherwise historically particularly close to Russia. Russia’s 
political lexicon already has several established terms describing the special – and in part 
subordinate – position of the regions around Russia: near abroad	(ближнее	зарубежье),	
neighbouring states	(сопредельное	государство)	and	Russian world	(русский	мир)	as	a	
general term for the Russian cultural sphere. In addition to strengthening its own position, 
Russia wants to eliminate competing political alternatives in its neighbouring regions. Rus-
sia is seeking to decrease the economic and political influence of Western countries, but 
has so far not expressed similar concerns about the increasing influence of China and Tur-
key, for example.
Russia’s most important goal regarding its neighbouring states is to prevent NATO’s en-
largement, and it is prepared to take pre-emptive action to prevent unwelcome develop-
ments. Russia has also succinctly communicated to the West, in its words and deeds, that 
this is a red line that Russia will not permit to be crossed. Outside its “sphere of influence”, 
Russia seeks to maintain a variety of safety zones and buffers against NATO. From this per-
spective, it is in Russia’s interests for the West to be as fragmented as possible, and for the 
EU and NATO to have poor decision-making capabilities.
30 Ziegler, Charles E: Russia on the rebound: Using and misusing the Responsibility to Protect, International Relations Vol 
30. (3), 2016, 354–355.
31	 МИД	России	2013,	31(б).
32 Ziegler 2016, 351.
33	 МИД	России	2016,	26(в).
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2.3  Russia’s main objectives in international relations
Global governance and the United Nations
Although Russia’s goal is a state-driven world order based on military power, its at-
titude towards international order and international law is not completely negative. 
Russia is prepared to support a system of cooperation based on sovereignty in which 
great powers have a strong and recognised status, particularly in questions related to 
security.
For Russia, international organisations are tools it can use in pursuing its own interests. 
Russia considers the country’s right of self-determination to be a foundation of all interna-
tional action, and in international discussion forums, it therefore emphasises inter-govern-
mental relations. Russia sees international organisations in the framework of a multipolar 
world order where Russia functions as a great power. Great powers like the US, China and 
Russia are at the heart of this multipolar world order.
Russia is seeking to influence the basic principles and methods of operation of the in-
ternational system; it supports the principle of non-intervention and opposes liberal val-
ues. Russia interprets international law from its own perspective and rejects an interpre-
tation of human rights that emphasises the rights and liberties of the individual, which it 
considers a cultural concept specific only to the West. Russia has a negative attitude to-
wards concepts that limit countries’ right to self-determination. In addition to humanitari-
an intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, Russia has also often opposed initiatives 
to strengthen civil society, monitor elections and establish various international investiga-
tive commissions.
However, at the same time, Russia sees the post-Soviet space as an exception; there, 
Russia has the right and obligation to defend Russian “compatriots” and its own interests. 
Although the EU and NATO membership separates the Baltic States from other former So-
viet states, Russia’s policy regarding compatriots also applies to them. Russia’s key themes 
in international forums include the position of ethnic Russians, the Russian language and, 
in general, of Russian cultural heritage. Another important international theme for Russia 
is the narrative concerning anti-fascism. It has been used to legitimise the use of military 
force in Ukraine and is part of a greater historical narrative promoted in Russia, based on 
its victory in the Second World War.34
Its permanent seat on the UN Security Council is the basis of Russia’s activities in the 
UN. The principles and composition of the Security Council conform to Russia’s outlook: 
great powers come together to deliberate issues of war and peace and are able to veto any 
undesirable resolutions. Although Russia emphasises the importance of a multipolar world 
order, the country is strictly opposed to reforms of the UN – and particularly the Security 
34 Zhurzenko, Tatiana: Russia’s never-ending war against “fascism” Memory politics in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, 
8 May 2015, Eurozine, https://www.eurozine.com/russias-never-ending-war-against-fascism/, accessed 11 February 
2019.
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Council – as it is afraid of losing its current strong status. Russia is particularly active in the 
UN in issues related to the use of military power, such as in issues relating to its neighbour-
ing areas, terrorism, nuclear weapons and the militarisation of space.
In the past few years, Russia has also actively supported attempts to define the inter-
national norms for cyber activity on the basis of state sovereignty. Its goal is to have the 
UN General Assembly issue a resolution, and Russia has already received preliminary sup-
port for it from the BRICS nations, as well as from the member countries of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia has also 
been seeking bilateral treaties with a number of countries, but Western countries in partic-
ular have been mistrustful of Russia’s aims, suspecting that these proposals represent an 
attempt by an authoritarian state to legitimise censorship and strict monitoring of citizens 
as part of international norms.35
Russia is actively using its veto on the Security Council. Furthermore, Russia sees the 
role of major organisations (such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope, the Council of Europe and various UN organisations) as purely technical and does not 
want them to have any independent influence. Russia’s diplomats are well versed in man-
dates, charters and rules, and typically insist that they must be interpreted literally. The 
siloing in international organisations also suits Russia: weak and ineffective secretariats 
are unable to dictate resolutions to national governments, who still hold the keys when it 
comes to resolutions.
Nowadays, Russia’s actions are also coloured by conservative values. They are used as a 
basis for opposing any emphasis on reproductive health in UN activities, for example. How-
ever, there is positive cooperation in the UN context in some issues, such as environmental 
and health policy as well as agricultural policy. Russia has also helped to keep international 
regulations regarding climate change a topical issue at the UN.36
Russia is effective in its international activities: it actively seeks allies in different groups 
of countries on an ad hoc basis and nominates candidates for positions that are important 
for its priorities. Russia wants representation in all decision-making bodies that control or 
advise these organisations.
Although Russia does not have any permanent allies, the state-driven system is often 
promoted together with Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and China. Certain CIS countries also often 
agree with Russia’s views in the UN, for example. When the parties’ interests coincide, Rus-
sia is also supported by the BRICS and G77 countries, the Vatican, and other strictly con-
servative societies.
35 Chernenko, Elena: Russia’s cyber diplomacy, 2018, 44–49. In Popescu, Nicu – Secrieru, Stanislav (eds.): Hacks, leaks 
and disruptions. Russian cyber strategies, EUISS, 2018.
36 It is easy for Russia to support the current obligations for reducing emissions, because the goals set for it were 
calculated from the high level of emissions in the Soviet Union in 1990. Therefore, in practice, reaching these goals 
does not require Russia to take any action.
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Russia often enshrouds its great power ambitions in legal justifications and seeks prec-
edents for its power politics in international organisations and treaties. Russia wants to 
uphold the system of international law, but it sees global governance as one of the ma-
ny arenas of international political struggle.37 For example, Russia has used the UN Char-
ter as justification for the occupation of Crimea and its illegal annexation. However, Russia 
strictly condemned the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 and its recognition 
by other countries, but nevertheless used Kosovo as a comparison for the annexation of 
Crimea to Russia.38
Relations with the United States
The US and Russia have a long history of tension and disputes. The year 2014 can be con-
sidered a watershed moment, when the war in Ukraine resulted in the imposition of sanc-
tions on Russia. In this new situation, Russia is trying to challenge the US more extensively 
and globally.39
Russia considers the current rules-based world order to be a unipolar system based on 
US supremacy, where Russia has become the subject of a policy of containment pursued 
by the US and its allies.40 Russia is opposed to the enlargement of NATO,41 which it consid-
ers an attempt by the US to encroach into the area Russia considers its sphere of influence, 
or too close to it. Russia considers the expansion of Western organisations as even posing 
a threat to Russian civilisation.42
Russia is seeking an international status comparable to that of the US. According to 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, the US and Russia share special responsibility for main-
taining global strategic stability and international security, and cooperation between them 
can only succeed from a position of equality.43 In turn, the US defined Russia as a strategic 
competitor in its National Security Strategy of 2017.44
Russia is particularly seeking to gain influence at the expense of the US. Since Russia is 
unable to challenge the US using conventional methods, it seeks to weaken the US in oth-
er ways, including by exacerbating internal divisions, dismantling its network of allies, and 
taking advantage of international power vacuums.45
37 Pursiainen, Christer - Forsberg, Tuomas 2019, 240–241.
38	 Кремль:	Обращение Президента	Российской	Федерации,	18	March	2014,	http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/20603, accessed 11 February 2019.
39 Stronski, Paul – Sokolsky Richard: The Return of Global Russia. An Analytic Framework, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2017, 10.
40	 МИД	России	2016,	61.
41 Ibid. 70.
42 Tsygankov, Andrei P: The Sources of Russia’s Fear of Nato, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 51, Issue 
2, 2018, 108.
43	 МИД	России	2016,	72.
44 The White House: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017, 2.
45 Stronski – Sokolsky 2017, 2–5.
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The mistrust between the two countries has further intensified in the past few years. 
Surveys indicate that the idea of Russia as an enemy nation started increasing among US 
citizens after 2012.46 Russian people also see a correlation between the poor relations be-
tween the two countries and great power politics: According to surveys carried out by Le-
vada-Center, relations between the countries reached record lows during both the Rus-
so-Georgian War and the war in Ukraine.47 A thaw in the relations is unlikely, particularly as 
the Russian government systematically frames actions aimed at restoring its great power 
status as defensive reactions against US activities.
Russian–US relations are also likely to remain poor because the two states in many cas-
es have interests that are almost diametrically opposed, with little interdependence. In the 
absence of strong economic interdependence, the US has no particular reason to relax its 
policy of sanctions. China is the most significant force driving change, and both countries 
need to prepare for its ascending status.
Strategic partnership with China
Russia and China share the same key interest of replacing the current international system 
based on liberal norms with one that respects the interests of great powers. Even their 
first joint proposal for a UN resolution in 1997 included views defending multipolarity and 
state sovereignty.48 Russia and China support each other’s aims at the UN and in interna-
tional organisations, where they share the key objective of being able to decide on the new 
norms of global governance.49 In the current situation, they are both defending their poli-
cies more aggressively than in the past.
The conservative turn during Putin’s third term in office, Xi Jinping becoming the leader 
of China in 2012, and the imposition of Western sanctions have paved the way for closer 
cooperation between Russia and China. This cooperation has become significantly closer, 
extending to new areas and beginning to resemble genuine strategic cooperation.50 The 
authoritarian models of their governments increase the similarity of Russian and Chinese 
interests in international politics. However, there is no deep alliance between the coun-
tries, and none is on the horizon.
46 Gallup: North Korea Surges to Top of U.S. Enemies List, 19 February 2018, https://news.gallup.com/poll/227813/
north-korea-surges-top-enemies-list.aspx, accessed 11 February 2019.
47	 Левада-Центр:	Отношение к странам. Отношение к США, http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-
stranam/, accessed 11 February 2019.
48 United Nations: Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New 
International Order, adopted in Moscow on 23 April 1997, A/52/153 - S/1997/384, http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-153.htm, accessed 11 February 2019.
49 Stronski, Paul – Ng, Nicole: Cooperation and Competition. Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and 
the Arctic, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018, 32.
50 Røseth, Tom: Moscow’s Response to a Rising China, Problems of Post-Communism, 2018, 4–5; Bolt, Paul J. – Cross 
Sharyl N.: China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics, OUP 2018, 41–45.
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As relations with Western countries have become more tense, Russia has sought to in-
crease economic cooperation with – and particularly tried to obtain financing from – Chi-
na instead of the West. Although relations between the two countries are now politically 
much warmer, expanding their economic cooperation has been difficult. China’s negotiat-
ing position in relation to Russia has strengthened, and China is not willing to compromise 
on its own demands in economic issues.
Relations between Russia and China will continue to develop favourably as long as the 
main international disputes between them concern the policies of Western countries rath-
er than issues where there is a conflict of interest between the two. Their relationship is 
starting to be disturbed, though, by China’s increasingly obvious position of advantage. 
Russia is keeping a close eye on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the opportunities it 
provides. The most interesting detail for Russia is the China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor in 
the Silk Road Economic Belt.
Decisions made by China will be key for further development of the relations between 
the countries. China can afford to compromise because current trends show that it will 
grow stronger in any case. It seems that there is a consensus between Russia and China 
on Central Asia: China is limiting its actions to the economic sphere, leaving Russia to take 
care of maintaining regional security. This arrangement suits both for the time being, as it 
serves their current interests.51
Russia’s objectives in Europe
Russia has the objective of creating a new security architecture in which it would have 
a more prominent role in Europe. Russian leaders and commentators often make refer-
ence to “Helsinki II” (referring to the Helsinki process from the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe in 1975) or to the “new Yalta” (a reference to the Yalta Conference 
towards the end of the Second World War). Over the years, Russia has made several un-
realistic overtures in that direction. They have been quickly rejected by European nations, 
which in turn has upset Russia’s leadership.52 The concrete partial goals include preventing 
the enlargement of the EU and NATO, and weakening their operational capabilities.53 Rus-
51 Kaczmarski, Marcin: Russian–Chinese Relations in Eurasia: Harmonization or Subordination?, FIIA, 2018, 5; Stronski, 
Paul – Ng, Nicole 2018, 16–17.
52	 МИД	России:	Вступительное слово Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова на церемонии 
официального закрытия российско-германского «перекрестного» Года регионально-муниципальных 
партнерств, Берлин, 14 сентября 2018 года, 14 September 2018, http://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/
minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/3344365,	accessed	11	February	2019;	Кремль:	
Меморандум по итогам встречи Президента России Д.Медведева и Федерального канцлера Германии 
А.Меркель 4–5 июня 2010 года, г.Мезеберг, 5 June 2010, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/575, accessed 11 
February	2019;	Кремль:	Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом Франции, Председателем Совета 
Евросоюза Николя Саркози и Председателем Комиссии Европейских сообществ Жозе Мануэлом Баррозу 
по итогам 22-го саммита Россия–ЕС, 14 November 2008, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/2082, 
accessed 11 February 2019.
53	 Кремль	2014,	12(а).
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sia’s long-term goal in Europe has been to prevent the US from implementing its missile 
defence initiative, which Russia views as a military risk factor.54
Russia is seeking to drive a wedge between Europe and the US and undermine Eu-
ropean unity. A weak and discordant Europe would increase Russia’s relative strength. 
In its political rhetoric, Russia often states that it hopes for a united and strategically in-
dependent EU. However, for a country like Russia that emphasises power politics, the 
European Union as a concept is alien to Russia, both structurally and as an internation-
al actor.55 It is far easier and more natural for Russia to pursue its objectives bilaterally, 
particularly with major European countries such as Germany and France. Russia opposes 
the enlargement of the EU to the post-Soviet space and the Eastern Partnership. Russia 
has blamed the Eastern Partnership and EU policy for the change of power in Ukraine 
and for the start of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014.56
The interdependence that exists between Europe and Russia limits their willingness for 
long-term confrontation – unlike the relationship between the US and Russia, where no 
such mutual dependence exists. In need of economic growth, Russia estimates that even 
partial lifting of the sanctions imposed by the EU would improve its situation, while on the 
other hand, the EU needs energy imports from Russia.57 However, both parties have pri-
oritised their security policy objectives, making it difficult to foresee any rapid thaw in re-
lations.58
Economic interdependence does not mean harmonic cooperation. Russia is in partic-
ular utilising the oil and gas trade to sow divisions within the EU’s ranks. It improves the 
chances of isolating some countries by favouring others.59 The EU has initiated a strategy 
to create the Energy union with the objectives of diversifying supply networks, increasing 
the proportion of renewable energy sources, and establishing joint contract negotiations 
and a fully integrated internal market. If these objectives are achieved, the EU’s political 
dependence on Russia will diminish.60
Russia often differentiates its objectives in Europe according to the specific charac-
teristics of the target countries. Countries with weak governmental institutions and close 
cultural or historical affinity with Russia are typical targets for Russia’s efforts to obtain a 
degree of social and political influence. Such countries are particularly found in the Bal-
kans and the surrounding areas. In turn, for countries where governmental institutions 
54	 Кремль	2014,	12(г).
55 Rácz, András – Raik, Kristi: EU-Russia Relations in the New Putin Era Not Much Light at the End of the Tunnel, 
International Centre for Defence and Security, 2018, 3.
56	 МИД	России:	Выступление и ответы на вопросы Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова на 
Германо-Российском форуме, Берлин, 14 сентября 2018 года, 14 September 2018, http://www.mid.ru/ru/
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57 Rácz – Raik, 2018, 10.
58 Ibid. 12–13.
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are strong and cultural characteristics are less similar to Russia, the aim is to magnify their 
internal divisions and to erode public trust in political institutions in order to weaken the 
ability of these countries to challenge Russia’s great power ambitions. Finland falls into this 
latter category, together with the other Nordic countries.61
Russia’s objectives in the “near abroad”
Russia considers the former Soviet states belonging to its sphere of influence, where other 
countries have only limited sovereignty. In Russia’s political rhetoric, its leadership in the 
region is often justified by the great power status that Russia inherited from the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union, as well as by the idea of a Russian-led civilisation based on 
the Russian language, Orthodox Christianity and conservative values.62 Russia’s tools for 
maintaining and strengthening its dominance can be divided into three categories: region-
al integration initiatives, “soft power” initiatives relying on historic and cultural influence 
as well as influence over identity politics, 63 and means of influence based on the threat or 
use of military force.64
In its regional integration initiatives, Russia has established or strongly supported or-
ganisations that allow integrating countries together in line with its own national interests. 
These organisations include the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Eur-
asian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).65
The key themes in the activities of the SCO are regional security cooperation, Muslim 
minority issues and economic matters. In addition to international counter-terrorism train-
ing exercises, the SCO countries have gradually started to hold conventional military exer-
cises; for example, the Peace Mission 2018 exercise took place in the Urals with the partic-
ipation of troops from China, India and Pakistan.
Russia has sought to establish functional and politically acceptable alliances built on 
the basis of CSTO, EAEU and SCO activities (security issues including terrorism and sepa-
ratism as well as economic issues); however, it has had limited success. This is evidenced 
by the fact that none of these allies has officially recognised the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia or the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
61 Galeotti, Mark: Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages Its Political War in Europe, European Council of Foreign 
Relations, 2017a, 6–8.
62 Eltchaninoff 2018, 61-62.
63 The concept of soft power constitutes a counterpart for hard power based on the use of military force. Rather than 
coercion, soft power is based on the attractiveness of the country’s culture, identity and values, which make other 
countries independently adapt their behaviour to the goals of the party wielding power. Ks. Nye, Joseph S. Jr.: Soft 
Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, 5–7.
64 Fischer, Sabine: Russian Policy in the Unresolved Conflicts, 2016, 13-14. In Fischer, Sabine (ed.): Not Frozen! The 
Unresolved Conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Light of the Crisis over 
Ukraine, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2016.
65 The CSTO is discussed in further detail in the section dealing with military matters.
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Russia has significant soft power resources in many former Soviet republics. For exam-
ple, the dominant position of the Russian language, literature, entertainment and media 
in the region comes with the power to determine how issues are framed and the language 
that is used when they are discussed and explained. The multitude of interpersonal con-
nections and shared history add closeness to the relations. For example, the Russian Or-
thodox Church and defence of conservative values in general resonate with many people 
in the region. In addition, many economic linkages (such as energy infrastructure, debt ar-
rangements, investments and cash flows generated by migrant workers) support Russia’s 
influence in former Soviet states.
Unresolved regional conflicts are an effective means for Russia to maintain its position: 
the Russian-supported rebel areas of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in Georgia, as well as Transnistria in Moldova.66 Although the genesis and regions 
of the conflicts are different, the toolbox for managing the conflicts includes the same set 
of instruments, although they are applied in different ways in practice. Russia maintains 
the regions economically, and they are all dependent on Russia’s support and investment. 
Russia has a strong and permanent military presence in the regions, and their de facto 
governments as well as their military staffs typically include people with Russian back-
grounds.67 Russia has also used the issuance of passports to people living in these regions 
as a tool for exerting political influence.68 Managing unresolved conflicts is an efficient way 
to impede and hinder these countries from forming closer ties with the West and to com-
promise their internal stability and success in implementing reforms.
Although the Russian government considers its policy based on the use and threat of 
military force to be an apparently successful one, it also erodes Russia’s soft power. Rus-
sia’s policies have also alienated its traditional partner states, almost all of which would 
like to balance out the position of Russia in one way or the other, e.g. by developing clos-
er ties with other actors, such as the EU, China or Turkey.69 These countries want to keep 
Russia’s integration projects (such as the EAEU) as limited and apolitical as possible. The 
66 The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan are partly 
elements of the same phenomenon, albeit dealt with separately from other separatist cases.
67 Gerrits, Andre, W. M. – Bader, Max: Russian patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: implications for conflict 
resolution, East European Politics, 2016, Vol 32, No 3, 300–306.
68 Grigas, Agnia: How Soft Power Works: Russian Passportization and Compatriot Policies Paved Way for Crimean 
Annexation and War in Donbas, Atlantic Council 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-
soft-power-works-russian-passportization-and-compatriot-policies-paved-way-for-crimean-annexation-and-war-in-
donbas, accessed 11 February 2019; Max Planck Institute: Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume II, 147–148; 171–174, http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_II1.pdf. 
On the subject in general and on Russia’s internal politics in this regard, see Shevel, Oxana: The Politics of Citizenship 
Policy in Post-Soviet Russia, Post-Soviet Affairs 28, No. 1, 2012, 111–147.
69 Popescu, Nicu, Secrieru, Stanislav: Conclusion: The new powers on the (eastern) block, 2018, 111–114. In Popescu, 
Nicu – Secrieru, Stanislav (eds.): Third Powers in Europe’s East, Chaillot Papers, European Union Institute of Security 
Studies, 2018.
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smaller member states of the EAEU that are seeking to safeguard their sovereignty consid-
er Russia to be both a source of opportunities and a potential threat.70
In turn, Russia often assumes that the former Soviet republics are similar to Russia and 
act according to the same operational logic as Russia. However, during a period of almost 
30 years, these countries have transformed into a heterogeneous group of independent 
states.71 It often seems from the Russian perspective that the former Soviet republics are 
disloyal: Russia allocates considerable resources to supporting its allies, only to be disap-
pointed with their actions in the end. In Russia, the events in Ukraine in 2014 are often cit-
ed as an example of this.72 Russia expects more reciprocity from the relationships, and in 
the future, may not be prepared to support these nations as handsomely as before with-
out receiving more tangible political gains.
The Arctic
Russia’s major interests also include issues regarding the Arctic, particularly aspects con-
cerning economic, security and other international cooperation. The growing importance 
of the Arctic is recorded in Russia’s key strategic documents, and the region is seen as a 
strategic stock of resources for the future, as well as a subject of extensive civilian and mil-
itary development.73 Russia has extensive economic resources in the region. One fifth of 
the country’s GDP is generated north of the Arctic Circle. Some 95 per cent of Russia’s nat-
ural gas resources and 75 per cent of its oil resources are in the arctic or subarctic regions.74
During the last decade, Russia has generally been willing to cooperate in arctic politics, 
and particularly in the Arctic Council. Russia would benefit from a stable operating envi-
ronment and international cooperation, which would help it fulfil its economic ambitions 
in the region. Due to the unfavourable situation in global energy markets, Russia’s weak 
economic position and the sanctions imposed by Western countries, the country’s goals 
associated with energy projects and navigation routes in the Arctic Ocean will be difficult 
to achieve, at least in the medium term. However, there have been local success stories in 
the region.75
Russia aims to enhance its control of the Northern Sea Route and the utilisation of 
commercial services provided by Russian companies. However, the country is lacking cap-
70 Moshes, Arkady – Roberts, Sean P: The Eurasian Economic Union: a case of reproductive integration?, Post-Soviet 
Affairs, Vol .32, No. 6, 2016, 554–560.
71 Trenin, Dmitri: Russia and Ukraine: From Brothers to Neighbors, Carnegie Commentary, 21 March 2018, https://
carnegie.ru/commentary/75847, accessed 11 February 2019.
72 Ibid.
73	 Министерство	экономического	развития	Мурманской	области:	Стратегия развития Арктической зоны 
Российской Федерации и обеспечения национальной безопасности на период до 2020 года, 8 September 2014, 
https://minec.gov-murman.ru/upload/iblock/b36/strategy_azrf.pdf, accessed 11 February 2019.
74 Laruelle, Marlene: Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2014, xxi.
75	 Коммерсантъ:	НОВАТЭК сжижает ударными темпами, 23 November 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/3807334, accessed 11 February 2019.
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ital and technology, which is why it has sought to cooperate with China.76 China will likely 
continue to be interested in utilising the resources in the region, such as oil and gas, and is 
prepared to invest in the development of the region.
However, Russia’s and China’s interests in the Arctic do not completely converge, which 
may limit the degree to which they cooperate. Russia’s aim of protecting its sovereignty in 
the Arctic differs from China’s objective of keeping the region as open as possible. Since 
2013, Russia and China have been holding meetings to discuss the situation in the region 
in order to reduce tensions. In January 2018, China published the first white paper regard-
ing its Arctic policy, in which it officially defines itself as a “near-Arctic state”. The white pa-
per also presents China’s aim to connect the Arctic to its new Silk Road Economic Belt by 
establishing the Polar Silk Road.77
Russia is increasingly looking at Arctic issues from the perspective of national security. 
The importance of the Arctic for Russia will not diminish in the near future, and the coun-
try will keep developing its military and natural resources in the region.78
76 Stronski, Paul – Ng, Nicole 2018: 27–29.
77 Stronski, Paul – Ng, Nicole: 2018, 26–30; Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China: 
China’s Arctic Policy, 26.1.2018, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_8002699.htm, accessed 11 
February 2019.
78 Käpylä, Juha – Mikkola, Harri – Martikainen, Toivo: Moscow’s Arctic Dreams Turned Sour? Analysing Russia’s Policies 
in the Arctic. FIIA Briefing Paper 192, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016, 4–8.
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3.  Methods of foreign policy
3.1 Russia’s competitive strategy
Russia is prepared to use military force to defend its own national interests and those of 
its allies, when “political, diplomatic, legal, economic, informational and other non-violent 
instruments, have been exhausted”.79 This reflects Russia’s view of international politics as 
a constant struggle. The concept of struggle often relates to all strategic interaction. Russia 
views its relations with adversaries as a state of perpetual competition and part of political 
activity, where only the degree of intensity of the activity and the methods chosen vary. 
Russia views having influence through foreign policy as a continuum and a competitive 
strategy where it pursues its desired outcomes by testing different methods in stages.80
Russia’s strategic culture seems to have changed very little in this respect. The opera-
tional logic of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy has been described as an “optimizing strate-
gy”. According to this interpretation, decision-makers set new, gradual political goals when 
opportunities arise rather than having one main goal. The intensity of the political action is 
then kept slightly below the threshold where the adversary will react, in order to achieve 
as many gradual goals as possible. The purpose of the optimising strategy is to maximise 
the political gains while preventing the mistake of wasting the opportunity by trying to 
achieve one major victory at excessively high risk.81
Russia is seeking to keep the initiative and to manage conflicts by obtaining and hold-
ing escalation dominance.82 Russia’s strategy is susceptible to risks, as a favourable out-
come for the country depends on the government’s ability to correctly estimate the 
threshold that must not be exceeded if overt escalation of the conflict is to be avoided. 
However, in principle, Russia tries to achieve its goals with minimal use of force and as 
little risk as possible.
79	 Кремль	2014,	5.	See	also	Pynnöniemi,	Katri	–	Mashiri,	James:	Venäjän sotilasdoktriinit vertailussa. Nykyinen versio 
viritettiin kriisiajan taajuudelle (Comparison of Russian Military Doctrines. Current version tuned to the frequency of 
times of crisis), FIIA Report 42, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015.
80 Adamsky, Dmitry: From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture, The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol 41, Nos.1-2, 2018, 35–36; 52–53.
81 George, Alexander L: The “Operational Code” A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-
making, International Studies Quarterly, Vol 13, No 2, 1969, 202–211.
82 Covington, Stephen R: The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, 2016, 11; George 1969, 211.
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The competitive and optimising strategies can be applied to analysing Russia’s hybrid 
influencing. Since the Cold War, countries have become increasingly interdependent, and 
transnational flows and networks have expanded and strengthened. These interdepen-
dencies have created new opportunities for Russia’s strategy and hybrid influencing based 
on it, and have made covert operations more effective and easier to carry out.83
Hybrid influencing
Russia’s hybrid influencing in Western countries can be seen as a systematically applied 
set of various and changing measures; the exact combination of tools and actors varies 
in each case. In many cases, part of the hybrid influencing belongs to the sphere of nor-
mal and completely legal activities between countries. The strategic understanding of the 
security risks caused by international interdependence has increased as the competition 
between actors has intensified. Cross-border energy infrastructure and control over it, for 
example, facilitate the use of energy as a geo-economic tool of foreign policy, and the in-
fluencing efforts by Russia in the information and online spheres relies on transnational IT 
infrastructure.84
Russia takes advantage of international interdependences in terms of economies, en-
ergy relations and technology. Aggressive activities that limit the operational capabili-
ties of the target country or group (or that seek to induce internal conflicts in them) take 
place during peacetime, which makes it more difficult for the target country to react to 
the events.
Networks of political parties and organisations, business life and conventional diploma-
cy constitute important resources for political influencing.85 Russia has the fourth largest 
diplomatic corps in the world: 242 diplomatic missions in 145 countries.86 Russia’s diplo-
matic corps is very professional and well trained. The extent of the resources Russia invests 
in diplomacy demonstrate its great power ambitions: Russia is a global actor with diplo-
mats stationed in practically all corners of the world.87 Russia exerts diplomatic influence 
in close cooperation with intelligence and security services. It is difficult to distinguish be-
tween public diplomacy and information influence activities, partly because of the Soviet 
83 Mikkola, Harri – Aaltola, Mika – Wigell, Mikael – Juntunen, Tapio – Vihma, Antto: Hybridivaikuttaminen ja 
Demokratian resilienssi. Ulkoisen häirinnän mahdollisuudet ja torjuntakyky liberaaleissa demokratioissa (Hybrid 
influencing and democratic resilience. Possibilities for external interference and capabilities for resisting it in liberal 
democracies), Finnish Institute of International Affairs FIIA, 2018, 23–24.
84 Mikkola, Harri – Aaltola, Mika – Wigell, Mikael – Juntunen, Tapio – Vihma, Antto, 8; see also Renz, Bettina – Hanna 
Smith (eds.): After hybrid warfare, what next? Understanding and responding to contemporary Russia, Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2016.
85 This section discusses the tools of open public diplomacy; more covert “technologies of political influencing” where 
intelligence officers play a significant role are discussed in the section on Russia’s influencing in the information and 
online spheres.
86 Lowy Institute: Global Diplomacy Index 2017, https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/, accessed 11 February 
2019. (Only the US, China and France have bigger diplomatic corps).
87 Stronski, Paul – Sokolsky Richard 2017, 26–30.
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legacy. During the Soviet era, public diplomacy as a whole was led by the Communist Par-
ty, and it consisted of propaganda, disinformation, cultural diplomacy and other “political 
technologies”.88 During that period, the main Soviet security agency, the KGB, was respon-
sible for ”active measures” aimed at weakening the operational capability of Western so-
cieties.89
Currently	the	responsibility	for	Russia’s	public	diplomacy	(общественная	дипломатия)	
lies primarily with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Administration. The 
Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Liv-
ing Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (commonly known as Rossotrud-
nichestvo), which operates under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
is an important actor. It primarily operates in the territory of the former Soviet Union and 
in countries where Russia has important strategic projects or other interests. Rossotrud-
nichestvo is currently represented in 81 countries, and it runs 74 centres of science and 
culture abroad.90 In the CIS countries, Rossotrudnichestvo’s activities particularly focus on 
safeguarding the rights of and services for people that Russia views as compatriots [of the 
Russian people]. Compatriot issues are often referred to as “humanitarian cooperation”.91 
Furthermore, Russia has been financing NGOs and various political groups, and has sought 
to use them in influencing the strategic choices made by CIS countries as well as the stabil-
ity of society in these countries.92
Alongside Rossotrudnichestvo, there are other organisations vested with the task of 
furthering Russia’s “civilisational” diplomacy objectives. Another important organisation is 
the Russkiy Mir Foundation (jointly funded by Russia’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture 
and Education), which was established in 2007 to defend “Russian civilisation”. The role of 
the foundation has expanded from defending the Russian people, language and culture to 
promoting Russian values, Russian civilisation and the idea of Russia as a nation. The op-
erations of the organisation are a mixture of cultural and public diplomacy combined with 
promotion of geopolitical objectives.
88 Bittman, Ladislav: Introduction, 1988, 3–10. In Bittman, Ladislav (ed.), The New Image-Makers: Soviet Propaganda 
and Disinformation Today, McLean: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1988; see also 
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(eds.): Fog of Falsehood. Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine, Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs, Report No. 45, 2016, http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/588/fog_of_falsehood/.
89 Abrams, Steve: Beyond Propaganda. Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia, Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, 
no. 1, 2016, 6–13.
90	 Россотрудничество:	О Россотрудничестве, http://rs.gov.ru/ru/about, accessed 11 February 2019.
91	 МИД	России:	Основные направления политики Российской Федерации в сфере международного культурно-
гуманитарного сотрудничества, 2010, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_
publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/224550, accessed 11 February 2019.
92 Wilson, Andrew: Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Yale University Press, 2006; Saari, 
Sinikukka: Russia’s Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its Influence in Former Soviet Republics: Public 
Diplomacy po russkii, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 66, no 1, 2014, 50–66; Mäkinen, S.: Russia as an alternative model. 
Geopolitical representations and Russia’s public diplomacy – the case of Rossotrudnichestvo, 2015, 101–121. In 
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In recent years, the role of Russia’s Presidential Administration has grown, particularly in 
the area of exerting covert political influence abroad. An important organ of the Presidential 
Administration is the Presidential Foreign Policy Directorate, including the department re-
sponsible for relations between regions and cultural connections with foreign countries, and 
the department responsible for cooperation between border regions, which both operate 
under it. The latter mainly concentrates on Ukraine, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.93
In addition to these institutions, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, which 
concentrates on public diplomacy, was established in 2010 under the control of the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs. It provides grants and organises activities for young people in order to 
support Russia’s foreign policy goals and goals regarding interpretation of history. The fund is 
particularly focusing on dialogue formats for young people: Dialogue in the Name of the Fu-
ture, as well as the Balkan, Caucasus and Baltic Dialogues, being examples of this.94
The policy of influencing in other countries used to be softer than that employed in the 
“near abroad”. However, these sectors have become increasingly similar in recent years, 
for example in policy towards EU countries.95 Russia has supported both far-left and far-
right movements in Europe, even in the same country.96 Russia seeks cooperation with all 
political actors that it thinks will further its own strategic interests.97
Influencing in the information and online spheres
The Russian concept of information warfare includes cyberattacks on data networks, elec-
tronic warfare and “information-psychological influencing activities”. The battle in infor-
mation space is a permanent part of foreign policy, and it requires cooperation between 
various actors.98 According to Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, the country attempts to in-
fluence foreign audiences using new information and communication technologies.99 In 
turn, the importance of controlling the information space is emphasised in the Doctrine of 
Information Security, where it is identified as a key area in ensuring strategic deterrence.100 
Information warfare is an uninterrupted process: the battle is being fought during both 
93 See e.g. Galeotti 2017a, 2–3. The descriptions of subdivisions and names of their chiefs can be found on the website 
of	the	Presidential	Administration,	Кремль:	Подразделения Администрации Президента, http://kremlin.ru/
structure/administration/departments#department-1009, accessed 11 February 2019.
94	 Фонд	поддержки	публичной	дипломатии	имени	А.	М.	Горчакова:	Программы фонда, https://gorchakovfund.ru/
projects/, accessed 11 February 2019.
95 Wilson, Andrew: Illicit Russian money poses threat to EU democracy, EUobserver 21 April 2017, https://euobserver.
com/foreign/137631, accessed 11 February 2019.
96 For example in Germany. See Polyakova, Alina – Boyer, Spencer P: The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, the West, 
and the Coming Age of Digital Competition, BBTI, 2018, 6.
97 Stronski – Sokolsky 2017, 30.
98 Adamsky 2017, 42. For cyber activities as part of warfare, see Connell, Michael – Vogler, Sarah: Russia’s Approach to 
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peacetime and wartime, in all possible arenas, both within Russia and abroad. The pur-
pose of these activities is to make the adversary act in a manner that complies with Rus-
sia’s strategic interests.101
These active measures are still an essential part of the influencing methods Russia uses 
in Europe. In information warfare and other active measures, Russia operates proactive-
ly, trying to gain or retain the upper hand. Its activities follow the principle of competitive 
strategy, according to which passivity leads to inaction and retreat. Studies on the subject 
indicate that the key actors include the military intelligence service (commonly referred to 
as GRU), the internal security service (FSB) and the foreign intelligence service (SVR). Each 
organisation has its own special expertise, but the areas of responsibility are, in practice, 
flexible.102
The state security services utilise Russia-based organised criminal networks for their 
operations. Criminal groups can, for example, assist in raising funds for financing active 
measures, in money laundering, smuggling and even assassinations.103 Russia also typical-
ly utilises non-state “patriotic hackers” in its cyberattacks; this happened e.g. in the deni-
al-of-service attacks in Estonia in 2007, in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine from 2014 on-
wards.104 The attacks in Ukraine in 2015 and 2017 are also suspected to have been carried 
out by Russia.105 In 2018, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre estimated that GRU is al-
most certainly behind 12 different hacker groups.106
Although Russia’s active measures draw on Soviet practices, the operating environ-
ment is different, as it is more complex and networked, and is more interdependent, which 
provides countries capable of quick decision-making, like Russia, with an opportunity to 
turn the conventional strengths of liberal democracy into weaknesses. Apart from being 
cost-effective, the utilisation of cyber measures is aided by the fact that they are very dif-
ficult to trace back directly to Russia.
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106 National Cyber Security Centre, a part of GCHQ: Reckless campaign of cyber attacks by Russian military intelligence 
service exposed, 4 October 2018, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/reckless-campaign-cyber-attacks-russian-military-
intelligence-service-exposed, accessed 11 February 2019.
34
Information operations can be used e.g. to disrupt governments, incite protests, con-
fuse opponents, influence public opinion and demoralise adversaries.107 Typically, the pur-
pose of influencing is to create general mistrust of Western governmental and institutional 
actors, both in Western states and globally.108 In a crisis situation, attempts can be made 
to slow down an adversary’s reactions, for example by leaking confidential discussions be-
tween politicians.109 Social media is a convenient platform for psychological influencing. 
The constantly changing environment makes it difficult to verify whether messages are 
true, and planting disinformation is easy and cost-effective.110
Data networks are part of Russia’s critical infrastructure, and Russia aims to decrease 
its dependence on other countries. Russia is striving for “digital sovereignty” that is as 
complete as possible, which means extending state control over the internet in Russia.111 
Russia has amended the current legislation and is trying to develop software and infra-
structure with this goal in mind. In 2016, as many as half of Russian banks were already 
using the domestic alternative to the SWIFT system, in addition to which, the authori-
ties announced that a closed version of the Internet, intended for military use, is now 
operational.112
Russia is already considered one of the great cyber powers.113 In the future, it wants 
to be among the first to utilise applications relying on artificial intelligence and big data. 
Self-learning artificial intelligence allows more personalised influencing on social media, 
and video recordings can be manipulated with credible results.114 The possibilities for im-
plementing various active measures considerably more effectively than before are com-
mon to all tools provided by new technologies.
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Economic influencing
Russia’s possibilities for economic influencing are limited by the country’s relatively small 
role in the global economy. Many countries nevertheless depend on Russian energy. The 
energy sector is of paramount importance for the Russian economy, which is why it is in 
Russia’s interests to support energy projects that maintain other countries’ dependence 
on Russian energy resources.
The EU continues to be the most important trading partner for Russia, although Asia 
(particularly China) has rapidly become more important since 2000. The sanctions imposed 
by Western countries on Russia have had limited impact on trade between Russia and Chi-
na, but import bans imposed by Russia have slightly reduced the amount of goods from 
the EU imported into Russia. In terms of total trade volume, the EU, China and the United 
States are far more important as trade partners for Russia than Russia is for them. How-
ever, Russia’s position is stronger in the oil and gas trade. Most direct foreign investment 
and bank loans to Russia also come from the EU. Russia’s possibilities to isolate itself from 
Western nations are limited because of the economic importance of the EU for Russia.
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the more extensive region of CIS countries 
constitute Russia’s primary partnership region in economic matters. The total GDP of coun-
tries in the Eurasian Economic Union is approximately 15 per cent of the GDP of Russia, 
while that of the more extensive region of CIS countries is 25 per cent of the GDP of Rus-
sia.115 The emerging role of China in the region is challenging Russia’s traditional role as the 
most significant trade partner for the CIS countries.
Energy resources are a very important factor maintaining the influence of Russia in the 
Eurasian Economic Union and in the CIS countries. Russia can sell oil and gas to its part-
ner countries at well below market prices, because the volume of this trade is very small 
compared to the total volume of energy exports by Russia. For example, the Russian state-
owned gas company Gazprom reduced the price of gas sold to Armenia on two occasions, 
in 2013 and 2015. Gazprom’s CEO indicated that the price reductions were directly attrib-
utable to Armenia’s decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union.116 The low price of en-
ergy is an example of indirect influencing that can be used, if required, to exert pressure 
on the subject country. All in all, analysts have been able to identify dozens of such cases, 
including shutting off the gas supply, blowing up a gas pipeline, and constructing alterna-
tive pipelines.117
115 IMF: IMF DataMapper, GDP, Current prices, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/RUS/CIS/
ARM/KAZ/KGZ/BLR, accessed 11 February 2019.
116 Azatutyun: Russia Agrees To Deeper Gas Price Discount For Armenia, 28 April 2018, https://www.azatutyun.
am/a/26983718.html, accessed 11 February 2019.
117 Overland, Indra – Orttung, Robert W: A limited toolbox: Explaining the constraints on Russia’s foreign energy policy, 
Journal of Eurasian Studies 2, 2011, 78–80; e.g. Reuters: UPDATE 3-Russia raises gas prices for Ukraine by 80 percent, 
3 April 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-gas-idUSL5N0MV2WL20140403, accessed 11 February 
2019.
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The situation is somewhat different on the European market. Western European coun-
tries are already paying market prices for gas, in addition to which Russia has to compete 
with liquefied natural gas from the US. Russia has initiated the new Nord Stream and Turk 
Stream gas pipeline projects, which would bypass Ukraine, Belarus and eastern EU coun-
tries. The new gas pipelines will reduce the income from transit tariffs, which is import-
ant for Ukraine, and would allow Russia to disrupt exports without impacting end users in 
Western Europe.118
Russia is also using credit as a means of achieving political commitment. The Maidan 
Revolution in Ukraine was precipitated by a decision by President Yanukovych to stop as-
sociation negotiations with the EU after Russia purchased USD 15 billion of government 
bonds from Ukraine, which was struggling with its payment obligations.119
Of Russia’s energy resources, the importance of nuclear energy is likely to keep increas-
ing in the future. In recent years, Russia has considerably increased its exports in the field 
of nuclear power. Russia currently has 42 nuclear power plant projects in progress in 12 
different countries, including in the EU member states of Finland and Hungary.120 Russia’s 
main competitor in nuclear power exports is China, which still lags behind in terms of tech-
nology. In addition to constructing reactors, Rosatom is providing maintenance-related 
services, the most important element of which for relations with foreign countries is the 
supply of nuclear fuel. Russia can use the price and availability of nuclear fuel for leverage, 
particularly against countries heavily dependent on electricity generation.121 If successful, 
these nuclear power plant projects further the growth of Russia’s influence and use of soft 
power in relation to the subject country.122
Companies partly or wholly owned by the Russian state often pursue the country’s po-
litical goals. These practices reflect the basic characteristic of Russia, where the exercise 
of power relies on informal networks, and where the benefits generated by companies for 
the state are not measured only in economic terms.123
118 Henderson, James – Sharpies, Jack: Gazprom in Europe – two “Anni Mirabiles”, but can it continue?, Oxford Energy 
Insight 29, 2018, 13–25.
119 BBC: Russia offers Ukraine major economic assistance, 17 December 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-25411118, accessed 11 February 2019.
120 In addition to these two countries (and Russia), construction projects are in progress in Turkey, Belarus, India, 
Iran, China and Bangladesh, and agreements have been signed with Egypt, Nigeria, Jordan and Armenia. Foy, 
Henry: Rosatom powers through nuclear industry woes, 27 June 2017, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/
content/774358b4-5a4a-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b, accessed 11 February 2019.
121 The Economist: Atoms for Peace. The world relies on Russia to build its nuclear power plants, 2 August 2018, https://
www.economist.com/europe/2018/08/02/the-world-relies-on-russia-to-build-its-nuclear-power-plants, accessed 11 
February 2019.
122 Aalto, Pami – Nyyssönen, Heino – Kojo, Matti – Pal, Pallavi: Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in Finland and 
Hungary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2017. 392–393.
123 Martikainen, Toivo – Saari, Sinikukka – Pynnöniemi, Katri – Working group of the Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs 2016, 14–16; Jääskeläinen, Jaakko J. – Höysniemi, Sakari – Syri, Sanna – Tynkkynen, Veli-Pekka: Finland’s 
Dependence on Russian Energy—Mutually Beneficial Trade Relations or an Energy Security Threat?, Sustainability 18, 
2018, 9–10.
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3.2 Limits of the competitive strategy
Russia’s competitive strategy works as long as its adversaries react in a predictable manner 
and try to adapt to the operations. From Russia’s perspective, the chosen policy has pro-
duced concrete results, because the country has succeeded in halting NATO enlargement 
into its neighbouring areas, at least for the time being.124 On the other hand, Russia’s mili-
tary operations in Ukraine have led to a strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defence, 
such as its military presence in the Baltic States and Poland, as well as to closer defence 
cooperation in the EU.
NATO has gradually broadened the interpretation of what constitutes an armed attack 
on one member state, as defined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Cyber defence 
was defined as one of the duties of mutual defence in 2014. In 2016, NATO began prepa-
rations for responding to hybrid warfare as part of its mutual defence. In 2018, it was de-
cided that NATO can invoke Article 5 as a response to hybrid warfare. Article 5 can be trig-
gered in any situation that the NATO countries assess as posing a fundamental threat to 
the security of an individual member state or the entire alliance.
However, the decision must be unanimous, which is why Russia would undoubtedly 
seek to cause uncertainty in the situation assessment by NATO members. Member states 
always have several economic and political reasons not to escalate a crisis, particularly 
when the degree of severity is still uncertain. It is therefore a challenge for NATO to make 
correctly timed decisions in this grey area when, in the absence of indisputable evidence, 
attribution is difficult.
Russia’s activities have also led to re-assessments in the EU. For the first time in years, 
there is political will among EU member states to promote a common security and defence 
policy. For example, five years ago, it would have been seen as unlikely for Russia to inter-
fere with elections in the US or EU, but now preparations against such activities are com-
monplace in both.
As a result of the updated situational picture, EU countries are politically more pre-
pared to strengthen their security and defence cooperation. Joint operations have, in par-
ticular, concerned defence against hybrid influencing, development of strategic communi-
cations and defence cooperation. The EU and NATO have agreed on a list of 74 practical 
measures for improving cooperation. In December 2017, a total of 25 EU states initiated 
the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on a voluntary basis in the manner facili-
tated by the Treaty of Lisbon. There are now 34 preliminary PESCO projects, with Finland 
currently participating in four of them.
124 Montenegro joined NATO in 2017 in spite of Russian opposition, and North Macedonia has already advanced to the 
ratification stage of the membership protocol.
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President Emmanuel Macron of France is an active advocate of closer European de-
fence cooperation, and he proposed the European Intervention Initiative, which has been 
signed by ten European countries, including Finland. The Treaty of Lisbon provides tools for 
closer cooperation, and in the new situation, the mutual defence obligation in Article 42.7 
and the solidarity clause in Article 222 have gained new importance.
The economic sanctions imposed by the EU have also harmed Russia’s long-term 
geo-economic position.125 They prevent Russian oil and gas sector companies from access-
ing Western capital markets, in addition to which they are particularly targeting the sales 
of foreign technology that the oil sector needs. Major companies in the IT sector have also 
suffered from the side-effects of an economy weakened by sanctions.126
125 Aalto, Pami – Forsberg, Tuomas: The structuration of Russia’s geo-economy under economic sanctions, Asia Europe 
Journal, June 2016, Volume 14, Issue 2, 227–234.
126 Abramova, Anna – Garina, Olga: Russian MNEs Under Sanctions: Challenges for Upgrading in GVCs (Cases of Energy 
and IT Industries), Journal of East-West Business, published online on 24 May 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/106698
68.2018.1467843, 10–15.
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4.  Conclusions for Finland
Russia’s policy towards Finland reflects the broader goals of its foreign and military policy. 
Finland is particularly linked with the goals of Russia’s EU and NATO policy. The objectives 
of Russia’s EU policy include that of weakening the organisation’s decision-making ability 
and restricting the development of closer relations with partners in the east. Correspond-
ingly, Russia is seeking to prevent the expansion of NATO and to weaken the operational 
ability of the organisation in crisis situations. From this starting point, Russia has criticised 
closer defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden, as well as Finland taking part in 
military exercises with NATO and key NATO countries.127
The conflict in Ukraine and the toughening methods used in Russian foreign policy have 
led to re-assessments of Russia policy in the EU and in EU member states. The changes in 
the situational assessment are reflected in the Finnish Government Report on Finnish For-
eign and Security Policy published in 2016, which states the following:
“The security of Europe and the Baltic Sea region has deteriorated. Russia annexed the 
Crimean Peninsula and created the crisis in eastern Ukraine. A vicious circle has evolved, 
resulting in increased tension and military activity in the Baltic Sea region. In recent years 
Russia has also increased its military footprint and activity in the Arctic, where the sit-
uation, so far, has remained relatively stable. Russia uses a wide range of military and 
non-military instruments in advancing its interests. The security policy environment of Fin-
land, a member of the western community, has transformed. A more tense security situ-
ation in Europe and the Baltic Sea region will directly impact Finland. The use or threat of 
military force against Finland cannot be excluded.”128
Finland’s policy regarding Russia reflects the five guiding principles of the EU’s Russia 
policy. These principles are: full implementation of the Minsk agreements, closer ties with 
Russia’s former Soviet neighbours, strengthening EU resilience to Russian threats, selec-
tive engagement with Russia on certain issues such as counter-terrorism, and support for 
interpersonal contact.129 In spite of the limited cooperation, Finland is seeking to commu-
nicate to Russia that Finland is a predictable and reliable actor that seeks dialogue with its 
neighbouring country in all circumstances.
Finland is part of the Western community, and the country’s security policy decisions 
reflect this position. If new conflicts emerge or existing ones intensify in the Baltic Sea re-
gion or elsewhere in Europe, it would be very difficult for Finland to remain outside such 
127 See Lalu, Petteri: Suomen ja Ruotsin läntinen puolustusyhteistyö herättää voimakasta kritiikkiä – ministeri Šoigu 
toi esille jopa vastatoimien tarpeen (Western defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden gives rise to 
strong criticism – Minister Shoygu even mentioned the need for countermeasures), National Defence University, 
Department of Warfare, publication series 3: white papers no. 7, 2018, 4.
128 Prime Minister’s Office: Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, 13.
129 European Parliamentary Research Service: The EU’s Russia policy: Five guiding principles, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614698/EPRS_BRI(2018)614698_EN.pdf, 2018, accessed 11 February 2019.
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a conflict. Finland’s increasing involvement in Western defence arrangements may lead to 
increased criticism and pressure from Russia.
Russia is seeking to influence Finnish public debate and decision-making regarding se-
curity policy. The two main messages to Finland from Russia’s foreign policy and influenc-
ing operations are as follows: 1) Finland and Russia are good neighbours, and Russia values 
good and well-functioning relations with Finland. 2) These good and well-functioning rela-
tions cannot be taken for granted; rather, Finland needs to actively maintain its neighbour-
ly relations by acting “responsibly” when making its political choices, i.e. it needs to take 
into account the main interests of Russia.
The two basic messages from Russia are communicated through a variety of chan-
nels. In particular, the first positive message is conveyed directly through official channels: 
during high-level visits, in official communiques and in meetings at various administrative 
levels. The second, less-positive, warning message is typically conveyed indirectly through 
unofficial channels.
The change in Russian practices that took place in the winter of 2015/2016 at two 
northern border-crossing points between Finland and Russia can be considered to be an 
example of such a warning message. Russia suddenly relaxed its tight border controls and 
allowed 1,713 third-country nationals to cross the border and seek asylum in Finland. Af-
ter a temporary agreement restricting border crossings was signed through bilateral ne-
gotiations, Russia restored border control and stopped the influx of asylum seekers. The 
case indicates how practical measures were taken to demonstrate that friendly relations 
between neighbours cannot be considered self-evident and that Russia can use other kind 
of actions, destabilising to Finland, when it wants to. It is likely that the operational capa-
bilities of the Finnish authorities and the development of public opinion in an exceptional 
situation were also being tested at the same time.130 For Finland, the events were an im-
portant reminder of the fact that established practices and the trouble-free cooperation 
that had existed for many years can change quickly and without any explanation.
130 Martikainen, Toivo – Saari, Sinikukka – Pynnöniemi, Katri – Working group of the Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs, 2016, 53–54; As noted in Martikainen, Toivo et al., prior to the influx of asylum seekers at the Russian–Finnish 
border, there was a brief seemingly similar case at the Russian–Norwegian border. That case has been explained 
by changes in prices of journeys from conflict areas (Syria, North Africa) to Europe – i.e. that the Eastern European 
route became so expensive and unsafe that asylum seekers sought alternative routes. This line of argumentation 
does not seem to apply to the Finnish case: many of the asylum seekers at the Russian–Finnish border had spent 
years in Russia and represented almost 40 different nationalities, including from states such as Pakistan and Nepal. In 
this case, the price of the journey from conflict areas to Europe is not a sufficient factor explaining the sudden influx 
of refugees. See Martikainen, Toivo – Saari, Sinikukka – Pynnöniemi, Katri: Neighbouring an Unpredictable Russia. 
Implications for Finland, FIIA, 2016, 15–16; Moe, Arild – Rowe, Lars: Asylstrømmen fra Russland til Norge i 2015: 
Bevisst russisk politikk?, Nordisk Ostførum Vol 30, No 2, 2016: https://tidsskriftet-nof.no/index.php/noros/ article/
view/432, accessed 6 May 2019. A recent Finnish study concluded that although Russia is one the centers of global 
migration and living standards of immigrants in Russia can be extremely low, human smuggling and governmental 
corruption were instrumental in enabling the journey from Russia to Finland, after “’borders were opened’”. See 
Piipponen, Minna – Virkkunen, Joni: Venäjän kansainväliset muuttoliikkeet ja Suomi (Russia’s international migration 
flows and Finland), The Strategic Research Council (SRC), 2019, 2–4.
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In their official contacts, Russian authorities nevertheless emphasise the good relations 
between the two countries. In this respect, Russia’s policy regarding Finland clearly differs 
from the messages sent to the other Nordic nations. News reporting by Russia’s state-run 
media regarding the Nordic countries and the Baltic States portrayed Finland as the only 
country to emphasise good relations with Russia.131 By contrast, Sweden, Norway, the UK 
and Latvia were at times subject to very harsh and confrontational language. The positive 
message is occasionally enhanced by a reminder of the negative consequences of joining 
NATO. One example of this is President Putin’s description of Finland as a potential theatre 
of war between NATO and Russia.132
The “good neighbours” discourse, while sounding good, may also be problematic for 
Finland: On one hand, the risk of the relationship breaking down is mentioned, and on the 
other, the right kind of politics are commended and rewarded. However, strategic commu-
nication is only one instrument in the toolbox of political influencing.
Since the energy trade is likely to remain important for Russia’s economy, it is in Rus-
sia’s interests to promote energy projects that maintain dependence on Russian energy. 
The energy trade is also being used to implant Russian presence and the accompanying 
soft power in Finland.
The ongoing technological transformation has changed – and will continue to change – 
the forms of political influencing. The flow of information has become faster, public debate 
has become more fragmented, and covering up actions intended to destabilise society has, 
in part, become easier. These factors pose a challenge to political decision-making and its 
effectiveness, particularly in a crisis situation. Hybrid influencing and other extensive se-
curity threats concern society as a whole, and identifying them and preparing for them re-
quires extensive cooperation between different actors at many levels.
131 Kaljula, Diana – Juurvee, Ivo: Narratives About the Nordic-Baltic Countries Promoted by Russia, 2018, 71–77. In 
Lange-Ionatamišvili,	Elīna	(ed.):	Russia’s Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment, NATO Strategic 
Communications Centre of Excellence, 2018.
132	 Кремль:	Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-финляндских 
переговоров, 1.7.2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52312, accessed 11 February 2019.
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Introduction
This part consists of two sections discussing Russia’s military defence and the resources of its de-
fence industry. The section concerning Russia’s military defence describes how Russia prepares its 
military defences. The major issues include the character of war, models of military threats, as well 
as the military capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and their development over the next ten 
years. The section discussing defence industry resources first reviews the Russia’s opportunities for 
military procurement based on economic growth prospects, as well as past and future budgets. 
Russia’s military procurement is discussed in the light of the results of the ten-year State Arma-
ment Programme to 2020, and on the basis of information available of the next State Armament 
Programme, which will run up to 2027. Finally, it analyses the situation, development aspirations 
and weapons exports of the Russian defence industry.
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1. Introduction
Emperor Alexander III, who ruled Russia from 1881 to 1894, described his realm in a man-
ner that also aptly describes it today: “We only have two reliable allies in the whole world, 
our army and our navy. Everyone else will rebel against us at the first chance.”1 Paradoxi-
cally, Russia did not wage a single war during the reign of Alexander III. The Russian Fed-
eration, the heir of Soviet Union following its dissolution, has during its 30-year existence 
been party to several internal and external military conflicts.
This sub-section discusses the mission of Russia’s military strategy, the character of 
war, as well as the duties, structure and capabilities of armed forces and assesses the im-
portance of armed forces from the perspectives of Russia’s stability and Finland’s security.
2. Russia’s view of the character of war
Military strategy – the highest level of the art of war – relates to planning and leading the 
military defence of the Russian state. In Russia, “military strategy” means the practical ac-
tivities of government and senior military command aimed at achieving the goals of the 
doctrines defining the country’s national security. Military strategy has several goals: to 
study the characteristics of modern military conflicts and ways to prevent them; to devel-
op the performance requirements for the armed forces; to develop principles for military 
deployment and strategic planning; and to lead the defence planning and armed forces of 
the country – in peacetime and in times of conflict.2
The characteristics of modern military conflicts described in Russian military strategy 
are understood in the West as the character of war, which means a perspective on aspects 
including military threats, the preparations that they require, the nature of war, elements 
of military force and the level of technology. The term nature of war refers to the goals that 
can be pursued by means of war and the means that can be used, as well as to the fun-
damental essence of war as a violent struggle. The character of war is interpreted as con-
stantly changing, whereas the nature of war is considered permanent3.
In Russian military policy, war is viewed in the same manner as it was by Carl von 
Clausewitz: “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.”4 The essence of this 
point of view is that war is seen as a political tool. Such an instrumentalist view of war is a 
legacy of the Soviet ideology, which adopted Clausewitz’s point of view, but further speci-
1	 Александр	Михайлович	1933.
2	 Рогозин	2004,	60–61;	VES	2007,	699.		
3 Raitasalo 2005, 316, cf. Strachan 2013, 259, 265–266, 282. Strachan uses the concepts of character of war (conflict) 
and nature of war. The character of war is in a state of constant change for social, political and technological reasons, 
among others. Conversely, the nature of war is permanent.
4	 Рогозин	2004,	36–37;	VES	2007,	154.
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fied it by including reflection of internal politics in wars5. The key objective of Russian mil-
itary policy is to prevent disagreements from escalating into military encounters, and the 
aim is to stop and control the spread of military conflicts. For this, strategic deterrence and 
dissuasion are used6. Strategic deterrence and dissuasion are established through compre-
hensive means – in other words, not just by the use of military force.
Actions by the Russian state – and particularly its power ministries and agencies – for 
creating strategic deterrence and dissuasion are described in the text box below.
Actions by the entire state
1. The military and economic power of the state
2. Proactive political, diplomatic and information-based action to resolve conflicts 
by peaceful means
Actions by the armed forces and other power ministries and agencies
• Military support for political, diplomatic and economic means – by a show of for-
ce, when required
• Readiness for combat and mobilisation
• Reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance and information activities
• Participation in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations
• International military cooperation
• Securing the integrity of aerospace, borders and sea areas with military means
• Organising and preparing theatres of war, regional defence and civil defence
• Cooperation between power ministries and agencies in resolving internal con-
flicts
• Securing the country’s borders and key sites
Text box 1. Activities of the Russian state and its power ministries and agencies (armed forces, securi-
ty services, National Guard, Ministry of Emergency Situations) for establishing Russia’s strategic deter-
rence and dissuasion. The detailed areas of application of these activities are presented in the Military 
Doctrine.7    
5	 Ленин	1969,	311–316;	Lalu	2014,	65.
6	 Военная	доктрина	2014,	§18–21;	Adamsky	2015,	31–43.
7	 Военная	доктрина	2010,	§19;	Военная	доктрина	2014,	§19–21;	Гареев	2008.
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According to an article written by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of 
the Armed Forces of Russia, which inspired several references and interpretations, the ra-
tio of non-military to military action used in resolving conflicts is 4:18. However, Russia’s 
range of methods for military action are not the final means to be used as part of the reso-
lution of conflicts from the theoretical or practical points of view; rather, Russia is typically 
flexible in its choice of methods and their intensity.
More solid evidence of Russia’s attitude towards war as a tool of politics is provided by 
the actual military action it undertakes than by the theoretical viewpoint. Examples of this 
include the Russo–Georgian War and the seizure of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine 
and its annexation to Russia’s own territory by way of a referendum organised during the 
military takeover, as well as its interference with the civil war in Syria. None of the mili-
tary campaigns related to these conflicts were necessary for Russia from the perspective 
of its military security. The war in Ukraine, in particular, has demonstrated that the risk of 
damage to its reputation abroad as a result of violating international law does not prevent 
Russia from using its armed forces in the territory of neighbouring countries to pursue its 
own interests.
From the Finnish point of view, the pursuit of political or economic interests by active 
deployment of military means seems alien. The publicly expressed goal of Finland’s foreign 
and security policy is “to strengthen Finland’s international position, to secure Finland’s in-
dependence and regional integrity, to improve the security and wellbeing of Finns and to 
ensure that the society functions efficiently. The primary aim … is to avoid becoming a par-
ty to a military conflict.”9 In other words, Finland can only be drawn into a war, not begin 
one; and war is at least not seen as an instrument that Finland itself would choose to use 
to achieve political aims or for pursuing its own interests.
2.1 Russia’s perception of military threats
Russia’s publicly stated perception of military threats includes changes in policy that are 
unfavourable to Russia taking place in the post-Soviet space, known in Russia as colour rev-
olutions, as well as an extensive massed missile and air strike by a US-led alliance. In the co-
lour revolution threat model, there would be activities controlled from outside the country 
in question aimed at destabilising the pro-Russian government through providing support 
to opposition groups, creating controlled chaos leading to a change of government. The 
main tools for missile and air strikes would likely be cruise missiles launched from US ves-
sels and aircraft, aimed at destroying Russia’s nuclear weapons and other military targets. 
8	 Герасимов	2013.
9 Prime Minister’s Office 2016, 9.
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Obsolete or outdated military technology has also been mentioned as a threat, as it could 
cause unpleasant surprises to Russia in a military conflict.10
The degree to which the above models of threat correspond to the actual situation or 
even to the official threats recognised by the Russian Armed Forces is open to interpreta-
tion. However, Russia has itself described the changes in power taking place in its neigh-
bouring countries as “colour revolutions”. The proven capability of Western countries, pri-
marily the USA, to carry out air and missile strikes outside their own territories has been 
described as dangerous. The administrative measures, armament and exercises carried 
out by Russia indicate that comprehensive political, legislative and military methods are 
being developed for averting them.
According to the legislation governing the defence of Russia, the duty of armed forces 
is to prevent or counter any armed attacks on the Russian Federation and to protect its in-
tegrity and territorial integrity, as well as to fulfil other duties and international obligations 
set out in legislation.11 According to an addition to the law in 2009, the armed forces can 
also be used outside Russia’s borders to repel attacks on armed forces or on other troops 
and actors, to prevent or repel attacks on other countries on the basis of a specific request 
made by the country concerned, or to protect Russian citizens from armed attacks.12
2.2 Indirect and asymmetrical influencing methods
Russian strategy documents and military theory presentations often discuss the use of in-
direct and asymmetric influencing methods. In the national security strategy, these actions 
are defined as follows:
“Interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information-
al, and other measures are being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic 
deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts. These measures are intended to pre-
vent the use of armed force against Russia, and to protect its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”13
The strategic documents of Russia’s security policy do not precisely specify the circum-
stances in which Russia would deem it legitimate to take indirect preventive action. In that 
sense, the previously clear demarcation between war and peace is becoming fuzzy. The 
early stages of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s post-facto justification for the use of mil-
itary force in the occupation of Crimea give some indication what this entails. The national 
security strategy emphasises the role of Russia’s “active foreign policy” and the fact that 
its goal is to create the prerequisites for stable international relations. In addition, it states:
10	 Гареев	2014,	9–10;	Полегаев	&	Алферов	2015,	3–10.
11	 Об	обороне	1996,	§10.2.	
12	 О	внесении	изменений	в	Федеральный	закон	’Об	обороне’	2009.
13	 Стратегия	национальной	безопасности	2015,	§36.
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“In the sphere of international security Russia remains committed to the utilization of 
primarily political and legal instruments and diplomatic and peacekeeping mechanisms. 
The utilization of military force to protect national interests is possible only if all adopted 
measures of a nonviolent nature have proved ineffective.”14
The definition presented describes non-military and military action as a sort of a linear 
continuum where the use of military action would signal the escalation of the conflict. Nev-
ertheless, Russian texts deliberating the change in the character of war have, in recent years, 
paid particular attention to the interweaving of non-military and military action, as well as to 
the fact that drawing a clear line between peace and war is becoming increasingly difficult.
In the debate concerning indirect military measures, ways of counterbalancing the mili-
tary superiority of the USA in a military conflict are being contemplated. If Russia were not 
able to respond to the kind of missile and air strikes described above with ground opera-
tions or its own long-range weapon systems, the enemy could instead be impacted by de-
stroying vital targets or targets dangerous to the environment with strikes carried out by 
special operations forces.15 The scope for the indirect use of military force also includes the 
participation of armed forces in an information war, which some analysts have even sug-
gested should be among the most important duties of the armed forces16. Impressive mil-
itary exercises and the associated active communication are an essential part of informa-
tion warfare as waged by the armed forces.
2.3 Russia’s attitude to NATO, international military cooperation and its own 
collective international military cooperation
Russia says that it is seeking to find a balance with NATO and is assess its relationship with 
NATO on the basis of the results achieved towards this goal. From Russia’s perspective, if 
NATO were to concentrate on counter-terrorism operations, combating piracy and limit-
ing drug trafficking, these would not be viewed as destabilising activities. However, Rus-
sia’s attitude towards NATO expansion is unequivocally negative. This is based on military 
realism – an expanded NATO would enhance the military infrastructure of potential oppo-
nents: garrisons, air and naval bases, and weapon systems in the vicinity of Russian terri-
tory.17 Closer military cooperation between Finland and Sweden with NATO in defending 
their own territories or the territory of NATO members is also seen as a development that 
weakens Russia’s military security, because, according to Nikolay Makarov, former Chief of 
14	 Стратегия	национальной	безопасности	2015,	§29.
15	 Чекинов	&	Богданов	2010,	46–53.
16	 Суровикин	&	Кулешов	2017.	Surovikin	presented	a	list	of	proposed	new	duties	for	Russia’s	military	back	in	January	
2014,	see	Суровикин	2014,	41.
17	 Концепция	внешней	политики	Российской	Федерации	2013,	§	63–64;	Военная	доктрина	2010,	§8a;	Военная	
доктрина	2014,	12a;	Герасимов	2015;	Lalu	2016,	49.
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the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, this “may in certain circumstances even 
pose a threat to Russia’s security”. According to Sergey Shoygu, Russia’s current Minister 
of Defence, military cooperation between Finland, Sweden and NATO create greater mis-
trust, forcing Russia to respond.18
In its attitude towards NATO and cooperation with it, Russia is systematically seek-
ing a position where the political systems of Russia’s Western partners bow to solutions 
that conform to Russia’s security needs. Finland’s declarations in its own government pro-
grammes limiting its freedom in security policy, such as the statement in the government 
programme in 2011 that Finland would not prepare a NATO membership application19, 
are serving Russia’s goals. It is obvious that it is also in Russia’s interests to influence Fin-
land’s future policy decisions and resolutions. However, these perspectives that take Rus-
sia’s needs into account and the solutions based on them often seem to totally ignore the 
fact that Russia’s own actions are destabilising the international security system.
Russia considers the post-Soviet space to be the most important area for its foreign 
and security policy, as well as the area most likely to see military conflicts. The coopera-
tion organisation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the Collective Secu-
rity Treaty Organization (CSTO).20 The military troops of the CSTO consist of regional forc-
es and the mobile Collective Operational Reaction Force. Russia has regional forces with 
Belarus, Armenia and some Central Asian countries. The CSTO has the goal of establish a 
20,000-strong force, the Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) to be used in the 
territories of treaty countries, as well as smaller, 4,000-strong, mobile forces that can be 
deployed outside the CSTO area.21 However, the CSTO is not becoming an eastern equiva-
lent of NATO. CSTO cooperation – particularly joint exercises associated with Russia’s stra-
tegic manoeuvres – creates good prerequisites for Russia’s military crisis management in 
the organisation’s territory.
2.4 Russia’s military capabilities and their development
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the capabilities of Russia’s conventional armed forces 
were assessed, both in Russia and abroad, to be poor and their readiness weak. Russia strug-
gled to find troops to deploy for its wars in Chechnya. In spite of several reform programmes, 
Russia’s military security was only guaranteed by its strategic nuclear deterrent. The defi-
ciencies found in the capabilities of the country’s armed forces in the Russo–Georgian War 
sparked the start of a series of extensive reforms in the armed forces in autumn 2008.22
18	 Makarov	2012;	Gorenburg	2015;	Шойгу	2018;	Lalu	2018.
19 Government programme 2011, 22.
20	 Концепция	внешней	политики	Российской	Федерации	2013,	§42,	§47.
21 Norberg 2013, 6, 21–24.
22	 Иванов	2003,	3;	Blank	2003,	1–26;	Mcdermott	2008;	485–501;	Bartles	2011,	55–80.
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The goals of these reforms were defined as transforming all military units into perma-
nent-readiness units, making the command and control system more effective, updating 
the training programmes for professional soldiers, equipping the troops with up-to-date 
weaponry, and improving the status of military personnel in society.23 According to Ana-
toliy Serdyukov, then Minister of Defence, the main aim of the reform was to create a per-
formance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed military ready to participate in at least 
three regional and local conflicts.24  
3. Russian Armed Forces
3.1 Command system
In Russia, decisions on whether to employ the armed forces or other military forces are 
taken by the president in the role of supreme commander, who also decides on the use 
of nuclear weapons. Decisions on whether to employ the armed forces or other military 
forces outside Russia’s territory or for tasks not in line with their main purpose are taken 
by the Federal Assembly.25 The Russian Ministry of Defence is part of the armed forces and 
acts as both a steering and an enforcing military authority. The Ministry of Defence leads 
other ministries in defence-related duties.26
In practice, decisions by the political leadership in Russia about deploying military forc-
es – even outside Russian borders – have been rapid, proactive, and centralised with the 
president. At the start of a documentary aired on Russian TV about the events in Crimea, 
President Putin explains how he made the decision to deploy military force in connection 
with the occupation of the peninsula in spring 2014 in the presence of only a few directors 
from the security services and the Ministry of Defence 27. On 1 March 2014, the Federal As-
sembly agreed to the request made by the president on that day to deploy military force 
in the territory of Ukraine28. In reality, though, the Russian Armed Forces had started seiz-
ing key sites in the Crimea several days previously using soldiers wearing uniforms without 
national insignia.
A similarly rapid decision on the use of military force occurred when Russia began mil-
itary operations in Syria on 30 September 2015. Preparations for Russia’s participation in 
23	 Гафутулин	2018;	Мясников	2008;	Lalu	2014,	349–353.
24	 Литовкин	2008.
25	 Об	обороне	1996,	Статья	4–5;	Военная	доктрина	2014,	§27.
26 Mil.ru 2018a; VES 2007, 186.
27	 Кондрашов	2015.
28 Lenta.ru 2014. 
58
the Syrian civil war in support of the regime of President Al-Assad had already taken place 
the preceding year29, but even during the meeting of the UN General Assembly on 28 Sep-
tember 2015, Putin did not mention that Russia was planning any military engagements.30 
Putin requested, and received, from the Federal Assembly unanimous approval to begin 
military operations outside the country’s borders on 30 September 2015.31 Strikes against 
rebel forces started on the same day.32
The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, part of the Ministry of 
Defence, is responsible for the strategic planning of defence and development of the basis 
of the country’s military security. The General Staff coordinates other state agencies and 
actors in defence-related duties. According to a decree issued by President Putin in 2013, 
the General Staff leads the work of producing the defence plan of the Russian Federation. 
The plan gives guidelines for the comprehensive defence of Russia and includes the estab-
lishment of the state’s military organisation required for wartime defence.33 The command 
system of Russia’s military organisation is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Command system of the Russian state military organisation34. Legend: MER = Ministry of Economic De-
velopment; Mintrans = Ministry of Transport; Minzdrav = Ministry of Health; MVD = Ministry of Internal Affairs; 
MChS = Ministry of Emergency Situations; FSB = Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
29 IHS Jane’s 2015. 
30	 Путин	2015.
31	 Российская	Газета	2015.
32 Lenta.ru. 2015.
33	 Герасимов	2014,	15–17.
34	 Герасимов	2014,	17.
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The National Defence Management Centre (NMDC) established in 2014 allows the daily 
operations of armed forces to be centrally led and is responsible for keeping the armed 
forces and top government officials up to date on the situational picture of military securi-
ty. The NMDC coordinates and adapts the operations of companies essential for the armed 
forces and other security authorities in exceptional situations of different degree of sever-
ity.35 The establishment of NMDC is also indicative the development of the armed forces’ 
command system. The digital command system is described as being capable, protected 
and secure36.
The military districts of Russia’s Armed Forces were traditionally vested with the re-
sponsibility for commanding the Ground Forces. In the military reform initiated after the 
Russo–Georgian War, they were reorganised into Joint Strategic Commands capable of 
commanding all services. All of the non-strategic armed forces in each military district – 
Ground Forces, navy and Air Force using conventional weaponry – operate under the au-
thority of the commander of the military district.37 The military reform reduced the num-
ber of military districts from six to four in 2010. However, the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic 
Command, comparable to a military district, was established in December 2014 for Rus-
sia’s Northern Fleet, which is responsible for an extensive area, including almost all arctic 
sea territories bordering Russia.38 The military districts and their areas of responsibility are 
shown in Figure 2.
The Russian Armed Forces are divided into three defence branches: the Ground Forc-
es, the Aerospace Forces and the Navy. The Strategic Missile Troops (responsible for the 
ground component of strategic nuclear weapon deterrent) and the Airborne Troops are 
both separate branches of the armed forces. In addition to these, the armed forces have 
special operations troops as well as branches and sectors external to the services, special-
ising e.g. in logistics. Although officially the Russian Armed Forces comprises just over one 
million military positions, the number of military personnel in active service has been es-
timated at 900,000 soldiers, while there are an estimated two million soldiers in the re-
serves who are available for mobilisation.39 The organisation of the Russian Armed Forces 
is shown in Figure 2.
35 Mil.ru 2018a.
36	 Рамм	&	Круглов	2018;	Владыкин	2014;	Мясников	2014.
37	 Объединённое	стратегическое	командование	(ОСК).	Literal	translation:	Joint	Strategic	Command.	Most	English	
sources use the term Operational Strategic Command (FOI 2016, MilBal, 2017), which however differs in meaning 
from the Russian name and omits the reference to joint command of services.
38	 РИА	Новости	2014.	
39	 Указ	президента	2017;	Жуковский	2018;	MilBal	2018,	192.	The	estimate	in	Military	Balance	2018	includes	the	
soldiers moved to reserve from military training during the last five years. According to the official personnel 
composition, there are a total of 1,902,758 positions in Russia’s armed forces in 2018, of which 1,013,628 are 
military positions. The total number of military personnel in the Russian Armed Forces has remained at around one 
million for the last ten years.
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Figure 2. The organisation and command structure of the Russian Armed Forces. The military districts are in 
charge of the operational planning and deployment of Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force troops in their respec-
tive areas of responsibility. 40
3.2 Nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons are among Russia’s primary military methods of strategic deterrent, 
aimed at preventing conflicts from escalating. Nuclear weapons are primarily intended for 
a counterstrike if Russia or its allies are subjected to a nuclear strike. The secondary ob-
jective is to be able to launch a first strike if Russia or its allies are attacked by weapons of 
mass destruction. Thirdly, nuclear weapons may also be used for a first strike if an attack 
using conventional weaponry threatens the existence of the State of Russia.41 According 
to the Military Doctrine, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (i.e. the 
president) decides on the deployment of nuclear weapons, albeit that the power to de-
cide on a counterstrike has also been delegated to other high-ranking members of military 
40 Mil.ru 2018a; MilBal 2018, 192.
41	 Арбатов,	Дворкин,	&	Ознобищев	2010,	50,61;	Военная	доктрина	2014,	§27.
61
command in the eventuality of an unexpected situation. The publicly expressed principles 
for the deployment of nuclear weapons do not lend themselves to drawing conclusions 
about Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in a combat environment during a military conflict.
Russia’s nuclear weapons is divided into between the strategic nuclear weapons triad, 
and non-strategic42 nuclear weapons to support combat operations by different defence 
branches. The strategic nuclear weapons triad consists of the Strategic Missile Forces, nu-
clear-powered submarines carrying intercontinental nuclear missiles, and strategic bomb-
ers of the Long-Range Aviation branch and their weaponry. The part of the triad with the 
highest degree of readiness are the missile divisions with decentralised locations deep 
in Russian territory. They are kept under constant readiness to execute strategic nuclear 
strikes in a matter of minutes. The naval component of the triad, based on submarines, 
is very well protected; submerged missile-carrying submarines are very difficult to detect 
and render inoperable. This is what makes them suitable for carrying out counterstrikes. 
The part of the triad maintained by the Aerospace Forces is based on the use of cruise mis-
siles launched from strategic bombers.
In February 2018, Russia and the United States announced that they had implemented 
the reduction targets of the New START armament limiting treaty. According to the treaty, 
both parties are allowed 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, 700 nuclear weapon 
launchers (i.e. operationally ready intercontinental missile launchers or strategic bombers) 
and a total of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers.43
One of the main trends of Russian military policy is to keep its strategic nuclear capa-
bility as reliable as possible. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, and it is developing a global capability for rapid missile strikes using con-
ventional warheads. Russia has responded to this development by developing its strate-
gic offensive weaponry. In a speech in March 2018, the president of Russia referred to the 
country’s new technically advanced weapons programmes in a manner that attracted a lot 
of attention. One of the goals of these programmes is to prevent US and NATO missile de-
fence systems from being effective44. The new systems did not actually surprise analysts 
who have been monitoring developments. Although there have been delays in the devel-
opment of certain systems, some of the systems are likely to be operational in the 2020s45.
42 Russians use the term “non-strategic” instead of “tactical” nuclear weapons, because a nuclear weapon carrying 
enormous destructive power cannot be considered a tactical weapon.
43 Podvig 2018; New START 2011.
44	 Путин	2018.	
45 Kofman 2018.
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3.3 Ground Forces
Of the defence branches of the Russian Armed Forces, the Ground Forces have the largest 
number of personnel and the most diverse weaponry. The units of the Ground Forces have 
almost one third of the total military personnel of the Armed Forces46. In combat opera-
tions, Ground Forces units are suitable for destroying the opponent’s troops in an attack, 
for capturing and holding territory, and for carrying out in-depth strikes on opponents. In 
defensive operations, Ground Forces units are suitable for defending against attacks as 
well as against naval and airborne landings. In spite of the development of weaponry and 
military equipment, the Ground Forces are still the most suitable troops for capturing, 
keeping and controlling land territory.
The units of Russian Ground Forces include combined arms armies, divisions and bri-
gades. Combined arms armies have flexible constitutions that include 40,000–60,000 sol-
diers. There are usually 2–4 armies in the area of a military district, consisting of 1–2 di-
visions and 1–4 brigades, as well as missile and artillery brigades, signals brigades, air 
defence brigades and logistics brigades.47
The combat power of the Russian Ground Forces divisions and brigades consists of reg-
iments or battalions, as well as support units them. The organisation of Russia’s Ground 
Forces includes considerably strong artillery and missile units that can support battles and 
cause casualties to the opponent irrespective of air support and weather. Another typical 
characteristic of Russia’s military organisation is the large number of anti-aircraft missile 
units and their use for establishing multi-layered protection over an area. Units using un-
manned aircraft have been added to the Russian Ground Forces. They are used for gain-
ing an operational picture and for reconnaissance of targets for ranged weapon systems.48
The combat readiness and capability of the Russian Ground Forces are limited by the 
fact that their personnel are mainly conscripts. In peacetime, the Ground Forces units 
serve as training centres where conscripts serve for one year. As conscripts enter service 
through drafts organised twice a year, in practice, the units never reach the full number 
of trained personnel their composition would require. This is one reason why Russia uses 
battalion tactical groups for combat operations. One peacetime brigade or regiment can 
provide 1–2 battalion tactical groups for operations. According to the Chief of Staff of the 
Russian Armed Forces, the Ground Forces and Airborne Troops have 126 combat-ready 
battalion tactical groups, with 900–1,100 soldiers each.49 There is no absolute certainty 
about whether the comment describes the current status or the goal of next few years. 
The personnel situation of the Russian Ground Forces – and therefore also the possibilities 
for them to be fully manned – will improve as the number of contract soldiers increases.
46 MilBal 2018, 192. In 2018, the number of personnel in the Ground Forces was estimated at 280,000 soldiers. The 
Marine Infantry units and Airborne Troops also have troops whose combat role is similar to the Ground Forces.
47 FOI 2016, 28; MilKavkaz 2018.
48 FOI 2016, 28–30; MilKavkaz 2018.
49	 Худолеев	2015;	Sutyagin	&	Bronk	2017,	22–23;	Герасимов	2018.
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3.4 Airborne Troops
The air assault units and airborne units of the Russian Airborne Troops are intended for 
flanking the opponent’s troops from the air and for operating in their rear, disturbing the 
command and control system, movement and maintenance, as well as for destroying the 
opponent’s precision-guided weapons systems in depth, as well as for preventing the op-
ponent’s reserves from deploying for combat. Russia’s Airborne Troops have traditionally 
been used as the General Staff’s spearhead force for tasks requiring rapid deployment in 
military conflicts and crisis management.50 In addition to or instead of landings, the Air-
borne Troops can be used to supplement and support combined arms troops from the mil-
itary districts as rapid-deployment vanguard troops.
Figure 3. Deployment of Russian Ground Forces in 201851. Image: Petteri Lalu.
Russian Airborne Troops also constitute the basis of the Collective Operational Reaction 
Forces (CORF) of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, established in 1992), 
which have been active since 2009. The CSTO’s mandate for collective defence and the 
compatibility achieved in exercises allow the flexible use of troops in conflicts in Russia’s 
neighbouring areas.52
50 FOI 2016, 36; VES 2007, 150–151.
51 FOI 2016; BMPD 2018; MilKavkaz 2018; MilBal 2018.
52 Norberg 2013; de Haas 2017. 
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3.5 Russian Aerospace Forces
In 2015, Russia’s air and space defences were organised into the Aerospace Forces, which 
include the Air Force, Space Forces and Aerospace Defence Forces. In addition to its air de-
fence duties, the mission of the Air Force is to launch air attacks on the opponent’s targets 
using conventional or nuclear weapons, in addition to which it supports the battles of oth-
er defence branches. The Space Forces are responsible for monitoring space and provid-
ing advance warning of missile strikes. Launching satellites into orbit and using them are 
among the key duties of the Space Forces. The mission of the Aerospace Defence Forces is 
to defend against attacks from the air and from space, as well as to protect important ci-
vilian and military targets in Russia and to destroy the warheads of an opponent’s ballistic 
missiles aimed at important sites in Russia.53
After the Russo–Georgian War, Russia decided to organise Air Force operations to bet-
ter support the operations of the other defence branches. Currently, support from the Air 
Force and the necessary cooperation of troops it requires are organised by having each 
military district command its own air army.54 The Air Force has played in important role 
in the war in Syria, and in practice all personnel stationed in command positions in the 
Ground Forces and Air Force units have gained personal experience of cooperation.55
Air defence in Russia differs from Western practices, being based even in normal cir-
cumstances on Air Force jet fighters and the use of air defence missiles kept at constant 
combat readiness. Since 2007, the air defence missile system has been systematically re-
formed with new materiel and upgraded equipment.56 The range of the latest and most 
efficient S-400 air defence missile system currently already extends to the airspace of Rus-
sia’s neighbours, which has given rise to speculation that the system could be used for 
attacks or for restricting any opponents’ freedom of operation.57 The aerial coverage in 
Central Europe of Russia’s air defences will also be enhanced in the future by a Russian–
Belarussian regional air defence system, agreed in a treaty in 2009 and ratified by Russia in 
October 2017.58 In a military conflict, the air defence missile troops of the Aerospace De-
fence Forces and the Ground Forces can form a battle-hardy and layered air defence zone 
in the combat zone.
53 Mil.ru 2018a. 
54 BMPD 2018; MilBal 2017
55 Mil.ru 2018a.
56 Mil.ru 2018a; FOI 2016; MilBal 2018; BMPD 2018.
57 Nato STO 2017.
58	 Российская	Газета	2017a;	Российская	Газета	2017b.
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3.6 Navy
The purpose of the Russian Navy is to support Russia’s interests, and to carry out military 
operations at sea and in maritime operating areas. The Navy is capable of carrying out nu-
clear strikes on an opponent’s targets on land, as well as destroying the opponent’s fleets 
at sea and in naval bases, and disturbing the opponent’s maritime transport connections. 
In battles near the coast, the Navy can support land operations with landings, and can also 
participate in defensive operations against landings. The Navy includes surface and Sub-
marine Forces, as well as aircraft units and costal troops.59
The introduction of Kalibr cruise missiles has resulted in the addition of standoff sea-to-
land missile strikes to the conventional duties of the Surface Forces: protection, transport-
ing landing units, and mine warfare.60 The main duties of the Submarine Forces are to de-
stroy an opponent’s key targets; to seek and destroy the opponent’s submarines, aircraft 
carriers and other surface vessels; to attack convoys; to repel landings; to spot targets for 
Russia’s other attack weapon systems; and to destroy an opponent’s coastal oil and gas 
production systems.61 Judging by the deployment of Russian Submarine Forces, their main 
areas of operation are the world’s oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. The extensive range 
of possibilities for using the Submarine Forces emphasise their importance: submarines 
can challenge the supremacy of Western countries in the oceans. In spite of its relatively 
small size, the Russian Baltic Fleet is capable of denying maritime supremacy on the Baltic 
Sea both in terms of time and location, disturbing maritime traffic, preventing the use of 
harbours and capturing coastal sites.
Climate change means that access to arctic areas, previously difficult to navigate, is 
now easier. In the Russian Armed Forces, the military responsibility for the Arctic lies main-
ly with the Navy. It must also protect Russia’s economic and security-related interests in 
this area.
Russia has very extensive economic interests in the Arctic. One fifth of the country’s 
GDP is generated north of the Polar Circle, and 95% of its natural gas resources and 75% of 
its oil resources are in arctic or sub-arctic regions.62 The traditional military importance of 
the Arctic in the Kola Peninsula and Russian Far East is, above all, related to the counter-
strike capability for nuclear weapons, as well as Russia’s general ability to project military 
force to external areas of operation in the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. In order to protect its 
military and economic interests, Russia has established new military bases on islands in the 
Arctic and has sought to reactivate Soviet-era airbases in the Arctic63. Russia’s increased 
military activity in the area is creating tensions, which became more pronounced when 
NATO took up the defence of its area following the events in 2014.
59 Mil.ru 2018a. 
60 Mil.ru 2018a; Kremlin.ru 2018.
61 Mil.ru 2018a. 
62 Laruelle 2014, xxi.
63	 Käpylä,	Mikkola,	&	Martikainen	2016;	Российская	Газета	2016;	Goble	2018.
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3.7 Precision-guided weapons
The significance of precision-guided weapons had been recognised in the Soviet Union in 
the 1970s. It was thought that they would allow the range and accuracy of conventional 
weapons would develop to develop to an extent where combat doctrines based on nuclear 
weapons would be insufficient to prevent military conflicts and their escalation. Although 
Russia’s current Military Doctrine pays particular attention to nuclear weapons, Russia’s 
Military Doctrines have since 2010 emphasised the fact that standoff precision-guided 
weapons carrying conventional warheads are also thought to affect the strategic balance: 
they are considered to pose a military threat to Russia. To avert this threat, Russia is de-
veloping a corresponding capability that it can use to form a strategic deterrent alongside 
nuclear weapons.64
The best-known Russian precision-guided weapons are the short-range ballistic 
Iskander-M and Iskander-K cruise missiles, which will replace the earlier Tochka-U missile 
systems by 2020. The deployment of a capable missile system in western parts of Russia, 
particularly Kaliningrad, has raised concerns in the Baltic rim countries, which are now within 
the range of the missile system. These concerns have also been amplified by suspicions that 
the range of the system exceeds the 500-kilometre limit stipulated in the INF Treaty signed in 
1987, which banned intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems65.66
However, the capability of the Iskander-class weapons, superior to that of their prede-
cessors, must be compared to that of the cruise missiles of Russia’s Navy and Air Force, 
which have considerably longer ranges, even exceeding 5,000 kilometres. On the other 
hand, the weight of a single cruise missile warhead, some 500 kilograms, is considerably 
smaller than the weapon load carried by a single modern fighter-bomber. Russia has suc-
cessfully used tactical, precision-guided bombs included in that weapon load in military 
operations in Syria67.
The regional centre of gravity for Iskander missile systems and long-range air defence 
missile systems is in the western and north-western regions of Russia. Several reasons af-
fect the deployment decisions. In these regions, Russia is in immediate contact with NA-
TO, which it considers a military adversary. The country’s largest population and adminis-
trative centres are located in the area, as are most of its industrial production – all targets 
to be protected according to the duties of the armed forces. After the collapse of the So-
viet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the buffer zone in the West shrank by 
as much as a thousand kilometres, and the combat-ready divisions stationed there were 
withdrawn. Now this lost buffer is being replaced by longer-range, high-readiness weap-
ons systems.
64	 Золотарёв	2000,	476–478;	Воробьев	1986,	37–40;	Полегаев	&	Алферов	2015;	Военная	доктрина	2014,	§12,	§21,	
§26,	§46;	Шойгу	2017.
65 NPR 2018, 10.
66	 McDermott	&	Bukvoll	2017.	
67 Riehunkangas 2017, 35–39.
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Russia is utilising the deterrent effect of the Iskander missile system as part of its infor-
mation influencing activities. In its political rhetoric, the deployment of the systems in Ka-
liningrad was connected to NATO’s construction of missile defence system sites in Poland. 
Russia’s Iskander missile systems are mainly grouped in the bases previously used for its 
predecessor, the Tochka-U missile system. This would probably have happened in Kalinin-
grad anyway, but NATO’s actions gave Russia the opportunity to claim that they needed to 
match NATO’s capacity.
When looking at the geographical deployment areas, we must take into account the 
fact that Iskander systems can be re-deployed relatively quickly to new areas of operation. 
This feature has also been demonstrated in manoeuvres by the Russian Armed Forces and 
in military operations in Syria68. Before an Iskander system was permanently stationed in 
Kaliningrad in January 201869, deployment of the system in the area had been rehearsed at 
least twice. During the Zapad 2017 exercise, an Iskander system was deployed to Pechenga 
in the Murmansk Oblast, near the Finnish and Norwegian borders70.
3.8 Electronic warfare
In the West, the need to develop and maintain electronic warfare (EW) capabilities de-
creased as their armed forces concentrated after 2000 on counter-insurgency operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in equivalent circumstances where the adversaries’ lim-
ited dependence on the use of the electronic spectrum and their inability to challenge the 
Western armies meant that the EW development efforts were reduced to procuring jam-
ming systems to defend its own troops against remotely triggered roadside bombs. In Fin-
land, work to develop EW capabilities was not scaled down in the same manner, because 
crisis management operations outside the country’s own territory were not taken as the 
starting point for developing its capabilities.
Even after the end of the Cold War, the Russian Armed Forces continued to consider 
electronic warfare as an essential element of armed combat, and continued developing 
their capabilities in this regard.71 In the Russian Armed Forces, EW systems have been de-
ployed at various organisational levels, giving Russia the ability to fight for control of elec-
tronic spectrum in all operations. Russia views electronic warfare as providing significant 
opportunities for achieving technological and operational supremacy over its likely military 
adversaries.72
68 Interfax.ru 2017.
69 Reuters 2018.
70 Nilsen 2018. 
71 VES 2007, 601.
72 Mcdermott 2017, 9–10. 
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3.9 Methods of influencing through information technology
In its strategies and doctrines, Russia takes the use of information technology very serious-
ly, in peacetime and when at war.73 However, it has not announced the establishment of 
a cyber-troops command under the armed forces, as many other countries have done.74 
In 2017, Russia instead established information troops, which nevertheless seem to be re-
sponsible for information/psychological operations, rather than cyber-activities as they are 
understood in the West.75 The skills of these personnel have been honed both in science 
companies established to provide special training to conscripts and in officer training.76 It 
is highly likely that IT capabilities have been established in the armed forces formations.77
Protecting its national networks is an essential part of Russia’s cybersecurity strategy.78 
A well protected “fortress” denying the adversary technological supremacy is a deterrent, 
and also a prerequisite for initial strikes and counterstrikes.79 Although cyber-capabilities 
are hardly comparable to nuclear weapons, the integrity of command and control as well 
as the ability of the nation to function in case of mobilisation are cornerstones of its de-
fence solution.80 Russia’s recent systematic policy of developing an information-based so-
ciety and economy has a military dimension.81 The development of domestic information 
technology ensures that military cyber-capabilities can be built and maintained, irrespec-
tive of whether they are to be used for offence or defence.
Russia is probably using its cyber-capabilities even in normal conditions to prevent mil-
itary threats from forming and to drive a wedge between its adversaries. It is possible that 
Russia’s cyber-capabilities could be used in the initial phases of a military conflict to disrupt 
an adversary’s mobilisation and troop movements, to compromise its awareness of the sit-
uation, to paralyse its command abilities, and to support the actual military operations as 
part of remote influencing.82 Russia is using its cyber-capabilities to support its troops and 
allies in combat abroad.83 It should be further noted that, for Russia, cyber-capabilities are 
an instrument for carrying out more extensive information operations aimed at situation-
al awareness, ability to function, and the will to fight of a potential opponent.84 For Rus-
sia, cyber-capabilities are part of the extensive set of strategic deterrence tools, and that is 
why organising or assessing them purely from the military point of view is not appropriate.
73	 Стратегия	национальной	безопасности	2015;	Доктрина	информационной	безопасности	2016;	ТАСС	2018.
74 DoD 2018; Raud 2016; Stoltenberg 2018; Reuters 2017a.
75	 Независимая	газета	2017;	Новая	Газета	2017.	
76	 Jones	&	Kovacich	2016,	208–213;	Mil.ru	2018b.
77	 ICA	2017;	NCCIC	2016;	US	CERT	2018;	РИА	Новости	2016;	Reuters	2017b;	Thomas	2015;	Adamsky	2017.
78 Meduza 2017
79	 Kukkola,	Ristolainen,	&	Nikkarila	2017;	Kukkola	2018a.
80 Adamsky 2017; Cooper 2016c.
81 Kukkola 2018b.
82 As no “cyber-war” has yet been fought and Russia has not published its military “cyber-doctrine”, stories about 
Russia’s alleged cyber-operations are purely speculative.
83 Russia has allegedly used its cyber-capabilities in operations in Syria, for example. Financial Times, 2016.
84	 Thomas	2015;	Вепринцев	ym.	2005,	310;	Бартош	2017;	Дербин	2017;	Никоноров	&	Голубчиков	2017.
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3.10 Special operations troops
The Soviet art of war emphasised the use of special operations troops in regional and 
large-scale wars as part of strategic offensives. The plan was to use them three days 
before the start of the offensive as much as 200 kilometres behind enemy lines to de-
stroy the opponent’s nuclear weapons, to capture important areas and to disrupt the 
opponent’s supplies and command lines. The typical characteristic of these special op-
erations is still the fact that they are aimed at activities in the opponent’s rear instead 
of on the front line.85
In the military reforms that began in 2008, the Special Operations Forces Command 
(KSO) was established under the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Among other 
things, it was tasked with evacuating the country’s citizens from crisis areas and with an-
ti-piracy operations. These special operations troops are used in anti-terrorism operations 
and for destroying an opponent’s military and political actors. The training of special op-
erations troops includes pinpointing targets for precision-guided weapons as well as sab-
otaging important or threatening infrastructure targets.86 The idea of using special opera-
tions troops appears to be shifting from large-scale warfare towards low-intensity conflicts 
and even peacetime operations.
Russia’s special operations troops attracted plenty of attention during the capture of 
Crimea.87 In operations in Syria, Russia’s special operations troops have gained valuable 
experience calling in close air support from the Air Force, as well as in search and rescue 
operations.88 Although the number of special operations troops is quite small compared to 
the total number of personnel in Russia’s armed forces, their deployment is of special im-
portance in low-intensity military conflicts and in operations carried out during the initial 
phases of military conflicts. Their operations are closely associated with the deployment of 
other troops and the capabilities of the armed forces, as well as with a new phenomenon 
on the battlefield: private security and military organisations.
85	 Шеповалeнко	2018.
86 MilKavkaz 2018.
87 Nikolsky 2014, 124, 129–130.
88	 Барабанов	ym.	2016,	113–114;	Гаврилов	2016.
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3.11 Private security and military organisations
Officially, private security and military organisations are prohibited by law in Russia. How-
ever, Russian legislation leaves the situation open to many interpretations. A legislative 
change passed in December 2016 allows soldiers with a contract not exceeding one year 
to participate in military operations in international peacekeeping and security duties, as 
well as for anti-terrorism operations outside Russian territory.89
The Russian government started making preparations for legislation governing private 
security and military organisations at the beginning of the 2010s. In 2012, during his term 
as Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin gave his personal support to the plan to establish offi-
cial private military organisations in Russia. According to him, they could act in lieu of the 
Russian state outside its territory, particularly when protecting property and when training 
foreign soldiers.90 Operations by private military organisations could cover the state’s di-
rect involvement in potential foreign operations requiring military assistance.
In this context, “protecting property” means critical targets and infrastructure out-
side Russian territory, such as the gas network. Therefore, major companies such as 
Gazprom and Transneft, in particular, were thought to be potential customers who 
might hire mercenaries.91 Legally commercialising and privatising military operations 
would create opportunities for companies and private individuals to defend their in-
terests with weapons.
The activities of companies registered as providers of security services are difficult 
to determine and regulate by legislation. The use of private military organisations is de-
fended by emphasising that these companies must comply with statutory requirements 
and operate as businesses and under normal statutory terms and conditions.92 It is ob-
vious that private security and military organisations operate by assignment of the Rus-
sian government e.g. in anti-terrorism operations and when supporting the separatists 
in Eastern Ukraine. For example, the Russian private military organisation MAR says that 
it has participated in organising humanitarian transportation in Eastern Ukraine. Accord-
ing to the company’s management, they can also provide military services, both to the 
Russian authorities and the separatist government in Donetsk.93
Outsourcing security and military services benefits the Russian state both econom-
ically and socially. In addition to the assignments described above, private security 
and military organisations can also be used in pursuing Russia’s patriotic goals and for 
strengthening the patriotic spirit outside the country’s borders.94 Among other things, 
these private security and military organisations use social media for recruitment – 
89	 О	воинской	обязанности	и	военной	службе	2017.
90	 РИА	Новости	2012;	Шеповалeнко	2018.
91	 Коммерсантъ	2018a.
92 Carmola 2010, 12.
93	 военное.рф	2015;	МАР	2014.	Companies’	recruitment	material
94	 Надтока	2018,	212.
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the same channels through which information about casualties of fighters in Syria and 
Ukraine have become public knowledge.
In the future, Russian private security and military organisations will increasingly switch 
to intelligence and warfare using data networks. As agile operators, they will be able to re-
spond to new customer needs in this profitable new business area, such as monitoring the 
internal communication channels of terrorist networks. Russian private military organisa-
tions have already partly responded to the growing needs for data network intelligence, 
for example by offering intelligence services and corporate espionage.95 The use of private 
military organisations requires background support from the governmental organisations 
to “legitimise” and support their operations.
3.12 Contract soldiers – an essential element of the personnel strategy 
of the Russian Armed Forces
In 1996, Russia set the goal of having its army mainly consist of contract soldiers by 2000. 
In 2008, the duration of conscription was shortened to one year. Currently, individuals with 
high- or medium-level education who are drafted can choose between one year’s service 
as conscripts or two years’ service as contract soldiers. They are also being attracted with 
shorter contracts, and individuals signing a three-year extension contract are offered hous-
ing benefits as incentives. The Ministry of Defence has sought to fill more demanding po-
sitions, such as squad leaders and submarine crews, as well as naval infantry and airborne 
units, entirely with contract soldiers. In 2015, there were approximately 300,000 contract 
soldiers.96
Contract service has been developed with gradual amendments to legislation, allow-
ing the use of short-term service contracts for anti-terrorism operations, in the navy, and 
in other temporary positions of a few months’ duration.97 In 2017, the number of contract 
soldiers exceeded the number of conscripts – or at least the target was to fill 405,000 po-
sitions with contract soldiers.98 According to the latest target, the number of contract sol-
diers will increase to 475,000 by 2025.99 Increasing the number of contract soldiers im-
proves the readiness and professionalism of the Russian Armed Forces. The possibility to 
use voluntary contract soldiers instead of conscripts lowers the threshold for using military 
force, particularly in low-intensity military conflicts outside the country’s borders.
95 RSB Group. RSB marketing material.
96	 ТАСС	2013;	ТАСС	2015.
97	 О	воинской	обязанности	и	военной	службе	2017.
98	 Прилуцкий	&	Горемыкин	2017,	14–16.
99 www.mil.ru 2018. 
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4. Conclusions
The aim of Russia’s military policy is to prevent military conflicts, to control them and to 
protect the important interests of the state. Russia’s military security is based on stra-
tegic nuclear weapons supplemented with modern standoff precision-guided weapons. 
During the next ten years, the military force used by Russia in conventional warfare will 
be based on the materiel of its Ground Forces units, which is partly obsolete, but remains 
operational thanks to modernisation efforts. The Russian Armed Forces can support their 
combat operations with the more accurate situational picture provided by the reconnais-
sance, surveillance, and command and control systems, as well as with the precision-guid-
ed weapons operated by the Air Force and Navy.
In addition to their external duties, the Armed Forces and the state military organi-
sation also support Russia’s internal stability. As a governmental actor and employer, the 
Russian Armed Forces are also one of the few instruments of regional policy in the country. 
The Russian people’s appreciation of and the significance of the Armed Forces as a state in-
stitution promoting the unity of the nation have strengthened in the last ten years.
From the Finnish perspective, the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and the will-
ingness of its government to use military force to safeguard its own interests constitute a 
permanent factor that must be taken into account in Finland’s security assessments and 
when dimensioning its defence.
The possible use of military force by the Russian Armed Forces in Europe, particularly in 
conflicts in the Baltics and Arctic, would weaken Finland’s security, irrespective of whether 
Finland actually became a party to the military conflict; the obligations imposed on mem-
ber states of the EU would connect Finland to the conflict politically. A military conflict in 
our neighbouring areas would weaken Finnish society overall: its security, economic health 
and social wellbeing. War waged in the Finnish territory would significantly damage our so-
ciety and change our way of life for a long time.
Military defence issues are an integral part of relations between Finland and Russia, in-
cluding during peacetime. Russia has used – and will in the future increasingly use – mili-
tary force to communicate its own views, its dissatisfaction and the importance of its inter-
ests. From the perspective of Finland’s defence, the challenges are the increased readiness 
of the Russian Armed Forces to rapidly initiate military operations from a situation of 
peace, the ability of the Russian government to wage a prolonged military conflict, as well 
as the use of the military for government-led struggles for dominance in the information 
sphere and for indirect active measures. Finland must continue to develop its concept of 
comprehensive security in order to prevent and mitigate these effects. In the future, it will 
be necessary to assess, systematically and without prejudice, the requirements the devel-
oping operating environment imposes on defence solutions and defence resources.
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1. Introduction
In an article titled “Questions of new warfare” that he wrote in the 1930s, Marshal Mikhail 
Tukhachevsky (the father of the Soviet theory of deep operations) stated: “The most pow-
erful country in the coming war will be the one that has the largest civil aviation and air-
craft industries.” The prediction, which was only published in 1962100, proved to be correct: 
the industrial capacity of the USA was a significant prerequisite for the Allied victory in the 
Second World War. While meeting some students in autumn 2017, President Putin made 
reference to artificial intelligence, saying that “whoever takes the lead in this area will in 
the future rule the whole world101”.
Putin’s statement underlines the strategic importance of technological developments. 
Even with a less dramatic view of the issue, the outlook for the development of weapon 
systems, as well as the growth and size of the defence budget are clear indications of Rus-
sia’s goals and potential. However, assessments of the importance of the sector are often 
conflicting. According to some assessments, all funding is allocated to weaponry, and fac-
tory production lines are churning out effective new weapon systems. This view also holds 
that Russian-made weapon systems are substantially less expensive than their Western 
equivalents. From another perspective, Russia’s economic and industrial base is consid-
ered to be so eroded that the country does not have the prerequisites to equip its armed 
forces with effective weapon systems that meet the needs of modern warfare. This view is 
often enhanced by claiming that bucket made of galvanised steel are the most advanced 
industrial product in our neighbouring country.
This section takes a statistical approach to the potential of Russia’s economy, the con-
tent and actual results of the State Armament Programmes, as well as the current status 
and future of its defence industry. This will produce a more accurate view of the potential 
of, and main challenges for, the Russian defence industry. The estimates of future funding 
are shown in nominal roubles in this section, because it is not appropriate to tie future 
funding plans to inherently volatile exchange rates. The historical annual average exchange 
rates of the rouble are shown in Table 3.
100	 Тухачевский	1964,	189.
101 TACC 2017.
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2. Russia’s economic growth and military expenditure
In 2010–2017, the Russian economy grew by an average of 1.8% a year, and it is widely be-
lieved that a similar growth rate will prevail for the next several years. Naturally, estimates 
of potential growth over the longer term vary considerably. Assuming there are no major 
structural reforms and the global economic situation does not especially favour Russia, 
there is good reason to expect a long-term growth rate of approximately 1.5% for the next 
few decades. The economic sanctions imposed by Western countries will have a negative, 
but very small, impact on Russia’s long-term economic growth.
Russia is no longer a rapidly growing emerging economy. Nevertheless, a growth rate 
of 1.5% is very good from the European perspective. If it were to continue, it would mean 
that Russia’s share of the global economy will shrink during the next few decades, although 
it will remain the same or increase a little in relation to EU countries. Crude oil, oil products 
and natural gas will continue to supply a significant proportion of the income of the Rus-
sian Federation. Russia’s foreign trade balance and economic fluctuations will also remain 
highly dependent on the prices of these commodities. That means that the Russian econ-
omy will continue to be vulnerable to fluctuations in global market prices of raw materials.
During 2010–2017, the amount budgeted for military spending increased both nomi-
nally, in real terms, as well as in relation to the overall size of economy. Figure 1 shows the 
military expenditure reported by the Ministry of Finance for 2010–2017 and the forecasts 
for 2018–2020. Russia’s military spending in 2016 was exceptional, because the amount 
reserved for repaying bank credit (equivalent to around 1% of GDP) was transferred to mil-
itary expenditure. Without that, military spending would have decreased from its 2015 lev-
el. In recent years, just under half of defence spending has been allocated to implementing 
the State Armament Programme.
It is realistic to assume that as the economy grows, the amount of money spent on the 
military will also increase. However, it is likely that the government wants to keep the pro-
portion of public expenditure in the total economy at approximately the current level. It 
would be possible to increase the share of the budget apportioned to military spending in 
the future, but it would require significant cuts in other areas. All in all, it is probably realis-
tic to assume that military spending will increase at the same rate as GDP, on average (i.e. 
no more than 1–2% a year in real terms).
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Figure 1. Defence expenditure in the Russian federal budget in 2011–2020. Image: BOFIT.102
As a whole, military spending exceeds the figures from the Ministry of Finance that are 
shown in Figure 1. According to the military expenditure database maintained by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and calculations from the Gaidar 
Institute for Economic Policy (IEP) in Russia, military spending is actually around one quar-
ter to one third higher. The information differs, because SIPRI and IEP add items from other 
expenditure categories to military spending. These include social security, internal security 
and the domestic economy. The share of such expenditure included in other budget lines 
of the total military spending has increased.103
Furthermore, loans and advance payments granted to companies in the sector can 
be counted as military expenditures. Defence industry companies were granted feder-
al guarantees for bank loans, particularly in 2011–2014. These loans supported produc-
tion growth in the defence industry and the implementation of the State Armament Pro-
gramme. The volume of lending stopped growing, but in 2015–2017 the defence industry 
was also supported by advance payments from the Ministry of Defence. There is no a focus 
on the rise in the number of advance payments, with the government now seeking to limit 
their use.104 Similar arrangements may also be used in the future.
According to the Ministry of Finance, military spending accounted for just over 3% of 
GDP, while SIPRI put the figure at 4.3% and IEP put it at 4.6%. Russia’s ratio of military 
spending to GDP is among the ten highest in the world.105
102 Russian Ministry of Finance, Rosstat. Budget Law 2018–2020.
103 BOFIT Viikkokatsaus 2018/18.
104	 Зацепин	&	Цымбал	2018.
105 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Ministry of Finance data 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.8 4.4 3.1
SIPRI estimate 3.6 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.9 5.4 4.2
IEP (Zatsepin)* estimate 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.0 5.3 4.5
IEP (Zatsepin)** estimate, 
incl. interest payments
3.8 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.4 5.2 6.0 4.7
Table 1. Russia’s defence spending as percentage of GDP according to different estimates during 2010–2017.106
In the future, monitoring the structure of total expenditure is likely to become more difficult, be-
cause the provisions of the Budget Code mean that an increasing number of budget categories 
are labelled secret. Furthermore, it has been suggested that many details of military procurement 
should be classified for fear of Western sanctions.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Saudi Arabia 8.6 7.2 7.7 9.0 10.7 13.5 9.9 10.3
Israel 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.7 4.7 4.7
Russia 3.8 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.9 5.5 4.3
USA 4.7 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.1
Finland 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
Germany 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Table 2. Defence spending as percentage of gross domestic product in certain countries.107
In addition to the budgetary expenditure shown in the statistics, one should bear in mind that the 
execution of Russia’s mobilisation plans creates additional burdens for companies in the private 
and public sectors. The objective of the plans is to secure the functions of the state in all circum-
stances, and the responsibility for executing these plans lies largely with the Presidential Admin-
istration, the Military-Industrial Commission of Russia and the Federal Agency for State Reserves. 
Basically, all companies must participate in executing the plans when requested to do so. During 
2005–2015, the direct costs of mobilisation preparations have amounted to an estimated 1% of to-
tal federal expenditure. The costs incurred in the preparations have proven to be significant, lead-
ing the federal government to attempt to reduce the number of companies involved and to make 
operations more efficient.108
106	 SIPRI	Military	Expenditure	Database;	Зацепин	&	Цымбал	2018.	
107 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
108 Cooper 2016a, 45.
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3.  State Armament Programmes
The development of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of materiel is carried out under the 
State Armament Programme. The Armament Programmes are produced for ten years at a 
time and are usually updated in an interim review after five years. The actual procurement 
is carried out as part of the state budget through war materiel orders. The Ministry of De-
fence is responsible for its execution. The State Armament Programme currently in prog-
ress is GPV-2020. It started in 2011 and will end in 2020.
3.1 State Armament Programme to 2020
The main goal of the programme, now in its final years, is to increase the proportion of 
modern weaponry to 70% of all weaponry supplied to the armed forces by 2020. At the be-
ginning of this decade, the figure was only about 10% for conventional weapons, and also 
a modest 20% for nuclear weapons109.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
(e)
2020 
(e)
2011–
2020
(RUB, billion) 573 677 893 1,450 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,450 1,550 1,550 12,943
Rouble-to-euro 
exchange rate, 
annual average
40.9 39.9 42.4 51.0 68.0 74.0 66.0
Share of budgeted 
military expenditure
38% 37% 42% 58% 57% 41% 46% 52% 55% 55%
Table 3. Distribution of procurement appropriations in the 2020 armament programme (GPV-2020) for 2011–
2020. The table does not include government-guaranteed loans.110
In recent years, just under half of military spending has been allocated to implementing 
the State Armament Programme. As well as the procurement of new materiel, the expen-
diture	under	the	Armament	Programme	includes	R&D	appropriations	for	the	industry,	as	
well as maintenance and modernisation costs. It can be roughly estimated that, on aver-
age, some 60–70% of appropriations are used for procuring new materiel, while expen-
diture	on	R&D	and	on	maintenance	and	modernisation	have	both	been	 in	 the	order	of	
15–20%. Originally, approximately RUB 20.7 trillion was reserved for implementing the Ar-
mament Programme, but probably only some RUB 13 trillion of that amount will be spent 
109	 Федоров	2012;	Центр	АСТ	2015.	
110	 Фролов	2016;	Фролов	2017a;	Cooper	2016b;	Зацепин	&	Цымбал	2018;	Институт	экономики	роста	им.	Столыпина	
П.А.	2017.
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in the end. In addition to actual procurement appropriations, approximately RUB 3 trillion 
was reserved for developing the defence industry.111
Table 4 shows that as a whole, the proportion of modern equipment has increased 
considerably, to approximately 60%. However, there are considerable differences between 
defence branches in this respect, and the Ground Forces and the Navy in particular are 
lagging behind the others. The programme has been widely considered unsuccessful, par-
ticularly for the Navy, as it was originally given the largest share of funding. Implementa-
tion of the plans have been hampered by the insufficient capacity of the industry and the 
crisis in Ukraine, as the sanctions following the latter have limited the availability of certain 
critical components and systems from Ukraine and Western Europe.112
Branch of defence GPV-2020 
original funding, 
RUB 1 trillion
Share of modern 
armament at the end 
of 2017 (%)
Some key items of procurement in 
2011–2016
Ground Forces 2.6 45 Approx. 1,900 combat tanks (e.g. T-72B3), 
1,020 artillery systems, eight Iskander-M missile 
systems, three S-300V4 air defence missile 
battalions
Navy 4.5-5 53 Three strategic Borei class submarines and 50–
60 Bulava ICBMs, one nuclear-powered Yasen 
class submarine, six non-nuclear submarines 
(Varshayanka class), 16 surface vessels
Aerospace 
Defence
3.4-4 73
(Aerospace Defence Forces 
68, Space Forces 81)
33 S-400 air defence missile battalions
Six Voronezh early warning radars
50 space satellites
Air force 4-5 72 Approx. 455 combat planes (e.g. Su-30SM, Su-34, 
Su-35S)
Approx. 685 helicopters
Strategic nuclear 
weapon forces
1.0 79 87 Yars ICBMs
Development of new solid-fuel (Rubezh) and 
liquid-fuel (Sarmat) ICBMs
Others 2.7 60
79
Modern automatic command and control 
systems
Electronic warfare systems
Total 18.2- 20.3 59.5
Table 4. Actual spending in State Armament Programme to 2020 (GPV-2020) by defence branch.113
111	 Военно-промышленная	комиссия	РФ	2017.
112	 Шеповаленко	2018;	Коммерсантъ	2018b;	Зацепин	&	Цымбал	2018.
113	 Зацепин	&	Цымбал	2018;	Фролов	2016;	Фролов	2017b;	FOI	2016;	Герасимов	2017.	The	Air	Force	is	still	shown	
as a separate item in the table for the sake of clarity, although in 2015 it was combined into the Aerospace Defence 
Forces. The proportion of conventional weaponry is based on information provided by the Ministry of Defence.
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The industry seems to have succeeded best at basic overhauls and modernisation of weap-
ons manufactured or developed during the Soviet era. Among others, T-72B3 battle tanks 
and several Sukhoi jet fighter models have been put into serial production, as has the 
S-400 air defence system. The latter, the flagship product of Almaz-Antei, has been suc-
cessfully delivered both in Russia and for export.
In contrast, the production of completely new weapon systems has been considerably 
behind the planned schedule. Basically, the resources required to develop them have been 
underestimated, while the ability of the industry to move from prototypes to serial pro-
duction has been overestimated. For example, the fifth-generation Su-57 jet fighter was 
expected to go into serial production some five years after the first flight of the prototype, 
although in the West, such development work can easily take more than ten years. Simi-
larly, the Armata tank platform for the Ground Forces was supposed to take five years from 
the drawing board to full-scale serial production, a goal that must be considered totally un-
realistic. So far, a few dozen trial versions have been delivered to the troops, and serial pro-
duction is not expected to begin in this decade114.
In summary, it can be stated that even if the target of 70% modern equipment is not 
achieved, the State Armament Programme has produced rather good results, given the 
condition of the country’s military when it started. Although it has not been able to devel-
op many top-modern weapons, let alone function as planned, the Russian Armed Forces 
will in 2020 be considerably better equipped than they were a decade earlier. The situation 
provides a good starting point for implementing the next armament programme.
114	 Центр	АСТ	2015;	Фролов	2017b.
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3.2 State Armament Programme to 2027
The normal planning cycle would have meant that the armament programme running to 
2025 should have started in 2016. Due to the uncertain economic outlook, the start of the 
programme was postponed until 2018. Like its predecessor, the new programme (GPV-
2027) will have a planned total funding of approximately RUB 19 trillion.
However, unlike the previous programme, the money will be divided evenly between 
the different branches of defence. That would make the Ground Forces the biggest winner, 
while the Navy would experience the biggest cut in funding. The focal points of armament 
procurement include strategic nuclear weapons, precision-guided weapons, conventional 
weapons as well as hypersonic weapons (i.e. those that travel at several times the speed of 
sound). The development and procurement of reconnaissance, command and control, and 
target acquisition systems support the migration to network-oriented warfare. Alongside 
conventional technology, artificial intelligence, robots and space-based systems are being 
developed.115 The general trend is migration from quantity to quality; in other words, the 
aim is to procure smaller numbers of more modern, higher-quality systems, which are also 
more expensive 116. In addition to armament procurement, RUB 1 trillion has been allocat-
ed to the development of army bases and the logistics system.117
The key areas for development in the strategic nuclear weapons triad include at least 
the new RS-28 Sarmat ICBM and the hypersonic Avangard missile. In the naval component 
of the triad, the aim is to finish equipping the Borei-class strategic nuclear submarines. The 
Ground Forces expect to have at their disposal new serial production models of the Armata 
battle tanks, as well as armoured vehicles of the Kurganetz and Bumerang types. Deliveries 
of Sukhoi jet fighters (Su-30SM, Su-35) and Su-34 fighter-bombers as well as Mig-35 fight-
ers to the Air Force will continue.118 Another important goal is the start of serial production 
of Su-57 fighters. However, there are uncertainty factors associated with this, among oth-
ers regarding high costs and engine development work119. It is also questionable whether 
all current and future manned and unmanned aircraft types can be developed and main-
tained. It is possible that the range of materiel types will have to be limited during the 
2020s, and development efforts directed more clearly to a single aircraft type.
For air defence, the procurement of the S-400 systems is likely to continue, while its 
successor, the S-500 (Prometheus) is to move into serial production. However, conflict-
ing and partly pessimistic estimates have been expressed regarding the latter, particularly 
about the progress of development work and the possibilities for serial production120. In 
the Navy, the trend appears to be a move away from large vessels to smaller surface ves-
115	 ТАСС	2018.
116	 Connolly	&	Boulègue	2018.
117	 Коммерсантъ	2017b;	Коммерсантъ	2017c.
118	 Коммерсантъ	2017c.
119	 Центр	АСТ	2015,	Connolly	&	Boulègue	2018.	
120	 Connolly	&	Boulègue	2018;	РИА	Новости	2017b;	Коммерсантъ	2017c.
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sels equipped with precision-guided weapons such as Kalibr-NK cruise missiles, and the 
Coastal Troops will be supplied with new missile systems121.
In addition to the above procurement of armament, significant changes in the defence 
industry include the introduction of lifespan contracts and changes in pricing systems for 
materiel orders122. “Lifespan contracts” are contracts that cover all phases of the system, 
from development to decommissioning123. The aim of developing the pricing system is to 
have a more flexible and less stringent regulatory system where companies can benefit 
more from the cost savings they have achieved124.
In spring 2018, President Putin attracted attention by presenting new “wonder weap-
ons” in his annual address to Parliament125. The general public may have been left with the 
impression that a significant change of direction or a technical quantum leap had sudden-
ly taken place in the development of military hardware. However, developing such com-
plex weapons systems takes years – even decades. Many of the weapon systems presented 
have already been in development for a long time. Some of them may come into service in 
the 2020s. None of the weapons shown off by Putin will necessarily progress beyond the 
prototype stage, for example due to technical or financial problems.
121	 Коммерсантъ	2017c.
122	 Коммерсантъ	2017a.
123 Päiväläinen 2016.
124	 Коммерсантъ	2017a.
125 Finnish Broadcasting Company, 2018.
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4. Defence industry
4.1 Overview and financial status of the companies
The Russian defence-industrial complex (OPK)126 consists of six key areas: aviation and 
space, shipbuilding, artillery and small arms, war materiel, radio electronics and nuclear 
weapons. The corporate structure of the sector changed at the beginning of the 2000s 
when large holding companies owned by the state (“state corporations”) were creat-
ed.127 The most important state corporations established during the first decade of the 
millennium were the air defence company Almaz-Antei, the aircraft builder OAK, the 
shipbuilder OSK, and Rostec. Furthermore, space-related activities have been concen-
trated with Roskosmos and the development of nuclear weapons and energy technolo-
gy with Rosatom.128
The sector has approximately 2 million employees. Officially, there are 1,355 com-
panies in the register of defence sector companies, 75% of which fall under the admin-
istrative sector of the Ministry of Industry. Together, 65 major companies are responsi-
ble for almost 85% of total production in the sector. Of these companies, 26 are part of 
Rostec and 13 part of Roskosmos, 13 belong to other Ministry of Industry clusters, and 
another 13 belong to other administrative sectors.129 The defence industry sector is esti-
mated to account for approximately 5–6% of total industrial production in Russia. Since 
most of the sector’s production is manufacturing (e.g. machine-building, electrical and 
electronics, and metals), it can be estimated to account for approximately 10% of total 
manufacturing in Russia.
The sector was in a difficult situation in many ways at the beginning of the 2010s. 
Among other things, the companies were burdened by debt, obsolete production machin-
ery and poor productivity. Most of the production machinery dated from the 1980s or 
1990s, and some estimates suggested that less than 20% of the equipment was under ten 
years old, while old equipment was being replaced at  a rate of only around 1% per year130.
Driven by the State Armament Programme, the output of the sector grew very rapidly 
during 2010–2016: by almost 12% a year. In 2017, the growth rate decreased to approxi-
mately 3.4%, which was still clearly higher than in the rest of the manufacturing sector on 
average. Although the companies are in better shape now, the sector is still burdened by 
low productivity and poor profitability compared to Western competitors131.
126 Oboronno-promyšlennyi kompleks (OPK).
127 Isakova 2007, 79.
128 Frolov 2017, 10.
129	 МинПромТорг	2017.
130	 Федоров	2012.
131	 РИА	Новости	2017a;	Klochkov	&	Kristskaya	2017.
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Analysis of the financial statements of some major companies supports this view. For 
example the return on equity of the aircraft manufacturer OAK was, on average, -20% in 
2013–2016. OAK continues to be very heavily in debt, indicated by its very weak equity ra-
tio (at most 20%) and high debt-to-revenue ratio (approximately two). The shipbuilder OSK 
is slightly more stable, as it regularly made a profit in 2014–2017, although its return on 
capital employed (ROCE) did not rise above 7%. However, the company managed to reduce 
its debt-to-revenue ratio (from approximately 180% to 88%).132
The situation is not quite as grim in all companies: The gigantic Rostec group reported 
returns of approximately 7–8% of revenue. The more successful companies include the he-
licopter manufacturer Vertoljoty Rossii, part of the Rostec group, which had an ROCE of up 
to 18% in 2013–2016. At the same time, its relative indebtedness was hovering around the 
90% mark, which means that even this cluster of companies is rather heavily burdened by 
debt133. During the last few years, Kalashnikov (the company renowned for its assault rifles) 
has also considerably improved its financial performance134.
The decision taken by the government in late 2016 to write off approximately 
RUB 800 billion in loans granted to companies in the defence industry companies has eased 
some of the debt burden, but it will not solve the productivity and profitability problems.
Before the beginning of the State Armament Programme, approximately one third of 
the total output of the defence sector was intended for civilian use. As the volume of mil-
itary orders has increased, the proportion of civilian production has decreased, being less 
than 20% since 2014. The government has been strongly steering the arms industry to ex-
pand its production to the civilian sector. The government has repeatedly warned these 
companies that the volume of military procurement will not keep on growing for ever, 
which means that new profitable businesses have to be developed to replace it. In Decem-
ber 2016, President Putin suggested that civilian production should cover 30% of total pro-
duction by 2025 and as much as 50% in 2030135.
However, there are very different views of how this target should be achieved. Those in 
favour of state-controlled industrial policy consider major state-owned corporations and 
government power to be essential for future growth. In contrast, supporters of more open 
markets would like to increase competition and open the sector up by attracting new in-
vestors through privatisation. The future challenges will particularly include attempts to 
expand	the	sector’s	R&D	to	civilian	products	while	the	state	wants	to	maintain	control	of	
the innovation activities136.
132	 Объединённая	Авиастроительная	Корпорация	(ОАК)	2018;	Объединённая	Судостроительная	Корпорация	(ОСК)	
2018.
133	 Вертолёты	России	2018.
134	 Калашников	концерн	2016.
135	 Ведомости	2018.
136 Frolov 2017, 18.
85
4.2 Innovations and other challenges
The development of companies in the defence sector is governed by many statutes and devel-
opment programmes, only some of which are public. The aim of the development programme 
approved in May 2016 is to speed up the development of the entire sector.137 In line with the 
general guidelines for Russian industrial policy, the defence sector development programme al-
so emphasises improved productivity, developing innovative products, and increasing the pro-
portion of domestically produced components. It had been hoped that the defence industry 
would drive the modernisation of the entire economy, but so far the chances of that have been 
slim.138 For weapon exports, the goal is to improve the competitiveness of Russian weaponry in 
the international market for next-generation high-tech weapon systems.
Increased emphasis on import substitution – which has gained momentum during the 
past decade – also applies to the defence industry. In 2012, the government initiated a pro-
gramme for improving the efficiency and competitiveness of Russian industry. The target 
set for the defence industry is to develop production so that its end products, and all their 
components, are produced entirely in Russia. Implementation of the programme was ex-
pedited when sanctions were imposed in 2014, among other things by establishing a com-
mission on import substitution, which aims to develop domestic production sectors that 
have	previously	relied	on	imports.	At	the	heart	of	the	implementation	will	be	the	R&D	by	
the defence industry, which should drive the work of developing innovations and skilled 
workers for society more broadly. Methods of achieving this goal include increased inte-
gration between the military and civilian sectors, better-skilled personnel, better quality 
control and compliance with international standards, as well as changes to the administra-
tive systems of companies in the defence sector.139
One of the objectives of the 2027 State Armament Programme is to promote innovation 
activities. Above all, it is a question of developing applied research, reforming the interfaces 
between the civilian and defence sectors, and supporting the innovation economy. The aim 
is to create a new generation of managers in the public and private sectors who have a holis-
tic understanding of the importance of utilising technology and science in all areas of society.
Due to its closed and government-led nature, the defence industry faces major chal-
lenges	 in	 its	R&D	work.	One	 important	problem	 is	 that	 the	education	 system	does	not	
meet the current needs of the defence industry. That leaves companies with difficulties in 
recruiting people that have the necessary practical skills and a sufficient theoretical basis. 
Graduates with bachelor’s degrees cannot cope with their duties and those with master’s 
degrees are too focused on research. These problems exist in the space, aircraft and ma-
rine industry sectors.140 There have been attempts to improve the situation by bringing vo-
cational schools and universities closer to companies in the sector.141
137	 Правительство	России	2016.
138	 Bukkvol,	Malmlöf,	&	Makienko	2017,	232–249.	
139	 Правительство	России	2014.
140 Articles in Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier related to educational needs are particularly common.
141	 Красная	звезда	2017.
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The problems include the high average age of employees and the unfavourable age distri-
bution, as well as polarisation of the demographic age structure of senior experts. Although 
the average age of employees decreased from 49 to 45 during 2012–2017, the workers with 
the highest level of education are also the oldest. The defence industry has problems in at-
tracting the best specialists from the private sector, where salaries and earning potential are 
significantly better. The process of recruiting skilled workers has also been hampered by a 
lack of housing, which has reduced social mobility and affected recruitment from universi-
ties, for example. There is now a grant programme aimed at making it easier for talented re-
searchers to move from the universities to the defence industry sector.142
Corruption constitutes a serious structural problem. Corruption in the armed forces and 
defence industry is usually associated with fraud, maintenance of real estate belonging to the 
Ministry of Defence, as well as to the misuse of these properties and construction contracts 
for them.143 The secrecy, lack of competition and undisclosed conflicts of interest associat-
ed with the sector tend to promote corruption, in addition to which poor control also con-
tributes to these problems.144 The number of corruption-related convictions doubled during 
2012–2016. However, it is impossible to say how much of the increase is due increased cor-
ruption and how much to more effective anti-corruption measures.145
The fact that the defence industry is government-led tends to curb innovation. The sec-
tor has traditionally had a strong symbiotic relationship with the state budget. Partly as a 
legacy of the Soviet era, many companies have an operating culture that is more like a gov-
ernment department than a business. Many companies also lack marketing and financial 
skills, which are vital in an open civilian market146. In order to rectify the situation, new skill 
and education requirements are planned for the general managers of major state-owned 
companies. In the future, they will be required to have at least three years’ experience of 
management and a suitable master’s degree.147
The subcontracting policy followed in the sector, dominated by major state-owned com-
panies, has been accused of being too introverted, and SMEs in particular have complained 
that they have difficulties getting orders, or even being allowed to participate in competitive 
tendering processes. Furthermore, the question remains unanswered of how to make it pos-
sible to utilise innovations created in the defence industry in the economy more broadly, in-
cluding in terms of contract law – currently the results of such work are unequivocally the 
property of the state.148 The problem is critical, because this is exactly where a critical bottle-
neck is created in moving promising innovations to the private sector.
142	 Красная	звезда	2017.
143	 Beliakova	&	Perlo-Freeman	2018,	7.
144 Transparency International – Russia Report 2017.
145	 Beliakova	&	Perlo-Freeman	2018,	6.
146	 Военно-промышленная	комиссия	РФ	2017.
147	 Коммерсантъ	2018c.
148	 Военно-промышленная	комиссия	РФ	2017;	Шеповаленко	2018.
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4.3 Russian arms exports
Exports are an important source of income for many successful defence industry com-
panies in Russia. Companies engaged in international trade compete on international 
markets, which means that their production must also meet international standards. To 
this end, the government has encouraged defence industry companies to expand their 
customer base to international markets and civilian products, and to seek international 
partners.149
Arms are mainly exported by subsidiaries of state-owned companies. Foreign trade 
deals related to the defence industry are struck through Rosoboronexport, a state-owned 
institution that was established in 2000 and transferred in 2011 to Rostec, the state-owned 
parent company for defence and civilian sector companies. Furthermore, the Federal Ser-
vice for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) is responsible for controlling military-tech-
nical cooperation.150
Russia is one of the world’s biggest exporters of arms. According to statistics from SI-
PRI, Russia’s 20% share makes it the second-biggest arms exporter after the US. According 
to Russian statistics, the value of arms exports in 2012–2016 was USD 15 billion a year.151 
However, arms exports represent less than 5% of all exports of goods. Approximately half 
of exports from the Russian defence industry are made up of military aviation products. 
Army materiel makes up approximately 30%, and air defence materiel approximately 20%, 
while naval warfare materiel is considerably smaller, accounting for approximately 6–7%.152
Arms are traded with more than 50 countries, and defence industry cooperation takes 
place with more than 100 countries. The biggest markets for Russian arms are in Asia. In 
2017, 58% of arms exports were destined to Asia, 39% to the Middle East and North Africa, 
and 3% to Europe. The biggest trading partners in the Middle East and North Africa have 
traditionally been Iran and Egypt, while in the 2010s, they were Syria, Iraq and Egypt. The 
biggest trading partners in Asia are China, India and Vietnam. In the past, more than half 
of arms exports were destined for China, but in the 2010s, exports to China have consid-
erably decreased, currently accounting for just over 10% of total exports. In turn, India’s 
share of exports has increased: In 2014–2016, exports to India made up 25–30% of Rus-
sia’s arms exports.153
Russia’s defence industry cooperation with China and India has been particularly close. 
In the 1990s, Russia was still exporting old Soviet-era materiel to both countries. The rapid 
development of China’s own defence industry and its aim of becoming self-sufficient have, 
in the past few decades, been evidenced by a decrease in arms exports to China, but Russia 
nevertheless remains China’s biggest trading partner in the defence sector. China has be-
149	 Афонцев	2016.
150 CAST 2016. 
151	 Заседание	комиссии	ВТС	2018.
152 CAST 2016.
153 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2018. 
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come more demanding, and in the 2010s, China was the first country to buy Russia’s latest 
weapon systems. India is still relying on imported technology and technology transfers for 
modernising the materiel of its armed forces and for developing its own defence industry, 
but the country has also raised its standards, and competition in the Indian market has in-
tensified. India has diversified its arms imports e.g. with US and French weapon systems, 
and Russia’s share of total arms imports has decreased.154
As the competition has intensified, the companies have diversified their exports and 
extended their cooperation to new markets in the Middle East, South Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, as well as expanding the scale of cooperation to new high-tech areas, including ones 
outside the defence industry.155 In addition to arms exports, Russia also has numerous co-
operation projects with China and India in the space, microelectronics, engine and civil avi-
ation industries. With India, Russia also has pure defence industry sector cooperation proj-
ects for developing and producing new military materiel.156
Russia’s arms imports have been very limited, but Russia does import dual-use tech-
nology and components. Russia’s dependence on foreign components increased gradually 
up to the 2010s, as Russia also intensified its cooperation with Western partners. Foreign 
components have been required both for Russian weapon systems and – due to demands 
from its trading partners – for weapon systems destined for export.157
The deteriorating availability of foreign dual-use technology has been a challenge, be-
cause some imported components are not produced in Russia at all, or their production 
has limitations. Russia has traditionally imported military aviation industry products from 
Ukraine. Until 2014, Russia was importing helicopter engines, ship engine turbines and 
electronic components from Ukraine. Replacing these with mainly domestic production 
is a slow process. The degree of success in replacing other imports also varies. One of the 
problems with the production of components required by the defence industry is the con-
tinuing poor domestic demand, low labour productivity, and the inefficiency of innovation 
activities. The result is often poor quality output.158
154 Juola 2018.
155	 Фролов	2017b;	Волобуев	ym.	2015.
156 Juola 2018.
157	 Фролов	2017b.
158	 Фролов	2017b.
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5. Conclusions
In spite of the difficulties, the 2010s can as a whole be considered a success for the arms 
industry. Particularly given the modest situation it was in at the start of the decade, the 
general state of the industry is now clearly better. During 2010–2017, many companies in 
the sector rose from their previous slumps, but the limited competition, low productivi-
ty and many old structural problems are still burdening most of the actors in the sector.
The State Armament Programme to 2020 has developed the material capabilities of 
the Russian Armed Forces. This is evidenced by the ability to engage in local military con-
flicts in Ukraine and Syria, where it has also been possible to test new war materiel in 
combat situations. Not all of the items in the Armament Programme are new; some are 
examples of modernisation prolonging the lifespan of existing equipment. Modernisation 
projects have restored the production base of the arms industry and established the pre-
requisites for implementing the next State Armament Programme. Companies in the de-
fence sector have been supported during the current armament programme with various 
financing and loan arrangements. The sanctions imposed by Western countries have in-
creased financing costs and made importing many components more difficult.
According to the new State Armament Programme to 2027, funding for the sector is 
likely to remain at the current level. At the same time, the demand for improved quality 
of production, more domestic components and increased civilian production will increase. 
While many companies have the technical competences required for the civilian prod-
ucts market, their operating cultures, the monopolistic structures prevalent in the sector 
and the lack of business management skills are hindering them from entering those mar-
kets. Innovations created in the Russian defence industry have seldom led to any signifi-
cant civilian products. Many new federal training and innovation programmes are seek-
ing to improve this situation, but the change is very slow at best. Not all companies have 
the prerequisites for responding to the increasingly strict requirements, but no significant 
company in the sector will be allowed to fail.
The basic picture arrived at using the current information and assumptions is that a 
lack of budgetary funding is not the biggest obstacle for the development of the Russian 
defence industry. Future estimates must take into account that, when required, Russian 
defence spending can be significantly increased by a combination of budgetary measures. 
Increasing spending by 20%, for example, would currently correspond to just over 0.5% of 
GDP. Tax revenues can be increased, the budget balance can be altered, and other expen-
ditures can be cut. Of course, this does not mean that the defence industry would have un-
limited funds at its disposal. As was seen in 2017, the budgetary spending on defence and 
internal security in Russia can also be limited.
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1. Introduction
This section describes the internal outlook in Russia, which is important for the country’s 
future and may affect Finland.
To the outside observer, Russia may look like a monolithic structure ruled by one in-
dividual, where peace is broken by occasional demonstrations about pension reforms or 
opposition to corruption. However, we must bear in mind that Russia is the world’s larg-
est country in terms of land area, consisting of more than 80 formally autonomous regions 
that are, in many ways, very diverse.
Russia’s future will be affected by several parallel developments, which may also produce 
conflicting results. Here, we analyse Russia’s internal security system, the country’s social sta-
bility and civil society, as well as its demographic development and economy. The objective 
was to select from the Russian reality the issues that are significant from the Finnish perspec-
tive. The cross-cutting themes of the section include authoritarian rule, corruption and lack 
of trust in society, which characterise Russian society overall, hampering and complicating 
many reform programmes. Furthermore, Russia’s internal development is characterised by 
slow economic growth and a lack of systemic reform in the economy. There is also a difficult 
demographic situation, which immigration compensates to a degree, while also increasing 
the shadow economy and leading to the creation of a “shadow society”.
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2. Internal security system
2.1 Decision-making in Russia
Russia’s social and political system is based on the power of the president. The compe-
tence of the government is limited, and it is more of a technical and practical operator than 
a political one. The authoritarian nature of the system is based on the fact that the govern-
ment does not answer politically to Federal Assembly, but it is also not a group of profes-
sionals who all pursue the same goal using the same methods.1 This has the result that the 
position of the president and the unofficial network created around him by the political 
elite2 are strong. The president can also appoint and dismiss the entire government and its 
individual members.
The system is a legacy of both the Soviet model, i.e. the division of duties between the 
Central Committee and Council of Ministers, which itself was based on the earlier division 
of duties between the monarch and royal court, and the ministries. The constitutional cri-
sis of 1993 is also a background factor; following the crisis, the constitution extended the 
power of the president in relation to other political actors. From the point of authoritarian 
governance, the system has the advantage that the president can change the key actors 
who head the government, either as a result of disloyalty or because the president wants 
to shift the focal points of his policy. The political responsibility for failure in implementa-
tion lies with the government, not the president. At the same time, the government has to 
perform a balancing act between effective leadership and political loyalty. The prime min-
ister is responsible for coordinating this complex network of relations. He relies on sever-
al deputy prime ministers, who head state organisations. The creation of operating policy 
often involves a complex series of deals and ad-hoc agreements between different state 
organisations.3
The Presidential Administration is a powerful but opaque actor in the decision-making 
system. It is mentioned in Article 83 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation4, but its 
mandate is not defined. The Presidential Administration started as a relatively small unit in 
the office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, 
it has 2,000–3,000 employees, and it is seen to have a central role in steering the different 
levels of administration. Among other things, its director coordinates anti-corruption mea-
sures, and the Executive Office monitors “people-to-people” activities and demonstrations. 
Furthermore, the largest subdivision of the Presidential Administration, the Domestic Policy 
1	 Gel’man	&	Starodubtsev	2016.
2 Ledeneva 2013.
3	 Gel’man	&	Starodubtsev	2016.
4	 Конституция	Рoссийской	Фeдерации	2019.
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Directorate5, produces, among other things, opinion polls for analysing public sentiment. To-
gether with Sergey Kiriyenko, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administra-
tion, the Domestic Policy Directorate is very influential in controlling the elite, political par-
ties, regional administration and civil society. This control is, in practice, somewhat opaque. 
Elections are the most important area of activity, because the directorate monitors and ad-
ministrates the arrangements for and implementation of elections and ensures that suffi-
cient administrative resources are available to achieve the desired outcome. The directorate 
also consults political parties and analyses the situation in the regions, particularly where a 
risk of conflict or separatism exists. The directorate also plays a role in the United Russia par-
ty: it maintains close contacts with the party, recruits its officials from the party ranks and al-
so participates in the election of the party’s top decision-makers.
The Security Council, working under the president, has proven to be an important or-
ganisation in terms of coordinating operational policies – a sort of core team within the 
government. Its membership includes the “power ministries”,6 as well as the chairs of the 
upper and lower houses of the Federal Assembly. The importance of the Security Council’s 
activities is an indication of the extent of security thinking and its increasing importance 
in the political culture of Russia. This is, in part, a question of increased global emphasis 
on security and its utilisation as the basis for various political and administrative solutions. 
However, the increasing importance of the Security Council can also be seen as an indica-
tion of the continuance of the social and public policy legacy of the Soviet and Imperial 
eras. The Security Council coordinates the security policy development work on the basis 
of the Federal Law on Security. In addition, the national security strategy (the latest version 
of which was produced in 2015) is another key document in this work. It defines the na-
tional interests and the focal areas of government’s activities. These two documents are al-
so supported by the 2014 Law on Strategic Planning. The planning includes the president’s 
annual public reviews and addresses, socio-economic development strategy, the security 
strategy, regional and sector-specific plans for regional development, as well as various 
forecasts, for example regarding scientific and technical development, state programmes 
and the defence programme. Therefore, the Law on Strategic Planning can be called the 
technical manual for producing the policy, whereas the national security strategy is a road-
map for developing the state and society.7 Although the power authorities and ministries 
have an important role in Russia, none of them dominate decision-making. The president 
seeks to balance the struggle for power and competition for resources between different 
ministries and authorities.
5 President of Russia 2019. 
6 The term “power authorities” usually refers to a group of 12 actors. Of these, five are ministries (the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Defence; and Ministry of Emergency 
Situations), while the others include the Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Main 
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU; Russia’s military intelligence 
organ), as well as parts of the Presidential Administration. Ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/
pm_0282.pdf
7 Heusala 2018.
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The large geographical distances in Russia make balanced regional development diffi-
cult. Methods of promoting economic and social development developed in the regions 
have, over time, been superseded by regional policy led from Moscow8. For example, spe-
cial economic zones and special development zones have not progressed as planned, de-
spite the resources allocated to them. The reasons for these failures have included bureau-
cratic benefits delaying reforms and a lack of political will. Coordination between different 
administrative units and regional organisations is also difficult.9
The authoritarian political culture, corruption and governance that resists reform are 
intertwined, and they create a self-generating model of governance that, among other 
things, lacks any incentives for economic reform or modernising the existing institutions. 
The core problems in the current system relate to steering by strong central government, 
as well as to the decentralised administrative model that implementing the reforms re-
quires. In Russia, issues associated with coordinating governance, socio-economic devel-
opment in the regions and fiscal relations between different levels of the administration 
constitute a continuing challenge for the current political system.
2.2 Development of the legal system and legislation
The fact that the Russian system is so strongly led by the president is also reflected in the 
legal system. The president appoints all judges to the higher courts, and representatives 
of the Presidential Administration participate in the boards that nominate judges in the 
regions. Other authorities, such as the FSB, may actually influence the independence of 
courts of law.
The Ministry of Justice has a major administrative role, because it is, among other 
things, responsible for registering legal persons, in addition to which it now has the new 
task of creating a shared population register. This duty of registration, in particular, makes 
the role of the Ministry of Justice essential in overseeing activities in civil society and as 
the authority responsible for enforcing legislation limiting those activities. In order to car-
ry out this duty, the Ministry of Justice maintains lists of “foreign agents” and “undesirable 
organisations”. Among other things, the ministry investigates the legality of activities pur-
sued by NGOs and religious communities, and it maintains a list of extremist materials and 
organisations that have been shut down on the basis of extremist activities. In addition, 
the Ministry of Justice can abolish, by a court order, organisations it has registered, as was 
the case with Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2017, when the Ministry of Justice declared it an ex-
tremist organisation.
8 Starodubtsev 2017.
9	 Gel’man	&	Starodubtsev	2016.
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Since the dissolution of Soviet Union, there have been many attempts to reform Rus-
sia’s judicial system. Two decades of reforms to the legal system have produced a confus-
ing mixture of legal cultures. The particular characteristics of the Soviet-era legal system 
are still evident, particularly in the application of the Criminal Code. The Russian criminal 
law process differs from its Finnish equivalent e.g. in that the authorities have extensive 
rights to carry out preliminary investigations, and in that it is rare in the Russian legal sys-
tem to decide not to bring charges.10 On one hand, criminal law is still applied in the Sovi-
et, prosecutor-driven manner, in practice starting from the assumption that the defendant 
is guilty. This means that in recent years, only one case in 500 has resulted in acquittal. 
On the other hand, Russian judges have also sought to use their discretion for the bene-
fit of defendants within Russian administrative culture. This is evidenced by, among oth-
er things, suspended sentences in cases where there is reason to suspect that the investi-
gation was carried out in a careless or unjust manner.11 Furthermore, in cases of civil law 
where a case is brought by a citizen or private company against a decision or action taken 
by central government, the courts often find in favour of the plaintiff, in line with Article 
53 of the Constitution.
Russian citizens are actively turning to the judicial system, and many cases are pro-
cessed in courts of arbitration, for example. The aim is to ease the workload for courts 
caused by civil law cases by utilising a reconciliation system with magistrates. The early 
2000s, during President Putin’s first term of office, was a particularly active period for re-
forms in Russian legislation. Among other things, a new type of criminal law and criminal 
procedure were created, as well as a new system of civil law 12. These changes were also 
aimed at modernising legislation for better compliance with Russia’s commitments under 
international agreements. At a formal level, Russian legislation today includes the right to a 
fair trial and the presumption of innocence – both elements of the rule of law. The number 
of prison sentences handed out has been reducing since 2010; by November 2018, approx-
imately 600,000 inmates were serving sentences in Russian prisons13, when the number 
had been about one million at the start of the century. In spite of the structural reforms, 
public opinion in Russia is still in favour of long and severe sentences.
The reforms carried out in the legal system in recent years to improve its predictability 
have produced conflicting results from the point of view of the independence of the judi-
cial system. In the past few years, there has been some change in legal thinking towards 
emphasising sovereignty and the right of self-determination in the application of interna-
tional law and enforcement of sentences. Since 2013, the Supreme Court of Russia has tak-
en the view that e.g. the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights only supple-
ments Russia’s national legislation and the treaties it has signed.14
10	 Heusala	&	Koistinen	2018.
11 Paneyakh 2016.  
12 Kahn 2008.
13	 Федеральная	служба	исполнения	наказаний	2019.
14 Antonov 2014.
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Corruption is one of the problems in Russia’s legal system. Political influence over the de-
cisions of courts is commonplace in trials that are economically or politically significant. Or-
dinary citizens face the challenges of more mundane problems associated with legal inter-
pretation and the prosecutor-driven legal process. Lack of training and a lot of red tape cause 
backlogs in the work of courts. Before the 2018 presidential election, Putin raised the need 
to slowly reforming the legal system. The reform plan was presented by Alexei Kudrin, the 
current chairman of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation. The plan to reform 
the legal system was produced by the Center for Strategic Research, led by Kudrin, as part of 
Russia’s strategic development programme for 2018–2024. According to the plan, courts of 
justice need to be made more independent from the security authorities and government 
administration should be improved and the training provided to court judges made more 
consistent15. However, representatives of the legal system have expressed doubts about the 
reform, because Kudrin did not allocate sufficient funds or demonstrate an understanding of 
the legal system reforms during his term as Minister of Finance.
The “May Decree” issued at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s fourth term as president,16 
made no mention of reforming the legal system.17 Although reforms to the legal system are 
not specifically mentioned in the decree, the government may seek to implement some 
parts of the plan produced by Kudrin’s think tank during the next six years. The transforma-
tion of the legal system is unfinished, and there is plenty of scope for making its operations 
more predictable. For example, in the field of criminal law, this is a question of the roles of 
and relations between the police, prosecution and judges, as well as of their professional 
competence and ethics, which all reflect the values and operating methods of society.
2.3 Administration of internal security
Decision-making in issues relating to Russia’s internal security is led by the president to-
gether with the Security Council, which has a coordinating role. The internal security or-
ganisation includes the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Ministry of Emer-
gency Situations, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Investigative Committee and the 
National Guard.
The responsibilities of the MVD include issues regarding law enforcement authorities and 
migration. The main duties of the FSB are counterespionage and intelligence, anti-terrorism 
operations, fighting particularly dangerous crime, anti-corruption work and border control. 
Russia’s Border Service has been part of the FSB since 2003. The Investigative Committee 
15	 Ведомости	2018a;	Бочаров	ym.	2018;	Право.ru	2018.
16 In May 2018, at the beginning of his fourth term as president, Putin issued a new “May Decree”, which included 
several requirements for modernising the country. The first May Decrees were issued by Putin at the beginning 
of his third term in office in 2012. The requirements are ambitious, and most of the decrees from 2012 are as yet 
unimplemented.
17	 Президент	России	2018a.
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is responsible for investigating the most serious crimes. In addition, the Investigative Com-
mittee is responsible for controlling the police (including corruption and misconduct in that 
organisation), as well as for investigations concerning central and regional authorities. The 
Prosecutor General’s office ensures that the Constitution is observed, as well as overseeing 
the enforcement of laws and legitimacy of actions by the power ministries.
The Main Directorate for Migration Affairs was established in the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in 2016, based on the previous Federal Migration Service. It concentrates on en-
hancing enforcement of migration policy. The strategic focal points of the directorate in-
clude migrant labour and ensuring the security aspects. Refugee and asylum issues do not 
have any priority in immigration. This is evidenced by the fact that applying for asylum is 
difficult in practice. No changes are on the horizon for immigration policy. Russia does not 
employ integration measures in the same way as countries like Finland do.
The Ministry of Emergency Situations is responsible for civilian protection and fire safe-
ty, as well as for taking action in emergency and disaster situations. The ministry has been 
under pressure to reform following the disastrous fire at a shopping centre in Kemerovo in 
spring 2018 and the resulting news stories about negligence.
The development and objectives of Russia’s internal security administration can be as-
sessed at a general level on the basis of the president’s annual keynote speeches, as well as 
on the basis of strategies and policy documents. In recent years, the trends have been the 
change of generation in organisations and the need to fill key positions in central and re-
gional government with trusted government officials who have a security authority back-
ground. Examples of the change of generation include the retirement of the directors of 
the Federal Drug Control Service and the Federal Migration Service when these activities 
were moved to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2016.
There is no precise information available about the numbers of personnel in the pow-
er ministries, and these figures are often exaggerated in the media. However, appropria-
tions for law enforcement authorities have increased, and budget proposals submitted by 
security authorities have been approved in the State Duma almost without amendment. 
Budget cuts due to the economic recession in Russia have been moderate in the internal 
security sector18.
The administrative sector of internal security is very strong and has ample resources, but 
it is not a homogeneous actor. The duties of different authorities partly overlap; anti-terror-
ism activities, for example, are duties of almost all the authorities. The Presidential Admin-
istration tries to control competition between authorities for skilled staff and resources. The 
key competitive factors include good relations with the Kremlin, and the division and extent 
of duties laid down in legislation related to intelligence and preliminary investigations. In the 
post-Soviet era, the structure and status of the internal security organisations in the Russian 
18 The share of the federal budget allocated to the security sector has increased slightly (it was 11% in 2010–2011, 
14–15% in 2012–2014, and 12% in 2015–2018), although in total expenditures of government sector budgets, the 
proportion has decreased due to a considerable increase in social security expenses (10% in 2010–2011, over 8% in 
2012–2014, and over 6% in 2016–2018). 
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administration have changed several times. For example, the Federal Customs Service has at 
times been an independent service, while at other times it has operated under the authority 
of another organisation. The authority of the Federal Customs Service in criminal investiga-
tions has also been changed. The changes in internal security and political cycles have also 
had an impact on the development of cross-border cooperation. Among other things, long-
term development of cooperation between Russia and EU member states (such as Finland) 
on preventing crime would require more flexible crime prevention instruments. In practice, 
this would require changes to existing national legislation if the aim were to have joint inves-
tigative teams, for example. However, the path to achieving these ambitious goals is made 
more difficult by the varying levels of trust between institutions, as well as by differences in 
national legislation and the issue of long-term commitment from political leaders.19 Reliable, 
smooth exchange of information is key.
Pressure to implement the principles of the rule of law in the activities of the security au-
thorities do not stem from parliamentary control or the pressure of civil society; rather, they 
primarily come from the authorities’ own internal control. Such self-regulation alone is in-
sufficient to achieve change. Pressure from civil society or investigative journalists, for exam-
ple, would also be required to accelerate the process of changing the legal culture in Russia.
2.4 Governance problems in Russia: corruption and networks of interest 
groups
Corruption is characteristic of the Russian culture of governance. The authoritarian po-
litical system, which is centered heavily on the president and has weak safeguards for 
promoting the interests of ordinary people, leads to a situation where the state pro-
motes the financial interests of the elite.
Several instruments, ranging from national strategy to numerous committees and au-
thorities, have been established to combat corruption. Soon after his victory in the pres-
idential election in spring 2018, President Putin submitted an initiative for new anti-cor-
ruption legislation, aimed at ensuring the right of the state to more easily obtain details of 
accounts and holdings from banks. Previously, only the police and judiciary had that right. 
The law also includes an incentive: organisations or individuals who actively assist in an-
ti-corruption activities by confessing bribery or exposing crime will receive more lenient 
punishment.20
However, Russia is still a country where corruption is rooted deep in business life and 
politics. In particular, large public projects are, in practice, impossible to implement with-
out “facilitation payments”, which constitute major reputation and business risks for par-
19	 Heusala	&	Koistinen	2018.
20 Pasmi.ru 2018.
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ticipating foreign companies. In addition to monetary input, corruption is also evidenced 
by various political appointments and business contracts, for example. Besides corruption, 
the intertwining of organised crime, business life and administration is also a major prob-
lem. It is difficult to pass any reforms in a system that also has nepotism as an inherent 
characteristic, as the relatives and family members of influential persons are appointed to 
political and administrative positions or as heads of state enterprises.
Corruption offences that reach the courts are mainly related to bribery. In addition to 
actual bribery and the facilitation payments referred to above, the problems include mis-
use of influence, lobbying and the “revolving door phenomenon”, where civil servants, pol-
iticians and managers of major companies exchange positions and favours. Russia’s posi-
tion in annual statistics published by Transparency International has remained unchanged. 
In the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index, Russia scored 29 points of 100, a result that is 
slightly below global average and indicates that corruption is fairly common in the public 
sector.21 The score has remained the same since 2012. Russia’s anti-corruption efforts do 
not effectively tackle the structures that enable and maintain corruption; they focus in-
stead on individual cases.22
2.5 Terrorism and extremist movements
The Russian authorities are paying a lot of attention to anti-terrorism measures, and these 
activities have been allocated relatively good resources. Anti-terrorism operations and the 
phenomenon of “foreign fighters” (where people join a rebellion or civil war in a state oth-
er than their own) have considerably weakened e.g. the operational capabilities of radical 
Islamists in the North Caucasus region. It is estimated that over 2,000 fighters left the area 
in 2011–2016 for Syria and Iraq, to join the ranks of the terrorist organisation Islamic State 
and other warring factions. Anti-terrorism activities were enhanced for the FIFA World 
Cup and the presidential elections in 2018. Individuals or small groups inspired by Islamic 
State’s propaganda constitute the biggest threat. Jihadism is still very rare among migrant 
workers, but people in a poor financial situation or a difficult situation in life are thought 
to be most susceptible to radical propaganda and extremist thinking.23
Foreign fighters originating from Russia are believed to be moving to new conflict ar-
eas or to other European countries, as Islamic State has lost its territories in Syria and Iraq. 
Those returning to Russia do not necessarily continue their terrorist activities, and very 
few returning fighters have been connected to terrorist attacks.24 As safe havens, fight-
ers returning from conflict areas can use politically unstable and corrupt countries, such 
21 Transparency International 2017.
22 Interview with Anton Pominov, executive director of Transparency International in Russia, 14 May 2018.
23	 	 See	e.g.	McCauley	&	Moskalenko	2008.
24 CSIS 2017; SIPRI 2016.
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as Ukraine or mountainous Georgia, where people from the Northern Caucasus fare well 
thanks to their command of Russian language and the support of Chechen minorities in 
these countries.25
In 2015, Islamic State established a branch in Russia, ISIL-CP, but it has not been very ac-
tive and is not believed to have many members. The Islamist terrorist organisation Imarat 
Kavkaz, which was established after the separatist movement faded away and operated in 
the North Caucasus is currently in such depressed state that it is not actually expected to 
carry out any strikes. It has been replaced by ISIL-CP.26 However, any terrorist organisation 
would need a lot of logistical support personnel for its operations, because the Russian au-
thorities exercise strict control and they have many different methods at their disposal for 
disrupting and preventing terrorist activities and communications. Armed skirmishes take 
place occasionally between suspected terrorists and the authorities in the North Cauca-
sus region, but the authorities have made it very difficult for radical Islamists to carry out 
any extensive operations. Anti-terrorism operations take place almost monthly in different 
parts of Russia.27 The Russian authorities have a strong mandate for anti-terrorist opera-
tions, as well as an extensive set of tools for surveillance of telephone and data networks. 
Russia has strict legislation regarding terrorism28, and anti-terrorist operations often end 
with the suspects being killed.29
Extreme right-wing, racist and nationalist activities rapidly became common after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, and they started having alarming characteristics 
in the early 2000s. At the end of the 2000s, the state started intervening more actively in 
the activities of these extremist nationalist movements, and racist street violence has also 
decreased from its peak year of 2008. That year can be considered a turning point in the 
attitude of the Kremlin towards radical opposition organisations. Since then, both the far-
right Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and the far-left National Bolshevik Par-
ty, which advocated revolution, have been declared prohibited organisations.
Although extreme nationalists have been unable to organise themselves into a sig-
nificant movement (in part due to internal disputes), loose networks can be mobilised 
through the internet and social media in a relatively short time. Prime examples of this are 
the massive riots that took place before the occupation of Crimea in Manezhnaya Square 
in Moscow in 2010 and in Biryulyovo Square near Moscow in 2013. In particular, the ri-
ots in Manezhnaya Square raised concerns in the Kremlin and made the authorities pay 
more attention to the activities of nationalists. On the other hand, nationalist – and even 
ultra-nationalist – movements have had political patrons. It has even been suggested that 
political leaders have taken advantage of them to promote their own political goals.30 The 
25 BBC 2016; RadioFreeEurope 2015.
26	 Кавказский	Узел	2016a;	Кавказский	Узел	2016b.
27	 Кавказский	Узел	2018a;	Кавказский	Узел	2018b.
28 CSIS 2017.
29	 Национальный	антитеррористический	комитет	2019.
30	 Arnold	&	Markowitz	2018;	Varga,	2008.
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far right is nowadays, particularly after the war in Ukraine started, rather fragmented and 
has not managed to organise any major demonstrations of power in the last few years. In 
spite of that, it still operates as a network that can potentially be mobilised. New far-right 
groups are constantly being created to replace those that dissolve.31 The capture of Crimea 
created a rift in the nationalist movement, when some members approved and some con-
demned the president’s foreign policy decision.
32 
Nationalist groups in Russia 
1. The nationalist anti-Putin opposition, consisting of a diverse range of actors, from 
anti-Western activists seeking to reinstate the Russian Empire, to pro-Western poli-
ticians, such as Alexei Navalny.
2. Players like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who take a different line from the Kremlin, but who 
mainly represent the “internal opposition to the system”.
3. Governmental nationalists, many of whom work in the Presidential Administration.
Although the Russian authorities have succeeded in weakening the ultra-nationalist move-
ments by enforcing the law and thanks to the rift caused by the occupation of Crimea, the 
threat they pose has not been completely eliminated. Thousands of ultra-nationalists are 
fighting as volunteers in Ukraine. Upon their return from the front, they may engage in po-
litical activity and cause social unrest.33
Russia’s fight against terrorism has been effective, but excessive punishment is the oth-
er side of the coin. For example, mere membership in the pan-Islamist organization Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, which is permitted in most countries in Europe, may be enough in Russia to be 
convicted of terrorist activities. Human rights organisations and activists34 have claimed 
that a number of security authorities have fabricated evidence about planned terrorist ac-
tivities in order to give them reason to imprison undesirable individuals, or simply in order 
to demonstrate their effectiveness. In Russia, the operating culture of law enforcement or-
ganisations is, in practice, guided by metrics based on quotas, which may lead to arrests on 
questionable grounds. Various state organisations are also competing with each other for 
resources. In this struggle for resources, highly visible operations preventing terrorist at-
tacks are an advantage. Arbitrary and severe actions by the authorities may also create an 
atmosphere in society from which terrorist activities may gain further motivation.
31	 Альперович	2018.
32 Laruelle 2017.
33 Sinelschikova 2015.
34 IFHR 2009; Arnold 2016.
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3. Social stability and civil society
3.1 Values and attitudes
During President Vladimir Putin’s third term in office, the references to heroic aspects of 
Russian history have increased, and victory in the Second World War has gained increas-
ing symbolic importance.35 Russia’s status as a great power is emphasised, and 72% of Rus-
sians also view their country as a great power. Admittedly, the citizens’ interpretation of 
the main characteristics of what constitutes a great power may differ from what the coun-
try’s leadership wants to present: the majority of Russians consider having a high standard 
of wellbeing among the country’s citizens to be the most important characteristic, rather 
than e.g. military might.36 Russia’s leadership is also attempting to maintain the concept 
of an external enemy threatening Russia, against which Russians citizens must present a 
united front.
Patriotism, shored up by the state, can be seen as a tool of governance with which it 
tries to take possession of the longing for a “stand-up citizen” and good order in society, as 
well as the idea of cherishing the memory of the Second World War, which are still deeply 
rooted in society. However, as a universally applicable and abstract ideal, patriotism is also 
open to interpretations that are opposed to Putin and the government.
Patriotism has increasingly become an “empty signifier”, a concept open to interpre-
tation that does not have a single fixed meaning and does not solve the problems citizens 
face in their everyday lives. The relationship between patriotism and ethnic nationalism is 
also problematic. The idea promoted by the state – multinationalism as a particular histor-
ical characteristic of the Russian people and state – does not necessarily resonate well with 
the people. A survey carried out by Levada-Center in July 2018 reported that xenophobic 
attitudes have increased among the Russian people.37
In practice, the state has sought to enhance the feeling of togetherness, e.g. with patri-
otic education programmes, the first of which was produced in 2001 and the most recent 
in December 2015. The latest patriotic education programme reflects the new threats in-
cluded in Russia’s policy and pays attention to the increased tensions in world politics and 
to the problems in the economy. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of patriotic edu-
cation programmes, because their goals are obscure and there are no unambiguous met-
rics for assessing their effects.38
In the past few years, Russia’s leadership has tried to link the national sentiment to the 
traditional “Russian” value basis, which has been increasingly positioned as opposition to 
35 Malinova 2017.
36	 Левада-центр	2018a,	s.	35.
37	 Левада-центр	2018b.
38 Sanina 2017, s. 45; 51–55; 61.
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Western values.39 The idea of Russia’s special status with a long history is also a key ele-
ment here. The Kremlin has also been influenced by the “Eurasian mindset”, according to 
which the state of Russia has a key role in fostering Eurasian civilisation.40 Russia’s leader-
ship is attempting to strengthen national sentiment by emphasising the greatness of the 
Russian state and the heroic history shared by its multinational people, as well as the tra-
ditional, conservative values as the common denominator of the people. This manner of 
speech and its application in practice, e.g. in legislation, excludes certain groups of people 
from the idea of national unity, and these people are then pictured as victims of external 
influence or even as being in opposition to Russia’s national interests. Of the minorities in 
the country, members of “non-traditional” religions and of sexual and gender minorities 
who face prejudice and pressure. Excluding minorities from what it means to be Russian 
may also affect regions neighbouring Russia when excluded people seek protection out-
side Russia’s borders.
Traditional values have been strengthened with the backing of the Russian Orthodox 
Church.41 The Russian Orthodox Church enjoys the relatively stable respect of the people, 
which makes its support for state policies valuable. During the last decade, the church has 
gained more political power, and it has e.g. influenced changes to legislation decriminalis-
ing domestic violence and the criminalisation of insulting the feelings of religious believers. 
Promoting conservative values as the key element of national feeling also limits public de-
bate and affects the way in which certain problems in society can be approached. For ex-
ample, discussion regarding the HIV epidemic in Russia is sometimes reduced to demands 
for sexual abstinence.
However, the idea of Russia’s special status and moral superiority compared to the 
West may be difficult to sell to the people, among whom feelings of inequality and in-
creased poverty have intensified during the past few years. In spite of the rapid economic 
growth and improved living standards during the early 2000s, as many as half of Russians 
feel that their lives have become worse since the switch to a market economy. Of all the 
former socialist states, Russian citizens have the most negative attitudes towards the shift 
to a market economy. In addition, a clear majority of Russians feel that the gap between 
the rich and poor has grown in the last few years.42
In the 1990s, the steep increase in poverty, inequality and mortality following the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union probably explains at least some of the conflict discussed above be-
tween perceived decreased welfare and improved living standards, measured by economic 
statistics. During the worst years of the 1990s, the low birth rate and low life expectancy led 
to Russia’s population falling by 700,000 per year – the largest ever population collapse in 
any industrialised country in peacetime.43 Because of the alarming demographic situation, 
39 Østbø 2017.
40 Bassin ym. 2015.
41 See e.g. Agadjanian 2017.
42 Denisova et al 2010; EBRD 2016a.
43 Kainu et al 2017, p. 291.
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during President Putin’s second term in office, the government declared that social policy is 
one of its top priorities.44 In reality, the state has in recent years taken a back seat in welfare 
politics, encouraging NGOs and companies to assume more responsibility for providing wel-
fare services.45 A distinct exception to that is the family policy, which encourages people to 
have more children, that the state is hoping will mitigate the demographic crisis. All in all, the 
Russian welfare system can be characterised as a mixture of neoliberal and state-led welfare 
policies, where neither political philosophy has a clear upper hand.46
3.2 Trust in Russian society
In European comparison, Russia can be categorised as a society of low trust: trust in other 
people, and particularly in institutions, is low (Figure 1). The Russian people are quicker to 
mistrust other people and social institutions than to trust them. On the other hand, there 
is little general trust in many other former Soviet and socialist countries in Europe, so as a 
society with a low level of trust, Russia is not in any way exceptional in Eastern Europe.47
Figure 1. Trust in Europe. Figure by Eemil Mitikka. 48
44 Cook 2011, Kulmala 2013.
45 Kulmala 2016.
46 Kainu et al 2017.
47 Kornai et al 2004.
48 ESS Round 6 (2012). Trust on a scale of 0–10 where 0 = “I do not trust at all” and 10 = “I trust completely”.
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Of social institutions, Russian people expressed (in 2018) the highest degree of trust in the 
army and the president, as well as the security service and other intelligence services. In 
turn, political parties, major Russian companies and the State Duma were the least trusted 
organisations. In the dynamics of trust of the Russian people, it is noteworthy that there is 
clearly more trust in abstract and symbolic institutions that are quite remote from the ev-
eryday lives of ordinary Russians than in institutions that are closer to their everyday lives. 
In particular, trust in the army has markedly increased over the past few years, which may 
be an indication of people’s satisfaction with Russia’s latest military operations in Ukraine 
and Syria. The apparent conflict between the high level of trust in President Putin and the 
very low level of trust in political parties is probably an indication of the president’s success 
in distancing himself from party politics. On the other hand, this high esteem reflects the 
weakness of the party institution and political institutions, albeit that the recent pension 
reforms have also eroded the trust in the president (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Trust in institutions in Russia. Image: Eemil Mitikka.49
49	 Левада-центр	2018c.	Percentages	of	“I	trust	completely”	on	the	following	institutions	of	all	replies	in	2012,	2017	and	
2018.
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3.3 Status of communication in Russia
The Kremlin has a dominant position in communication in Russia. In Russia, 90% of all mass 
media is funded by the public sector in one way or another. Most important private me-
dia outlets are owned by major businessmen loyal to the regime. During the last six years, 
the Kremlin’s hold on the mass media has become even stronger. Precision steering by the 
state has now changed to almost full-scale control.
In a report in 2018 mapping the status of internet in the world, Freedom House 
stated that the internet in Russia is not free, and its freedom has been increasingly re-
stricted for six consecutive years. In the index measuring the freedom of internet in 
the world, Russia is in 53rd place among the 65 countries included in the comparison. 
Countries comparable to Russia include Belarus, Turkey, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and 
Uzbekistan.50
Roskomnadzor, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information 
Technology and Mass Media, was established in 2008. Its sphere of responsibility includes 
information technology licences and permits, management of personal data and looking 
after the rights of registered persons, as well as monitoring of telecoms traffic.51
In recent years, the Russian authorities have actively enhanced the management 
methods of telecom channels and data. Concrete action that has been taken include 
legislation passed in 2006 protecting the personal data of Russian citizens52, as well 
as a data localisation law introduced in 2015 to support the legislation53. The data lo-
calisation law requires that personal data about Russian citizens must primarily be 
stored in databases and servers located within Russian borders. The change requires 
all organisations processing the personal data of Russian citizens to take action. This 
requirement has also caused problems for foreign companies, including Finnish com-
panies, that have business operations in Russia54. The law requires, for example, that 
companies have websites in the Russian language, the website has a Russian top-lev-
el domain, the company has advertising aimed at Russian customers, and it must be 
possible to pay using Russian currency. In practice, the localisation law means that 
maintaining two databases accessible both from Russia and from outside Russia is not 
permitted. However, copies of the database may be kept outside Russia’s borders pro-
vided that certain conditions are met.
Breaching these obligations has also resulted in direct effects. For example, the oper-
ations of the business-oriented social network LinkedIn was prevented in Russia, because 
LinkedIn did not comply with the localisation law described above.55 Preventing foreign 
50 Freedom House 2018.
51	 Роскомнадзор	2019.
52	 Президент	России	2006.
53	 Президент	России	2014.
54 Kauppalehti 2016.
55 Iapp 2017.
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service providers from operating in Russia has led to an increase in demand of encrypted56 
connections In Russia, which allow Russians to continue using messaging services prohibit-
ed in Russian territory, such as Telegram, in the same manner as before.57
Pavel Durov, the founder of the instant messaging service Telegram, used to own VKon-
takte, Russia’s most popular social media channel. When he refused to provide the au-
thorities with the personal data of people who took part in demonstrations in winter 
2011/2012, he had to give up VKontakte, and he moved abroad.58 It has been alleged that 
VKontakte has been working in close cooperation with the security authorities since its 
change of ownership. VKontakte responds to these allegations by saying that it must com-
ply with Russian legislation.59
Yandex, the search engine company that has beaten Google on the Russian market, is 
Russia’s commercial internet success story. Russia’s largest bank Sberbank is the business 
partner of Yandex, Russia’s largest internet company. The Central Bank of Russia is Sber-
bank’s biggest shareholder. The President and Chief Executive Officer of Sberbank provides 
reports about the company’s situation directly to the president of Russia.60 Together, Yan-
dex and Sberbank have developed a company for the Russian e-commerce market; it is 
promoted as the Amazon of Russia. Sberbank is a shareholder of Yandex, and it can veto 
any transaction involving more than 25% of Yandex’s share capital.61 In recent years, Yan-
dex has had to remove results from its news aggregator from mass media companies that 
are not registered with Roskomnadzor62.
A package of laws bearing the name of Russian politician Irina Yarovaya is a key factor 
affecting the status of communication in Russia. The package was developed in 2016 in or-
der to combat and contain terrorism. The laws consisted of requirements that obligated all 
telecom operators in Russia to record details of their network traffic, such as identification 
and location data, and to meet strict terms and conditions, including some specifying the 
required duration for which the details must be stored. It turned out that the requirements 
of the law were more difficult to implement than originally thought. No equipment com-
plying with the requirements of the Yarovaya laws has yet been developed, and the pres-
ident has announced that technical equipment supporting the legislation must be devel-
oped.63 Attempts were made in 2016 to improve containment of terrorism. The FSB issued 
an order64 obligating telecom operators to divulge their encryption keys to Russian securi-
ty authorities. The requirement caused conflict between the Russian security authorities 
and several companies.
56 Virtual Privacy Networks.
57 The Moscow Times 2018.
58 The Moscow Times 2014.
59 BBC 2018.
60	 Президент	России	2018b.
61 Financial Times 2018.
62 The Moscow Times 2017.
63	 Новая	газета	2018.
64	 Государственная	система	правовой	информации	2016.
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In the 2000s, social media became a space where people who disagreed with the state 
engaged in political debate on different forums in the same manner as they did in the 
kitchens of private homes during the final decades of the Soviet Union. It was used to orga-
nise the protest demonstrations of winter 2011/2012, following which the state enhanced 
its own communication over social media and sought to control it more closely. However, 
the Russian deputy minister for mass media and communications has admitted that it is, 
in practice, impossible to completely block any content on the internet if the user has the 
required skills and resources to circumvent the measures implemented.65
In 2018, 75% of Russians were internet users.66 Television continues to be the most 
common source of news. Over 70% of the population watch TV news, over 40% read online 
magazines, while approximately 20% follow blogs and news on social media.67 However, 
trust in TV news has decreased by 30% over the last decade, while the trust people have in 
news feeds on the internet has tripled. For young people, the internet is already a slightly 
more popular media outlet than television.68
In 2018, the volume of internet advertising exceeded TV advertising for the first time69. 
Instant messaging channels and video bloggers have gained in popularity at the expense of 
traditional media. Television is facing increasingly intense competition from social media70.
3.4 Protests and citizens’ political influence
The fact that the electoral system supports authoritarian use of power, protests by citizens 
and pressure exerted on citizens all have very important roles in political and social stabil-
ity in Russia. If elections keep losing significance as a channel of civil influence, it is proba-
ble that there will eventually be more demonstrations. The Kremlin has also tightened its 
hold over civil society, so increased pressure and oppression in society cannot be excluded.
Economic forecasts for Russia do not provide a sustainable solution for the problems 
that different regions and sectors in Russia are facing. Following the stricter control after 
the mass protests in 2011–2012 and the “Crimean euphoria” of 2014, there have been few 
participants in protests. The small size of protests is explained mostly by the fact that it has 
become more difficult to get permits to hold demonstrations and the penalties for partic-
ipation in unauthorised demonstrations have become more severe.
65 TASS 2018. 
66	 Исследование	GfK:	Проникновение	Интернета	в	России.	
67	 Источники	новостей	и	доверие	СМИ.	ФОМ.	
68	 Ведомости	2018b;	Левада-центр	2018e.
69	 Коммерсантъ	2018.	
70	 Комитет	гражданских	инициатив	2018,	s.	24,	29	ja	34.
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The protests of 2017–2018 differ from those in 2011–2012 in four significant respects:
1. Geographical scope: all over Russia, not just in major cities.
2. Demographic change: extensive participation by young people.
3. More extensive range of themes: strong dynamics in protest themes and obvious, yet 
not explicit link to opposing corruption among the elite.
4. Readiness to protest in spite of deterrents: the deterrents limit the number of partici-
pants, but not the reasons for protests.
The spread of protests to practically all areas of Russia is a new and already quite estab-
lished feature. Furthermore, the subjects of protests cover almost all aspects of everyday life, 
from waste management to problems with financial institutions and property developers.71 
In spring 2018, the increase in the retirement age proposed by the government and Presi-
dent Putin’s strong commitment to the government bill faced unprecedented opposition. Al-
most 90% of Russians said they opposed the reform, and as many as 53% said they were pre-
pared to demonstrate their opposition.72 Before that, the weak trust that citizens had in the 
government, authorities and politicians had not been a significant problem for the Kremlin’s 
use of power, but now support for Putin is also considerably lower. This may have significant 
consequences, because in the past Putin has been able rise above dissatisfaction among the 
people by delegating the problems to lower levels of government. For example, in his inau-
guration ceremonies in 2012 and 2018, the president issued73 the “May Decrees”, which in-
cluded several reform goals. The decrees in May 2012, at least, were unrealistic, given the 
economic possibilities that the regions had of achieving these goals.
Although no immediate economic, political or military threats are on the horizon for 
Russia’s current system,74 the sudden drop in Putin’s popularity shows that it is difficult to 
assess the citizens’ dissatisfaction and readiness to demonstrate solely on the basis of the 
support enjoyed by the social elite and President Putin. The readiness of Russian people to 
protest can change rather rapidly, as shown in Figure 3. For example, anti-corruption pro-
tests increased suddenly early in 2017 when Alexei Navalny, who is excluded from receiv-
ing official publicity but has a strong influence in the internet, mobilised extensive anti-cor-
ruption protests around Russia. Similarly, their number dropped late in 2017 as a result of 
pressure exerted on the demonstrators.75
The interconnectedness of economic power groupings in Russia mean that there may 
well be more anti-corruption demonstrations in the future. In addition, protests related to 
everyday life and the living environment may become more deeply intertwined with oppo-
sition to political corruption. On the other hand, the attitude of Russian people regarding 
corruption has not significantly changed: it is considered a negative phenomenon, but at 
71	 Minchenko	consulting	2018;	Центр	экономических	и	политических	реформ	2017.
72	 Левада-центрd	2018.
73	 Президент	России	2018a.
74 Gill 2018, ss. 1–24.
75	 ОВД-Инфо	2018.
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the same time a regrettable custom.76 However, the dynamics and extent of protests in-
dicate that people are more prepared to seek a change to the status quo. Surveys clearly 
show that citizens expect the state to invest resources in improving their everyday lives.77
The turnout rates in local elections, especially, are very low, and they are also on the 
decline in parliamentary elections, which are problematic developments as far as elections 
and social participation are concerned. In the 2018 local elections, the official opposition 
parties – above all the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party of Russia – beat in a few constituencies candidates from the Kremlin’s ruling 
party, United Russia. However, the willingness to compromise and actual submission to 
the blatantly fraudulent conduct of the ruling party showed that the Kremlin is still able to 
maintain its authoritarian hold over the official “systemic opposition”78 for the time being.
The poor reputation of all the parties is becoming a major problem. The local success 
of the systemic opposition in 2018 was largely the result of protest votes, rather than im-
proved support for these parties. Candidates from both the extraparliamentary opposi-
tion and the systemic opposition who are “too independent” have been systematically ex-
cluded from elections using administrative pretexts. Ordinary citizens have little chance of 
changing the situation. Dissatisfaction among citizens has increased in recent years, while 
their opportunities to influence issues have further decreased. This poses a serious risk to 
social and political stability.
Figure 3. Protest themes as a percentage of all protests in Russia during 2015–2017 (six-monthly figures).79 
Image: Eemil Mitikka.
76	 Левада-центр	2017.
77 Volkov 2017.
78 The term “systemic opposition” refers to the opposition that is officially recognised by the Kremlin and does not 
“excessively” oppose the policies promoted by the Kremlin.
79	 Комитет	гражданских	инициатив	2018.
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The foreign policy focus emphasized by the Kremlin and mainstream media, particular-
ly state television, does not give rise to much opposition by the citizens. However, an in-
crease in protests related to foreign policy cannot be excluded, because the themes of 
protests can change rapidly. Regarding foreign policy, the potential for protests has to do 
with the dissatisfaction with the regime’s choice of economic priorities between internal 
politics and foreign policy.80 In this respect, the Kremlin’s possibilities to use foreign poli-
cy as to help compensate for challenges in internal politics are facing increasing pressure.
Given the authoritarian trend of Putin’s regime since 2012, the pressure on civil society 
and demonstrations is likely to remain intense – or even to intensify further. Besides po-
litical pressure, attention must be paid to citizens’ willingness to emigrate. In a survey car-
ried out in 2018, one in five Muscovites said they wanted to move abroad, while the figure 
elsewhere in the country was just a few per cent.81 The increasing popularity of emigration 
concerns above all those people most essential for the modernisation of Russia: young, ed-
ucated urban people with a good command of languages.82
3.5 Effect of the authoritarian system on public opinion
The low level of trust is also indicated by the low response rates to surveys in Russia.83 
This is one reason why it is difficult to reliably assess solely on the basis of surveys citi-
zens’ actual commitment to the policies and values that Russia’s leadership promotes. 
Furthermore, attitudes can also change relatively quickly if the attitudes of Russia’s lead-
ers or the elite change or in a situation where authoritarian institutions face a crisis that 
weakens their position. Therefore, the picture of Russian society that opinion polls paint 
is not a complete one. Particularly in countries under authoritarian regimes, responses 
may be affected by the way that various issues are framed by the elite, the general view 
of what are considered social norms, as well as the expected social consequences of ex-
pressing opinions, such as pressure from society or the government. These factors must 
be taken into account when interpreting surveys in Russia.84 For example, survey data col-
lected in recent years indicates that relatively few Russians are actually afraid to publicly 
express their views on the policies of Russia’s leaders. However, relatively few people al-
so feel that they can speak completely freely about such issues: in 2012–2017, the aver-
age was 34%.85
80	 Волков	2018.
81	 Радио	свобода	2018.
82 The Insider 2016.
83	 Lefteast	2017;	Юдин	2016.
84 Rogov 2017.
85	 Левада-центр	2018a,	s.	43.
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4. Economy and demographic development
4.1 Economy
Communication by the state’s leaders in Russia has focused a lot on adjusting budget ex-
penditures. There has been far less focus on market-positive system changes aimed at cre-
ating reliable regulation, which could incentivise business operations and the generation 
of income. During the past decade, Russia’s leaders have only rather infrequently spoken 
about the business environment, and only at a general level. In transition economies, re-
forms are at times debated between the parties advocating them and opposing them, but 
in Russia, the symbiotic relations between those in power, the authorities and companies 
combine to resist reform, particularly when it compromises the positions and benefits they 
have achieved. The regions and localities have not embarked on reforms as visibly and suc-
cessfully as they did in some cases in the 1990s and 2000s. The patriotic rhetoric under-
lining the special status and unity of Russia, sometimes using harsh tones, and the lack 
of trust tend to make companies even more careful. The people are far less in favour of a 
market economy than they are of a planned economy.86
The economic equilibria in Russia are rather good (see Figure 4), which supports 
growth. The country’s leadership also views these equilibria as important in fostering sta-
bility and the nation’s as well as its own sovereignty.87 Unemployment rates are currently 
far lower88 than at the beginning of the Putin era and during the recession of 2009. Region-
al and local leaders were at that time made responsible for dealing with it under threat of 
being fired. Inflation has slowed down, which mainly supports people with low incomes 
who have to spend all of their income. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation has a 
target for inflation of about 4%, and it runs a accurate monetary policy. The state regulates 
some prices, mainly those of household energy, important medicines and petrol. Russia’s 
leaders have usually maintained a government budget surplus, among other things by ap-
plying budgetary rules. The rule introduced at the beginning of 2018 sets a fairly strict 
framework for expenditure89 and generates a surplus at the current oil prices. The Central 
Bank has been promoting stability in the banking sector for a long time. The country’s ex-
ternal sector current account balance has been managed by letting the exchange rate of 
the rouble float since November 2014.
86 EBRD 2016a.
87 However, long-term imbalances, such as underemployment at places of work, dismantling of price regulations and 
large, uncovered pension liabilities (estimated in IMF 2014 to be over 280% of GDP in 2012) are to be taken care of 
later.
88 According to a regular labour force survey carried out using the methodology of the International Labour 
Organization	(Росстат	2010	and		Росстат	2006−2018).
89 The calculated price of Urals crude for the next few years is approximately USD 42 per barrel, and the budget must 
not have any “basic deficit”, which means deficit before interest expenses for state debts.
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Exports of energy and metals represent approximately 17–18% of GDP, which means that 
fluctuations in world market prices can swing the balance. However, preparations have been 
made for such swings. The primary buffer is the exchange rate of the rouble, which decreas-
es when oil prices and export revenues drop or when capital flows out of the country, e.g. 
when new sanctions are imposed or threatened. This dampens the slide in export revenues 
and dollar-based oil tax revenues in roubles, and particularly steers the decline of domestic 
demand to imports. The decline in imports naturally also concerns Finnish exports to Russia. 
The Central Bank can moderate any excessive drops in rouble exchange rates through cur-
rency market operations, because the country has ample reserves of foreign currency.90 Falls 
in the price of oil (which notably occurred in 1998, 2009 and 2014–2015) erode budget rev-
enues because oil and gas tax revenues represent a large part of them.91
Figure 4: Key equilibrium indicators of the Russian economy. Image: Vesa Korhonen.
There are savings to finance the budget deficit, for example in the Russian National Wealth 
Fund (which is currently the state’s sole reserve fund). At the end of 2018, the Russian Fed-
eration’s deposits at the Central Bank totalled 9% of GDP. The state has debts amounting 
to only 12% of GDP, and as a reserve, it can rely on the state-owned banks, and in extreme 
situations on the Central Bank.
The social contract of the 2000s has become eroded. The chain of events during the 
recession of 2015 (a fall in the price of oil had a knock-on effect on  the rouble exchange 
rate, which led to higher inflation) reduced household consumption by 10%. Russia’s lead-
ers nevertheless maintained their strict policy regarding salaries and pensions. Before the 
Duma elections in autumn 2016, pensioners were promised a considerable lump sum and 
90 In addition, large, state-owned export companies were instructed in late 2014 to limit foreign currency receivables 
and special controls were imposed on payments by banks.
91 In 2017, 40% of federal budget revenues and 20% of consolidated budget revenues (the Russian Federation, its 
regions and localities, and state social funds).
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reinstatement of index-linked rises. As the presidential election of 2018 was approaching, 
Putin announced salary increases as well as minor social and tax benefits. These benefits 
applied to millions of voters but did not require very much in funds compared to the pen-
sion and salary increases for the 2008 and 2012 elections. The policy indicates that Russia’s 
leaders do not strongly believe there will be much economic growth.
The coefficient representing income distribution among the population92 has slightly 
decreased, but was still 38–41% in 2016–2017, i.e. of the same order as the extreme val-
ues in Europe. The statistics show that the 20% with the highest income receives a bigger 
share of the total income of population than almost anywhere else in Europe, while the 
three lowest-income categories earn slightly less than in most of Europe93.
On the other hand, many Russians remember much bleaker times. In 2018, household 
consumption was up 40% from 2006, and the percentage of people in poverty has de-
creased a lot over the years. There are major differences in living standards between differ-
ent regions, which is also partly reflected in satisfaction among people in different regions. 
(See Figure 5.) In Karelia, for example, consumption per capita is half of that in Finland. 
Nevertheless, Putin has had slightly better than average election results in 2012 and 2018 
in regions where consumption is lower94. The popularity of Russia’s leadership grew fol-
lowing the capture of Crimea, but it has since been decreasing for a few years, apart from 
Putin’s own popularity. His personal popularity may also decrease following unpopular re-
forms, as happened in early summer 2018 when the government announced increases to 
the retirement age and VAT rate. Late in the summer, Russia’s leadership decided on nota-
ble increases to pensions up to 2024.
Figure 5: Satisfaction among Russian people by federal district in 2012 and 2016. Image: Vesa Korhonen.
92 The Gini coefficient before and after taxes and transfers.
93	 Росстат	2018	and	World	Bank	2018a.
94 Comparative calculation for Karelia using consumption and price data from the World Bank and Rosstat. Data on 
regions is from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation and Rosstat’s consumption and price 
statistics.
54
51
57
45
53
64
51
55
61 60
51
58
48
46
57
42
44
41
31
39
30
36
25
30
30
49
40
50
29
40
33
51
28 26
33
2527
28 28
25 26
28 26
40
36
41
24
22
22 24 23
16
28
2024
19
23
20
26
20
26
22
30
26
21 19 20 17
20
8
22
19
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Whole of Russia Central FD Northwestern FD Volga FD Southern FDNorth Caucasian FDUral FD Siberian FD Far Eastern FD
Own life Government
Democracy National economy
% of respondents
Source: ESS 2012 and 2016
128
Export prices only boost economic growth when they rise, and Russia’s leadership knows 
that the price hikes in 2000–2008 were exceptional. (See Figure 6.) The talk of annual 
growth of several per cent that began early in the 2000s is continuing, but the prerequi-
sites for such economic growth are not present. Forecasts expect that GDP will increase by 
1.5–2% per year in the next few years if the price of oil remains at USD 60–75 per barrel 
and no significant reforms supporting growth are carried out.95 The forecasts for econom-
ic growth over the next few years predict a slower rate for Russia than in almost all other 
countries in Europe. Adjusted for purchasing power, Russia’s share of the world economy 
will slightly decrease from the current figure of just over 3%. The size of the economy will 
remain unchanged at approximately one fifth of that of the USA and will keep decreasing 
compared to China from the current 17%.96
Figure 6: Growth in the main components of the economy and the world market price of oil.  
Image: Vesa Korhonen.
In the 2000s, there was plenty of available labour and productive capital, as well as possi-
bilities for improving productivity. Today, the basic prerequisites for economic growth are 
not good, but sanctions imposed by foreign countries are far from being the main culprit97. 
It is already somewhat difficult to increase employment, but the gradual increase in the 
retirement age starting from 1 January 2019 will start alleviating the situation.98 The migra-
tion of workers into sectors and localities suffering from a lack of available labour could be 
95	 This	is	projected	e.g.	by	Банк	России	2018a	and	Министерство	экономического	развития	2018,	IMF	2018a,	World	
Bank 2018b, OECD 2018a and BOFIT 2019. The growth rate forecast for the next few years is based on long-term 
growth estimates. (Estimates have been lowered over the years; see e.g. World Bank 2018c, Korhonen, Iikka 2015 
and	Rautava	2004	&	2013.)
96 IMF 2018b and World Bank 2018a.
97 They are estimated to have been responsible for approximately 0.5–1 percentage points of the 2.7% decline in GDP 
in 2015–2016 (Korhonen et al 2018).
98	 Банк	России	2018b	and	Министерство	экономического	развития	2018
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aided e.g. by developing employment services. Compared to EU countries, there is a much 
bigger shortage of skilled workers and considerably less training for adults.99
The productive capital is rather worn out and aged. The investment ratio, which mea-
sures the ratio of investment to GDP, remains low.100 The low volume of investments is 
harmful to infrastructure (particularly the road network)101, as well as to productivity and 
diversification of the economy, which Russia’s leaders have frequently called for. Major in-
vestments are being made in the energy sector, but at the same time, the proportions of 
oil and natural gas in the global consumption of energy are falling. Manufacturing indus-
tries make few investments. Companies’ research and development expenses, in particu-
lar, are much lower than in almost any developed country. Innovation was added to the 
management lexicon of Russia’s leadership some ten years ago with state-driven and forc-
ible emphasis. The small number of international patent applications filed from Russia in-
dicates that the results were meagre. Companies are the core element of productivity, but 
prospects for improving productivity do not look promising in the light of country compar-
isons	of	investments,	R&D,	employee	skills	and	company	management102.
Among other things, the state can support the development of companies through 
its choices regarding expenditure in the state budget. However, the leadership’s focus 
has shifted in another direction. In spite of pensions being small, social security expens-
es have comprised more than one third of all expenditure throughout the 2010s, because 
the number of pensioners has increased. The decision to raise the retirement age was 
taken after the state leaders had been assuring people for many years that it would not 
be increased. Spending on defence and internal security accounts for 15–18% of budget 
expenses. That proportion has increased, particularly following the sharp rise in defence 
spending in 2013–2016.103 Internal security was given additional funding after the 2012 
presidential election and the demonstrations. The segments promoting welfare, develop-
ment	and	economic	growth	(i.e.	healthcare	and	education)	each	receive	9−10%	of	budget	
funding. The intention is to increase spending on these two segments. Expenses related to 
the environment remain almost the lowest in the world at 0.3% of GDP.
There is no public programme aimed at market economy reforms. A presidential de-
cree on 7 May 2018 lists projects for improving e.g. education, healthcare, roads, digital-
isation and the productivity of a limited group of companies, and the government pro-
gramme up to 2024 is similar. The intention is to create a better basis for economic growth, 
but systemic reforms, such as improving and developing the operations of public authori-
ties, are scarcely mentioned.104 Russia’s leadership is also continuing with its industry sec-
99 OECD 2014.
100 For more details, see e.g. Korhonen 2018.
101	 WEF	2018;	EBRD	2016a	&	2016b.
102 EBRD 2012.
103 For possibilities of increasing defence expenditure for the next few years, see Korhonen 2018.
104	 Президент	России	2018a	(see	also	Simola	2018),	Правительство	2018.
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tor-specific programmes without taking a broader view, and is paying little attention to 
studies and public discussion concerning reforms.
In Russia, the need for reform still mainly concerns the basic elements of market economy, 
as deficiencies there are detrimental to competition. The state’s holdings in companies do not 
necessarily mean that the state interferes with their operations, but in Russia, people in pow-
er actually do interfere for different reasons, which vary from underlining the interests of the 
motherland to personal gain, for example.105 Particularly the privatisation of major state-owned 
companies, which came to a halt years ago, has not recommenced. On the contrary, the state 
has at times increased its holdings. Furthermore, people in power can also pursue their goals 
by influencing the owners and managers of private companies. Interfering with business oper-
ations weakens the efficiency of companies and the willingness of competitors to the enterpris-
es in symbiotic relationships with Russia’s rulers to enter the same sectors.
The actions of the authorities are superseded, for example, in cases where regulations 
are applied in ways that suit the needs of people in power. This keeps companies in a state 
of uncertainty. These kinds of arbitrary actions can apply to anyone, and favouring some 
discriminates against others. Surveys indicate that e.g. the conduct of the Federal Tax Ser-
vice has improved106, but the actors and factors that have created most problems for com-
panies in the 2010s – more than e.g. in the most recent EU member states – were the per-
mit authorities, tax authorities, customs, courts, corruption and weak protection of the 
right of ownership.107 The Federal Antimonopoly Service operates in a suboptimal manner 
and sometimes makes decisions that actually restrict competition. Russia does not score 
highly in broad comparisons of system characteristics and business environments.108
The Russian economy has become open to a relatively small extent. Following 18 years 
of negotiations, the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2012, partly at-
tracted by the status of being a member. Even this mild degree of openness gave rise to 
warnings of the threat of imported products, and the benefits attracted little attention. 
There is little interest in free trade, and hopes of a free trade agreement between the EU 
and Russia faded long before the annexation of Crimea. The closest relations regarding 
economic integration are focused on countries that pose little risk to Russia’s own produc-
tion and are most promising for the circle of power.109 In recent years, Russia has increased 
import restrictions and production support, and – following the imposition of sanctions – 
has enhanced the policy of replacing imports that was already made official ten years ago. 
The actual viability of production supported by state funds and import restrictions is ques-
tionable.
105 State-owned companies have revenues estimated at 12% or more of the total revenues of non-financial sectors (IEP 
2018). State-owned banks, following an increase, now account for two thirds of the total of balance sheets in the 
banking sector (IMF 2018c).
106 CEFIR 2007 and EBRD 2012.
107 EBRD 2012 and 2017, WEF 2018 and World Bank 2018d
108 World Bank 2018d and 2018e, EBRD 2018 and WEF 2018.
109 In particular, the Eurasian Economic Union and also CIS free trade and free trade e.g. with Vietnam.
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4.2 Demographics and public health
There has been public debate throughout the 2000s in Russia about the demographic crisis 
being a threat to the country’s great power status. Population growth took a slight turn for 
the better approximately ten years ago after bottoming out (Figure 7). Healthy population 
growth could calm the atmosphere and improve self-esteem and political confidence. The 
overall impact on Finland’s security could then be assumed to be positive. However, popu-
lation forecasts (including those produced in Russia) predict that population will again be-
gin to decrease in the coming years.
Figure 7: Population of Russia 1950–2035. Image: Vesa Korhonen.
It	is	forecast	that	the	working-age	population	in	Russia	will	decrease	by	0.3−0.6	million	a	
year for the next 5–6 years. These forecasts are largely based on the assumption that nat-
ural (net) population growth will continue to be negative, i.e. the number of deaths will 
exceed the number of births every year. In 2013–2015, Russia enjoyed a three-year peri-
od of slightly positive population growth, until it turned steeply negative in 2017 and 2018 
. (See Figure 8.) In 2017, the development of population was the worst for a decade: the 
birth rate decreased by approximately 10% and the number of deaths exceeded the num-
ber of births by 136,000. There is a simple reason for the decline in the birth rate: the his-
torically small age cohorts of the late 1990s and early 2000s will soon reach childbearing 
age. By the beginning of the 2030s, the number of women in childbearing age will be ap-
proximately one third lower, i.e. around 7–8 million less than what it was at the beginning 
of the 2010s. The dependency ratio will suffer as the age cohorts entering working life be-
gin to decrease in size and the baby boomer generation starts leaving the labour force.110
110	 Центр	стратегических	разработок	2017.
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Figure 8: Natural population growth in Russia in 1950-2018. Image: Vesa Korhonen.
The number of Russian people living in poverty has halved since the economic crises fol-
lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union; rapid economic growth and the low birth rate after 
the crises ended have had particular impacts. The birth rate in Russia was at its lowest in 
1999, when there were 8.3 births per thousand people. Following that, the birth rate im-
proved,	standing	at	13.2−13.3	in	2013−2015.111
The	mortality	rate	 is	still	very	high	 in	Russia:	12−13	deaths	per	1,000.	 In	Finland,	by	
comparison,	the	rate	is	9.7−9.8.	The	background	factor	still	affecting	mortality	 in	Russia	
is the exceptional social transformation of the 1990s, which had the effect of steeply in-
creasing mortality. The mortality rate is in part explained by the use of intoxicants and peo-
ple’s lifestyles. Russia’s demographic development includes a paradox: the life expectan-
cy of Russian men in particular has not significantly increased, despite the rapid economic 
growth in the 2000s. So far, the state has, above all, concentrated resources on increasing 
the birth rate with family policy measures and has also managed to decrease the mortali-
ty of new-born infants.112
Due to the unfavourable development of its population, Russia needs labour migration, 
and the economy has depended on migrant workers for years. Official statistics show that 
during 2011–2017, an average of half a million people migrated to Russia every year.113 
However, anti-immigration sentiment is leading to pressure on decision-making. This feel-
ing particularly concerns visually distinct ethnic minorities, such as people from Central 
and East Asia. In the past few years, the importance of migration policy has increased in 
111	 Finland,	by	comparison,	has	in	recent	years	had	a	lower	birth	rate:	9−10	per	1000.	The	total	fertility	rate	(children	per	
woman	of	fertile	age)	in	Russia	has	increased	from	1.2	(1999−2000)	to	1.6−1.8	(2010−2017).	In	Finland,	the	fertility	
rate	was	1.9	in	2009−2010,	but	has	since	decreased	(and	was	1.6	on	average	in	2015−2017).
112 Kulmala et al, 2014
113 Net immigration (the difference between immigration and emigration) has been just under 300,000 people per year.
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national security thinking in Russia, which also provides guidelines for societal policy.114 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, reforms in migration policy have been a balancing act 
between a more practically oriented and liberal approach, and an approach emphasising 
security aspects and nationalist issues.115 In 2016, the Federal Migration Service was dis-
continued as an independent service, and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.
The poor average health of Russia’s economically active adult population has already 
been hampering and jeopardising sustainable economic and social development for a long 
time.116 From the perspective of public health, Russia is still wasting its human capital much 
more than its Western neighbours.117 If the general public health situation were to improve 
due to healthier lifestyles and basic preventive healthcare, this would result in consider-
able benefits to the national economy in the form of savings and economic productivity. 
It would also naturally improve the quality of life of citizens, which is also one of the goals 
of Russia’s security strategy. Issues related to public health and quality of life also reflect 
directly on the neighbouring countries from the perspectives of both health and security. 
The security aspects are particularly related to intoxicants, such as the flow of narcotics.
A slow change for the better has started in the public health of Russia, but continuing 
the trend will require sticking to a health policy based on systematic evidence and taking 
health into account in all areas of social and public policy. In the future, the significant dif-
ferences in health between regions may cause dissatisfaction, perhaps even leading to 
pressure on Russia’s leadership.
4.3 Immigration into Russia
Until the economic recession that started in 2014, Russia received the second-highest 
number of immigrants in the world, after the USA. Approximately 80–86% of immigrants 
coming to Russia are citizens of CIS countries, with people from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
being the biggest individual groups. 118 During the 1990s, ethnic Russians from former So-
viet territories, in particular, moved to Russia after unrest started brewing in those areas. 
Labour migration increased in the 2000s, and the first immigrants from Central Asia were 
often educated urban dwellers. Later in the decade, immigrants often came from rural ar-
114 Heusala et al. 2016, p. 40.
115 Abashin 2017.
116 For a comparison of healthcare and illnesses between the countries, see e.g. The Lancet 2018; for self-assessments 
of the population’s health, see e.g. EBRD 2016a.
117 This waste can be assessed using potential years of life lost (PYLL), a national health indicator where the years of 
life lost that are preventable are calculated on the basis of deaths occurring before the age of 70. PYLL calculations 
can be used e.g. for financial assessment of the health benefits and the human potential from improved health. For 
further information on PYLL calculations, see OECD 2018(b).
118	 Министерство	внутренних	дел	2018.
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eas, with a poor command of the Russian language and low level of education. Some immi-
grants work in expert positions, but the majority are employed in lower-paid sectors, such 
as the construction industry, facility maintenance and transport. Most immigrants come to 
Russia alone, sometimes in the company of a close male relative. In the 2010s, more than 
80% of immigrants have been men, and 75% have been aged under 30.
The Russian state has sought to attract immigrants with professional skills and of ethnic 
Russian origin. For example, a programme was initiated in 2006 and reformed in 2012 to 
promote the voluntary return of ethnic Russians living abroad to the Russian Federation. 
However, the programme has quite strict conditions, and there have been nowhere near 
enough willing immigrants who meet those conditions to satisfy the shortage of labour in 
Russia. One major reason for this is the lack of interest in moving to Russia, particularly 
among Russians living in the West.119
It is estimated that the number of migrant workers will remain at the current level until 
2020 (i.e. approximately 8 million). It is estimated that approximately 80–86% of all immi-
grants coming to Russia are citizens of CIS countries. In Moscow and the Moscow Oblast, 
this would translate to 2.4 million people, and in St. Petersburg to 840,000. That would 
mean that 12.5% of the labour force are of foreign origin.
In Russia, family reunification, entry to the labour market or educational institutes, 
obtaining social security and applying for citizenship are challenging for people who have 
been granted asylum or refugee status. From the perspective of asylum seekers, the cur-
rent immigration policy will therefore lead to a situation where it is impossible for them 
to build their lives financially or otherwise on the basis of the residence permit they have 
been granted. Usually, even those who have received a positive decision cannot stay in 
Russia permanently. From the perspective of asylum seekers, Russian immigration policy 
can be described as very restrictive.120
Reforms were implemented in 2014 and 2015 to legalise the status of employees from 
countries from with no visa requirement and for creating more distinct categories of im-
migrants.121 Passing a test of cultural knowledge and language skills was added to the re-
quirements for obtaining a work and residence permit. Furthermore, a new type of work 
permit was introduced for employees coming from countries that do not require a visa. At 
the same time, the penalties for violating Russia’s immigration laws have become stricter, 
including deportation, fines, arrests and bans on entering the country for five to ten years.
However, instead of a simpler policy promoting legality, the costs incurred by individu-
al immigrants have increased, and negative actions were emphasised when enforcing the 
legislation. The challenges created e.g. by the war in Ukraine, the FIFA World Cup and the 
Eurasian Economic Union became priority objectives for the authorities and clearly ham-
119 Myhre 2017.
120 Fomina 2017.
121 Abashin 2017.
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pered the work to develop the immigration system. Immigration policy has been the sub-
ject of competition between different interest groups.122
Although the new work permit is an important step in developing the immigration sys-
tem, the new rules have not significantly changed the number of illegal workers.123 Besides 
the cumbersome and expensive process of obtaining the permits, this is also due to mi-
grant workers not being familiar with the rules and administration in Russia, as well as the 
fact that entrepreneurs operating in Russia are tempted to use cheap labour. Furthermore, 
the number of work permits and temporary residence permits granted does not corre-
spond to the number of immigrants seeking employment. Estimates regarding the number 
of people working illegally without the required work and residence permits vary greatly.
In practice, Russia’s immigration policy seems to aim at most of the migrant workers al-
so returning to their homelands at some stage. In the 2010s, the Federal Migration Service 
initiated programmes aimed at integrating immigrants, but they have been modest com-
pared to the number of immigrants. The integration programmes have been criticized for 
not taking into account the needs of immigrants or not reaching them, as well as for the 
fact that funds allocated for them are lost due to corruption. In August 2017, integration 
issues were transferred by a presidential statute from the Main Directorate for Migration 
Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Russian Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs. 
In addition to the integration of immigrants, this agency was also given responsibility for 
drawing up immigration-related legislation.
A significant proportion of migrant workers in Russia work in the shadow economy, in 
arrangements without contracts where their position is comparable to extortion-like work 
discrimination. Particularly the extensive use of workers from Central Asia without con-
tracts is one of the key factors maintaining the shadow economy in Russia. This means 
lost tax revenues, but it also has more far-reaching consequences for Russian society. The 
quality of production, products and services suffers from poor working conditions and 
insufficiently trained employees. The shadow economy distorts competition and main-
tains widespread corruption. It is easy to exploit immigrants ignorant of Russian legislation 
and administration who live outside mainstream society. In turn, the exploitation of immi-
grants keeps wages artificially low.124
Corruption is associated with the control of immigration and immigrants in many ways. 
The police routinely stop immigrants, particularly those who obviously belong to ethnic 
minorities, and check their work permits and registration. Bribes constitute a significant 
part of the income of police overseeing public order, and this has far-reaching consequenc-
es for the operating culture of the Russian police force, and thus also for judicial protec-
tion in general.125
122 Abashin 2017.
123 Eraliev 2018.
124	 Heusala	&	Aitamurto	2017.
125 Zabelina 2017.
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As the majority of immigrants are (due to their lack of identity papers, ignorance or sus-
picion) incapable of relying on official structures like the judicial system or social services, 
they often rely on alternative, unofficial systems. These unofficial networks may also have 
connections to organised crime. Unpaid wages can be collected with the help of criminal 
organisations who specialise in this.126
The structural problems associated with immigration, ranging from the shadow econo-
my to corruption, increase anti-immigrant attitudes and racism among the majority popu-
lation. Since the problems associated with immigration have not been conclusively solved, 
they increase conflicts and ethnic confrontations in society. The nationalist frame of in-
terpretation also distorts the public debate on structural problems in society. Immigrants 
working without the required papers have little chance to defend their rights in the labour 
market by organising, which in turn weakens the position of employees in Russia in gener-
al. Thus, the extensive use of paperless labour is also detrimental to the development of 
democracy in Russia.
The large number of migrant workers without identity papers weakens Russian soci-
ety in many ways, but also produces short-term benefits. Unregistered migrant workers do 
not use the social and health services paid for by the state. If they fall ill or retire, migrant 
workers mainly return to their homelands. Migrant workers without contracts are easy to 
dismiss depending on fluctuations in the labour market.127 Reforms aimed at reducing cor-
ruption and illegal labour have often faced tacit opposition, when different parties seek to 
hold on to the benefits achieved. Different public authorities may also have differing in-
terests.128
The factors affecting the immigration situation in Russia will largely remain unchanged 
in the next few years. The country will continue to need millions of short-term migrant 
workers, who have traditionally come from the CIS countries. Construction work in Rus-
sian growth centres would not be possible without low-paid migrant workers. The number 
of employees varies slightly with the economic situation. The work permit charges paid by 
migrant workers in 2016 accumulated USD 70 million in the coffers of the Russian state. 
There has been little internal pressure in Russia based on human rights or the obligations 
of international law to make the country’s immigration policy more humanitarian. There 
has also been little political pressure to combat the shadow economy. In Russia, criticism 
of corruption is focused more on individuals and sequences of events than on structural 
problems that would require looking after the interests of society.
The opposition has taken a more critical attitude towards immigration than the Krem-
lin. Should Putin and his regime unexpectedly have to step aside, they could be replaced 
by parties who would follow a stricter immigration policy. For example, particularly the na-
tionalist opposition has demanded that visas should be required for citizens from Central 
Asian countries.
126	 Urinboyev	&	Polese	2016.
127	 Heusala	&	Aitamurto	2017.
128 Light 2013.
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Russia’s immigration policy is, in many ways, closely linked to its foreign policy and the 
development of the Eurasian Economic Union, which will not necessarily suffer any set-
backs if the mobility of labour is restricted. On the other hand, increasing the free move-
ment of labour is at the core of the cooperation, and thus is also resulting in pressure on 
Russia’s immigration policy.129
Labour migration from Central Asia has also been a factor improving the political stabil-
ity of these regions. The possibility to work in Russia has alleviated the pressure increased 
by high unemployment, which may otherwise have erupted in political unrest. Remittanc-
es from Russia are also an important stabilising factor. According to the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation, the total value of remittances from Russia to Central Asian countries 
in 2016 amounted to USD 6.9 billion, having been USD 13.6 billion in 2013. For instance, 
in 2016, the value of remittances comprised one third of the GDP of Tajikistan and Kyrgyz-
stan.130
A sudden collapse of the security situation or chaos in society in Russia’s neighbour-
ing countries or a change in global migration could increase the risk potential of illegal im-
migration both to and from Russia. Russia has over 20,000 kilometres of external borders 
with former CIS countries with considerably lower living standards and poorer security sit-
uations. For example, in the statute on Russian border policy approved in April 2018, in-
creasing the military presence on the borders with Central Asian countries is not among 
the top initiatives. On the other hand, the statute stipulates that bilateral and multilateral 
border cooperation should be further developed.
For years, Russian asylum seekers of Chechen origin have been coming via Belarus to 
Poland and further to central Europe, mainly heading towards Germany. However, the 
number of Russian citizens turned back from the border between Poland and Belarus  has 
decreased over the years. The potential of illegal immigration from Russia via Ukraine is 
also worrying. According to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Ukraine is the 
main route from Russia for illegal immigration for people from the Caucasus region and 
Central Asia people.131
4.4 Radicalisation of migrant workers
The radicalisation of young people of Central Asian origin (e.g. over the internet) is seen 
as a challenge to internal security in Russia. Bad treatment, lack of income and marginali-
sation leave these migrants susceptible to jihadist propaganda. One study found that sec-
ond- and third-generation Muslim migrants in Europe react to discrimination with religious 
129	 Heusala	&	Kangaspuro	2017.
130 Eurasianet 2018. 
131 EASO 2018; Frontex 2018; Independent 2017. 
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radicalisation more easily than their parents do.132 The situation of migrants from Central 
Asia living in Russia should not be compared directly with the experiences in Western Eu-
rope, for example in the United Kingdom or France. Russia and Central Asia still share the 
experience of the same political system, and almost three generations of people in Central 
Asia have lived in states that are officially atheist. Labour migration is a relatively new phe-
nomenon, and most migrant workers come to Russia for seasonal work, unlike in the West, 
where migrants intend to settle down permanently with their families.133
For example, it has been estimated that some 2,000–4,000 people from Central Asia 
live in areas controlled by Islamic State, but there is no exact information on the number of 
people leaving these areas. The FSB has been quite effective at exposing groups planning 
terrorist activities, and the development of more extensive terrorist groups is unlikely be-
cause of the effective security apparatus. The lack of trust and fear of members of the spe-
cial forces infiltrating hampers cooperation between and recruitment by terrorist groups. 
However, “lone-wolf” operations or actions by small groups pose a major challenge to the 
authorities. Soft targets, such as public transport and shopping centres, are more tempting 
targets for terrorists than closely guarded major events, for example.
The Russian authorities have been constantly developing methods of preventing the 
spread of jihadist material over the internet. However, Islamic State has extensive and ef-
fective propaganda material in the Russian language, and it is generally estimated that new 
strikes inspired by Islamic State propaganda are likely.
Ordinary internet users no longer easily come across material promoting terrorism, but 
more technically advanced users still know how to find such material. Mainstream news 
of terrorist attacks by Islamic State can also serve as an example. The term “Islamisation 
of radicalism” refers to the fact that Islamic jihadism also serves as a model for generally 
rebellious young people with “violent nihilistic” tendencies, for whom it provides a model 
and a label for their actions.134 Therefore, these individual terrorists cannot necessarily be 
profiled in advance on the basis of religious fundamentalism.
132 Leiken 2011.
133 Eraliev 2018.
134 Roy 2017.
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5. Conclusions
The authoritarian development and one-sided economy in Russia reduce the freedom of 
choice available to the country. The authoritarian system is based on a very president-cen-
tric structure where the government is not politically answerable to parliament; nor does 
it consist of a group of professionals who share the same goals or views regarding devel-
opment of the administration. Therefore, the president is personally in charge, which in-
creases the importance of the elite surrounding him. The current Constitution of the Rus-
sian Federation prescribes that President Putin’s fourth term in office ends in 2024, but it 
is uncertain how his successor will be chosen. It is possible that the process of transferring 
power will already begin before 2024.
Politically, Russian society is still very poorly organised. Instead of open political con-
test, the operating policies are currently drawn up e.g. in the Security Council of Russia, 
headed by the president. The importance of its activities is an indication of the extent and 
growing importance of security thinking. When policies change, extensive and well-coordi-
nated implementation in cooperation between different central government and regional 
organisations is often challenging.
The decreasing popularity of President Putin is problematic from the point of legitima-
cy of governance for the very reason that administration has increasingly relied on Putin’s 
strong position. No practical alternative for the current authoritarian governance is on the 
horizon, and short-term political shocks are not likely, albeit that they cannot be totally ex-
cluded. The growing dissatisfaction of citizens and their readiness for change have been 
demonstrated.
Russia’s leaders are trying to draw a picture of Russia as having special status, but gen-
erating this identity cannot compensate for the citizens’ everyday problems. Patriotic rhet-
oric from the Kremlin typically portrays Russia as morally superior to the West. State-run 
television has been powerfully modifying the atmosphere in society, but the increased 
role of the internet and the fact that younger people watch less television pose increasing 
challenges for state propaganda. This atmosphere is conveyed e.g. via television and oth-
er media. It may eventually affect the Russian people’s mental image of their neighbour-
ing countries.
The intensifying control of the Kremlin over e.g. the communication space and civil so-
ciety is taking Russia in an increasingly isolated and authoritarian direction. On the other 
hand, the possibilities for influence that the internet offers, as well as different types of 
grassroots non-political activism, can serve as the basis for new types of civic movements.
Russia is a society with a low level of trust. People are dissatisfied with economic in-
equality and do not trust institutions. They also feel that the difference between the rich 
and the poor has increased in recent years. The birth rate increased in 2000–2013, but the 
most recent figures again indicate a significant decrease now that the millennial age co-
hort has started having families. The low life expectancy for men is a particular character-
istic of demographic development in Russia. No significant improvement has occurred in 
that respect.
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Russia has invested resources in family policy and increasing the birth rate. Extensive 
reforms have been carried out in the protection of children, where the aim is to dismantle 
institutions and increase the use of foster care. Demographic data shows that the mortality 
rate is growing rapidly and the birth rate is low. The situation has changed slightly thanks 
to the social policy observed during Putin’s second term in office. However, at the same 
time, the state has increasingly delegated its welfare policy duties to NGOs, among oth-
ers. The population collapse has been partly compensated for through immigration, partly 
from poorer ex-Soviet republics. In spite of a number of legislative and administrative re-
forms, Russia’s immigration policy still appears to be based on widespread acceptance of 
the informal economy. This has negative effects on the development of the rule of law and 
looking after the interests of society.
In Russia, people are actively turning to the judicial system, and there are many cases 
being processed in arbitration courts, for example. There has been some change in legal 
thinking towards emphasising sovereignty or the right to self-determination in the appli-
cation of international law. Transformation of the legal system can still be considered in-
complete, and there is plenty of scope for improvement in the predictability of its opera-
tion. For example, in the field of criminal law, this is a question of the roles and relations 
between different parties, their professional competences and ethics, which all reflect the 
values and methods of the society.
Regarding immigration, reforms were implemented in 2015 to legalise the status of 
employees from countries that do not require visas and to simplify the immigration pro-
cess. The situation continues to be somewhat confusing. Obtaining permits is arduous and 
expensive, running a business is difficult, and in particular the large number of workers 
from Central Asia who have no employment contracts is one of the factors maintaining 
the shadow economy. However, factors affecting the immigration situation will remain un-
changed in the near future, because the country needs cheap labour.
The prerequisites for economic growth are not good. The main reasons for this are in-
sufficient investments and the decreasing labour force. However, the basic outlook for 
economic growth is not particularly critical for Russia’s stability in the next few years, be-
cause the economy is forecast to grow, albeit slowly. On the other hand, the economy is 
still relatively sensitive to changes in the world market prices of commodities that Russia 
exports, and a marked drop in oil prices would cause an economic recession. Russia could 
manage for a few years, above all thanks to the funds in the sovereign reserve fund and the 
fact that there is scope for increasing state debt.
The 10% decrease in consumption – and thus also in living standards – during the 2015 
recession and the slow recovery has weakened the social contract of the 2000s between 
the people and Russia’s leadership. The contract has held for the time being, which is 
largely explained by the fact that most Russians remember the bleak times of the 1990s, 
and even more of them remember the times of the 2000s, which were also considerably 
worse than today. In addition to many other events in the lives of citizens, unpopular eco-
nomic reforms may reduce the popularity of Russia’s leaders. A dissatisfied populace is an 
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unstable combination of various factors where an accumulation of issues could even rap-
idly swing citizens’ attitudes towards the negative.
Those in power in Russia are seeking to allocate more funds to education, healthcare 
and infrastructure. However, these investments are insufficient in international compari-
son. Increased private investment and improved productivity would require economic re-
forms that are market-positive and aimed at reliable regulation of businesses. They should 
reduce interference by the people in power in the operations of companies, improve the 
activities of public authorities and make them more predictable, and transform Russia’s 
trade and investment policies towards increased openness. However, there are no signs of 
that happening. The symbiotic relationships between Russia’s rulers, authorities and busi-
nesses and the benefits gained are preventing reforms. Russia’s leadership does not pro-
vide any credible, wider horizons for economic development and growth.
Cooperation between Finland and Russia is based on various treaties and other coop-
eration plans. In the area of practical crime prevention across borders, Finland has been 
among the pioneers of this cooperation on the basis of a 1994 agreement on cooperation 
for the prevention of crime. Cooperation is particularly important for preventing serious 
crime and in the field of immigration. However, Russia’s activities have shown that a breach 
of the earlier good cooperation is also one of the methods of influence that it would use if 
it feels the need to pressurise or confuse Finland politically. An example of this is Russia’s 
decision to let people pass the border without a Schengen visa in 2015–2016. Such coop-
eration can only be developed if there is high-level political commitment to do so.
There are actors in the Russian administrative system who have considerable interest 
in utilising Finnish solutions in their own fields of operation to improve the living condi-
tions of their citizens within the constraints of the current policy. This aim and, in general, 
Russia’s constructive participation in cooperation across regional borders implemented in 
Baltic Sea, Arctic and EU frameworks may promote the goals of Finland’s stability policy in 
Northern Europe, and thus support Finland’s security. All this, though, is finally subordi-
nate to the geopolitical calculations of the Kremlin.
The current situation in Russia’s domestic policy does not indicate that there will be 
any major changes concerning Finland. Major economic or political shocks or natural disas-
ters could lead to the situations described above at the border between Finland and Rus-
sia, or increase the number of asylum-seekers coming to Finland. Trade between Finland 
and Russia is no longer hugely significant for the whole of the Finnish economy, which is 
why fluctuations in that trade have a relatively small impact on Finland. The authoritari-
an system in Russia has many direct and indirect impacts on Finland: the unpredictability, 
corruption and possibility of arbitrary action hamper all kinds of cooperation with Russia, 
both at the official level and at the level of individual citizens and companies. The challeng-
es in developing cooperation between Finnish and Russian authorities include the varia-
tion of trust between institutions, obstacles due to differences in national legislation, and 
the issue of long-term commitment by top political leaders.
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1. Starting points for foresight
This last section of the report reviews the effects of possible future scenarios on Russia’s 
own security and the security of its neighbours. This section utilises assessments made in 
the previous sections as sources and supplements them. It also contributes to the discus-
sion regarding the significance of changes occurring in Russia for Finland and the develop-
ment of European security. The period under review begins in the near future and contin-
ues to the 2040s.
The review starts with global trends (i.e. recognised developments affecting many 
countries and societies in the world) and their relation to development in Russia and the 
country’s international position. This trend analysis is supplemented by identifying weak 
signals, i.e. minor phenomena and events that, if repeated and extended, may significant-
ly affect developments. The review concludes by creating four different future scenarios. 
None of them individually presents a comprehensive view of Russia’s development oppor-
tunities; taken together, however, they provide a stronger framework for review. The pur-
pose of these future scenarios and their assessment is to provide tools for discussing de-
velopments in Russia and their impact on Finland.
In this study, “foresight” means a systematic and goal-oriented examination of the rela-
tionships between the past, the present and the future. The change in international order 
and societies is the sum of several factors. Historically, the main variable has been tech-
nological development, which directly and indirectly affects economic structures and thus 
also the societal and political development. Major external events, such as natural disas-
ters or wars, can also trigger extensive changes affecting all of society. Attitudes1 can also 
change quite quickly and values2 may gradually change due to the impact of the above fac-
tors, but that will not necessarily happen. The gradual change of values has a guiding effect 
on other areas. Signs of such changes must be identified in order to ensure the success of 
long-term development for all societies and all actors.
The operating environment is currently undergoing a phase of complex transformation 
in which phenomena that challenge people’s interpretations are constantly taking place. 
A global technological and economic transformation is underway, and political solutions 
are also being sought to manage it. As people have realised that there are limits to what 
the environment can withstand and that current ways of life are not sustainable, there are 
signs of change in the values. The current era of fast – even radical – change challenges 
people to analyse the future more broadly than merely by predicting possible courses of 
events and producing strategies based on the most likely one. Some phenomena and im-
1 Attitudes are people’s tendency to approve of or oppose a certain state of affairs, issue or person, and they are more 
limited concepts than values. 
2 Social values are ideas held by an individual or group of what they consider welcome, and they affect the choice 
of goals and methods. Values change constantly, but slowly, and are always linked to the social status and practical 
historical situation of the individual.
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pacts that will inevitably be faced in the future are therefore left outside the analysis of 
identified development paths.
The changing operating environment encourages us to utilise different possible futures 
as tools, i.e. to take a critical view regarding these possible futures, and to identify the as-
sumptions behind them and put them into different contexts. The possible futures created 
in this work for Russia are not forecasts presented in order of probability. These possible 
future scenarios are intended as perspectives for discussion of Russia’s development out-
look and its impacts on the operating environment. The future of Russia is likely to involve 
elements of several of the possible futures outlined here, including factors not discussed 
in this section.
2. Global megatrends associated with Russia and estimates 
of their impacts
Russia defines its position in relation to global trends in much the same manner as West-
ern countries. For example, Russia’s strategy for scientific and technical development 
states that threats to national security are complex and have significant interdependen-
cies. This strategy pays particular attention to the following global challenges:
• New technologies changing labour productivity and the global economy
• The ageing population and pandemics
• Sustainability, climate change and exhausting natural reserves
• Food safety
• Global competition for human resources 
• Changing global and regional energy systems.3
Russia and its government define the tools for managing the futures from their own per-
spective. Challenges stemming from global megatrends reflecting the opinions and worl-
dview of the Russian government have been analysed, e.g. in a series of articles produced 
by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). These articles forecast developments 
during the next hundred years. The length of the review periods is justified by the large 
ranges of variation in the rates at which technologies, institutions and social processes 
change, and with the objective of modifying the reader’s views of the present so that the 
preferred future would be possible. These reports seek to describe the problems and the 
dilemmas they cause for decision-making, but they do not discuss any practical political 
solutions.4
3  Presidential decree of the Russian Federation of December 1, 2016, No. 642; see also IMEMO, 2016.
4  Ivanov and Kortunov, 2016.
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In general, the authors of the reports believe that globalisation will strengthen and 
the global economic, trade and information ties will become stronger. According to them, 
global problems require global institutions to manage them and moderate the competi-
tion between countries, but the imbalance in the world order results in conflicts between 
leading global players. Russia has a need to influence the global development with its own 
view of the world and with the way it manages international relations. Russia must solve 
its own problems within the constraints of global problems. The strong state, understand-
ing its own starting points, military power and collaboration with the world’s major centres 
of power (“great powers”) are seen as key to solving these complex problems. It is note-
worthy that in these articles the potential for large environmental disaster or collapse, and 
the methods to prevent it receive less attention in the analysis. Climate change is mainly 
seen as a factor driving the transformation of the energy market and opening Arctic nat-
ural resources for exploitation. The need for cooperation in the international operating 
environment is stressed, but the reports view it primarily as an issue between great pow-
ers. Reviewing the world’s economic, political, security and social development outlook 
creates a picture of complex and difficult problems, but ones which can still be managed.5
As the first key factor, the articles raise the possibility of Russia building a diverse informa-
tion economy and achieving a high technological level in agriculture, in exploiting natural 
resources, as well as in further processing and machine-building industries. Freeing socie-
tal structures to produce new ideas and added value is a key success factor. On one hand, 
a top-down innovation structure is doomed to always result in the role of pursuer, which 
can at times be alleviated by favourable trends in energy markets. However, a strong state 
is considered to be a necessary support for this liberated society in order to prevent it from 
sliding into anarchy.6
The second key factor examines the possibility of the Russian political system responding 
to the new economic paradigm and the external and social changes, and creating a repre-
sentative political system providing feedback. According to the authors, political systems 
grow from individual national goals, problems and confrontations. For the purpose of anal-
ysis, Russia’s political system cannot be regarded as either simply democratic or simply 
authoritarian. Calcifying the system into an unchanging edifice and depending on the in-
stitution of leader are considered particularly risky propositions in a diverse and complex 
agglomeration such as Russia. The revolutions during the previous century in Russia are 
widely seen as a consequence of ill-timed political reforms. The stability offered by cen-
tralised control and the political reforms required to make changes in society are in con-
flict. In the future, Russia’s government will have to solve this conflict, which is made more 
difficult by the accelerating change in society.7
5  Ivanov and Kortunov, 7–12, 366.
6  Ibid. 13–14, 365–366.
7  Ibid. 13–14.
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The third key factor highlights the vulnerability of Russia’s federal structure. This vulnera-
bility stems from having a multitude of nationalities and religions, and the different eco-
nomic bases that those regions have. Disintegration of the country is seen as a significant 
and relevant threat, both to society and the political elite. The federal structure has so far 
managed to strike a reasonable balance between centralised administration and the re-
gions of the Russian Federation, but it is not clear that this balance can be maintained. As 
economic resources contract, one option is to give the regions more responsibility for their 
own development. Such political independence, which will increase with broader respon-
sibilities, would weaken central government’s control. Regulation of the division of power 
is a conflicting issue for Russia’s political leadership, as is making changes to the political 
system in general.8
The fourth factor discusses the international operating environment. Uprisings and wars 
during the 20th century that threatened the existence of states and carried the risk of nu-
clear war are widely attributed to intense political competition. The world order is still 
seeking a new form following the end of the Cold War, and the continuation of a chaotic 
era of change is considered to be the most likely scenario. Restraints on the use of military 
power by great powers and other loci of power in the world are not considered sufficient, 
and local conflicts have the potential to expand into broader confrontations. The poten-
tial for conflict combined with arsenals of nuclear weapons and new types of weapons is 
dangerous. Russia is facing a contradictory situation where it is necessary to integrate into 
a globalising world, but this must be balanced against security needs to prevent military 
and non-military challenges. Finally, it can be stated that all key actors in the world have 
similar problems, and the ability to cooperate is a critical question – for Russia and for the 
rest of the world.9
8 Ibid. 13–14.
9 Ibid. 13–14
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Impacts of global megatrends on Russia’s potential futures  
from the Finnish perspective
In the foresight work for the Russia of Power project, the factors affecting the develop-
ment of Russia associated with global trends were identified.10 The experts participating 
in the project wanted to emphasise the most important trends and change factors among 
them as follows.11
The political dimension – Poor general state of law and order (corruption, poor gover-
nance, weak institutions, crime) and the increased importance of the country’s leader are 
strongly steering the development of other dimensions. Corruption is an income distribu-
tion mechanism that reaches across society, the current elite and governance. Organised 
crime is associated with corruption, and thus influences the use of public power. The secu-
rity services have a role that is in actuality more extensive than their stipulated areas of re-
sponsibility in the political system. Many individuals in the government and the elite have 
intelligence or security service backgrounds.12 Therefore, security aspects are given much 
weight in decision-making. The legitimacy of Russian governance relies on the president’s 
persona more than it has in the past. The current leadership of Russia has no real motiva-
tion to attempt to control the interconnections between corruption, organised crime, oli-
garchs and administration.
The economic dimension – The dependence of the Russian economy on energy and en-
ergy exports, as well as the possibilities for developing its structures, do not suggest that 
there will be any significant economic growth in forecasts that extend to the 2040s. This 
situation results in pressure to actively develop the country’s economy and to strengthen 
its influence in key energy production areas (the Middle East), in areas with unutilised en-
ergy resources (the Arctic) and in market areas. The energy transformation (i.e. the tran-
sition from fossil fuels to renewable energy) is a serious challenge for Russia’s economy. 
Fluctuations in the global energy markets are already causing a constant need to adapt the 
economy. In addition to these factors, which are mainly independent of Russia, the chal-
lenges are increased by the need to maintain and develop transport infrastructure and 
housing stock, which is very extensive, given the country’s resources. This is evidenced in 
practice by the fact that investments made outside the energy sector are concentrated in 
major cities and in logistical infrastructure between them as well as infrastructure support-
10 The PESTE method was adapted to classify and identify variables for the future scenarios and to create a narrative. In 
general, this analysis looks at the political (P), economic (E), social (S), technological (T) and ecological/environmental 
(E) development. In this case, the PESTE analysis was supplemented by analysing international, military and 
information aspects as well.
11 Twenty-eight researchers and civil servants from different fields participated in the foresight workshops for the 
project.
12 See also Gudkov, 2011, 33.
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ing international trade. Elements of the housing stock and transport infrastructure outside 
these areas are decaying.
The social dimension – Russians maintain a mental image that the country has special sta-
tus, which stems from the legacy of Russia being the largest Soviet nation inheriting the 
status of a great power. During the Soviet era, that image was enhanced by isolating the 
population from the world around them. The identity as a great power and Russia’s social 
conservatism, as well as threats from external sources, are currently affecting the general 
Russian worldview and creating internal cohesion. There has been no significant change in 
the attitudes of the population since the collapse of the Soviet Union, even in the younger 
generation. The current government, which came into power in the 2000s, is still strength-
ening the mechanisms for keeping the values and behaviour of the majority unchanged.13
Generally, the majority of population are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, 
and the government is dealing with this issue by redistributing income to alleviate the 
most pressing problems, and by redirecting the attention of the people away from their 
grievances and problems. The key tools of governance include education and upbringing, 
social movements and campaigns, as well as propaganda and control of the information 
space that supplements and enhances (TV, the internet, social media). When the above 
measures do not suffice, force is used.
The ageing of Russia’s population and external migration pressure from the conflict 
zone in the south make it necessary to adapt to the gradual changes in the country’s pop-
ulation. Solving the need for labour by means including unofficial immigration enhances 
the culture of “securitization”. This leads to a situation where there is a large number of 
individuals without proper documentation, and the unofficial social structures established 
to provide them with services creates a feeling of insecurity and erodes general trust in 
the government.
The technological level – Russia generally lags behind Western countries in technological 
development, and is also falling behind rapidly developing Asian countries. For the time 
being, the situation means that the country must constantly adapt and work in coopera-
tion. Russia’s lagging behind in new and developing energy technologies may even result 
in a major need to adapt, as the transformation in energy supply and usage is progressing 
in spite of the country’s extensive hydrocarbon resources and expertise in nuclear power.
The international dimension – Russia is a regionally fundamental and globally important 
player with strong expertise in many areas, including utilising a broad range of measures 
to promote its interests in international politics. Russia also has a need for cooperation. Its 
13 See also Gessen, 2018, the sociological theories of Juri Levada and Lev Gudkov regarding survival of the Soviet man 
as a social type and the associated decline in the standard of education, culture and ethics. (pp. 70–75); Gudkov’s 
assessment of the inability of the government to develop and the need for the population’s sufficient lack of activity, 
its resource is the citizen pacified over the centuries (pp. 301–302).
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influential status in international global14 and regional institutions and its military creates 
the potential to adapt to its operating environment.
No visible changes are occurring in the great importance of Russia’s armed forces – 
both conventional and strategic (nuclear weapons). The security services and corruption 
as well as the organised crime associated with them are also part of Russia’s undeclared 
international dimension.15 Russia also has the ability and prerequisites to adapt to the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons.
The environmental dimension –climate change and pollution are resulting in a strong need 
for adaptation. These risks are particularly prevalent in agriculture in the extensive culti-
vated areas in the southern parts of the country. The vast and diverse territory of Russia, 
spanning several climate zones, and the country’s array of natural resources also provide 
opportunities for adaptation. The limited public debate regarding adaptation measures 
and the lack of programmes to take action increase the risks caused by climate change.
The military dimension – Success in military reforms in this decade will create potential for 
adaptation in the 2020s. The armed forces and their improved status among the public are 
also helping to maintain social cohesion. There are constraints on defence resources and 
on the ability to develop and utilise related technologies, which have a particular impact 
on great power competition. Russia’s space capabilities are currently competitive in cer-
tain areas, such as the ability to launch satellites and satellite navigation, but opportunities 
for long-term development of such technologies lag behind those of other great powers. 
Space capabilities are increasingly important for the military balance between great pow-
ers, and there is a significant need for cooperation.
The information dimension – the country has to adapt and cooperate due to the con-
straints that exist on developing and producing technologies. There is generally strong 
competence in utilising and managing information, but the technology that underlies it is 
not at the level of Western countries or advanced Asian countries, which is why coopera-
tion is required.
14 Particularly the United Nations Security Council.
15 See also Galeotti, 2016. 
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2.1 Observations of the impacts of global megatrends
Russia has an extensive land territory spanning several climate zones, abundant natural re-
sources, and transport and industry infrastructure in which the productive elements are 
well maintained and developed. The population and skills base is probably also sufficient 
to maintain the current level of society, economy and technology. These factors provide 
possibilities for coping with the problems and individual strategic shocks caused by global 
trends, such as natural disasters, refugees and changes in the energy market.
Based on these trends, it currently seems unlikely that there would be rapid and com-
prehensive changes in Russia’s internal situation. Russia’s current situation matches the 
general outlook for change of an industrialised, highly modernised and urbanising soci-
ety. The fact that rural areas have been left behind in development results in challenges, 
but developing these areas is not necessarily even viewed as necessary. The ageing popu-
lation, development of technology and the changing state of the environment mean that 
the economy and social structures will have to adapt to changes sooner or later. Howev-
er, there are also possibilities for rapid change associated with the amplification of sever-
al negative trends and with the combined impact of various external or internal shocks.
The steep inequality in Russia and the fact that ordinary citizens have little to no polit-
ical influence engender and maintain social tensions, as does the lack of trust in the gov-
ernment and its ability to promote economic and social development within the country. 
The government and administration are in close contact with the security authorities, and 
problems can be managed using a large security force and other authorities and authori-
sations.16 However, if several disasters were to occur nearly simultaneously or in the same 
location, or if there were an external crisis, the resulting pressures could exceed the gov-
ernment’s ability to control the situation, leading to unpredictable consequences.
In light of the current developments, Russia’s international status is likely to generally 
weaken. Russia is no longer a rapidly growing economy. In general, there are large differ-
ences between the economies of European countries and that of Russia, and Russia is on 
the weaker side. The current trends indicate that the difference will remain the same, or 
may slightly decrease. Among other things, Russia compensates for its weaker economic 
position by developing its military power and using it as part a range of measures to pro-
mote its interests. Russia’s international status may also relatively strengthen if there is 
a combination of trends that negatively affect other great powers or power centres, or if 
they face a major disaster.
16  See also Gudkov, 2011, 33–36. 
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3. Weak signals in Russia’s development
In this report, “weak signals” are phenomena and events that, according to our current 
understanding, are individually quite insignificant in terms of development, but that, if re-
peated and extended, could significantly affect it. They can be called the first expressions 
of change. When weak signals are first raised, they often challenge the existing under-
standing, but if they have the potential to question earlier views, they are nevertheless 
significant as phenomena that need to be monitored.
Weak signals related to the development of Russian society
Weak signals from different sources and areas all seem to have one aspect in common: in 
spite of the apparent stability of the government’s position, there is political dissatisfac-
tion brewing at many levels of society, and the root causes cannot be eliminated by exert-
ing pressure.17
It is noteworthy that the values conservatism that the government promotes is becom-
ing mixed with other types of value choices made by young people. Choices that diverge 
from traditional Russian culture (such as vegetarianism or identifying with Western pop-
ular culture) can still, for example, be combined with a strongly negative attitude towards 
sexual minorities. Young Russians are also performing actual volunteer work, not just pre-
tending to do so under government control. Young people clearly have a cynical view of 
the government’s ability to resolve social problems. Social self-organisation is significant 
e.g. in connection with disasters, such as floods or forest fires.
Popular feeling is monitored nationwide in Russia, but there are also local surveys of 
opinions in Russia’s regions. People are protesting, but this does not necessarily meant 
that they are trying to change the government politically; rather, they seek only to correct 
the specific grievances they have. The steadfast attitude of the government when initiat-
ing the pension reform in 2018 was noteworthy, because the government did not appear 
to recognise the effects in advance. The government put aside the usual careful approach 
in handling the public and put an immediate stop to the demonstrations. Unlike his previ-
ous behaviour, President Putin did not seek to place himself above social criticism when he 
supported the reform. His intervention reduced the public willingness to demonstrate, but 
he also lost support.18 It seems that the Russian government can pass, at its discretion, any 
reforms that are required to maintain the balance in the economy. However, managing the 
risks stemming from unpopular reforms is difficult and increases the possibility that there 
will be more demonstrations. When force is used against parts of the population that oth-
17 See also Ledeneva, 2013, 235–236.
18 As a reaction to the pension reform announced in 2018, half of the population expressed a willingness to 
demonstrate against it, but after President Putin pleaded for the reform to be implemented, the number of people 
willing to demonstrate dropped to one third. Support for the president decreased correspondingly.
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erwise support the government, it prevents demonstrations. However, the use of violence 
decreases support for the government among the public.
Russia has a key strategic objective of protecting infrastructure that it has defined as 
critical. This includes being able to isolate the Russian part of the internet from the rest of 
the global network to any degree and at any time. This is associated with the fact that the 
management and security of the network infrastructure within the country’s borders is 
being systematically developed. The Russian government is seeking the required skills and 
competence in security and risk management for the internet in China, but the two coun-
tries have different goals, operating cultures and resources. While it is possible to imple-
ment the technical means to isolate Russia from the broader internet, the impact on the 
country’s economy and production, and on people’s ability to access information are not 
much raised in the public debate.
Weak signals related to managing external relations
Analysing weak signals that may portend a change in the intensity and permanence of 
anti-Western attitudes and actions in Russia is essential from Finland’s perspective. An-
ti-Western sentiment leads to general instability in relations between states, but the lev-
el of this sentiment varies: At the beginning of the 1990s, the general attitude towards 
the West was very positive, whereas the deterioration of relations due to the conflict in 
Ukraine meant that sentiment became much more negative. There was another peak in 
positive attitudes after the FIFA World Cup took place in Russia in 2018.
The actions and statements of the Russian government also express a desire to reverse 
its isolation from Europe, which was accelerated by the conflict in Ukraine; however, the 
conditions imposed on both sides for cooperation do not permit any progress in that re-
spect for the time being. The coercive methods used by Russia that violate the sovereign-
ty of other countries so far do not encourage others to enter into closer cooperation with 
Russia.
The visible actions by the Russian security services in 2018 have created a public image 
of the limits of their competence and of the fact that the government steering them total-
ly ignores the sovereignty of target countries. Both these factors reduce willingness to co-
operate with Russia. The assassination in Great Britain, identified as carried out by Russia, 
or the attempt to steal information from an international institution challenge the sover-
eignty and administrative capabilities of the countries affected. It can be assumed that the 
assassination was intended to send a message to Russia’s own security services, but that 
does not reduce the negative effect on the country’s external relations.
Sweden’s and Finland’s partnerships with NATO and their bilateral security relations 
are, in Russian security thinking, seen as a potential military threat to Russia. This became 
evident when the Russian Minister of Defence made a public assessment of the military 
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security of Russia in August 2018.19 The address did not include any new factors regard-
ing the Russian opinion of threats from Finland, but the weight of the assessment was in-
creased by the fact that it was presented by the Minister of Defence. The previous message 
more widely noticed in Finland was presented by the then Chief of the General Staff at the 
beginning of the decade.20 The importance of the threat assessment in the address by the 
Minister of Defence was played down in official comments and public debate in Finland, 
although it questions the basis and strength of Finland’s relations with Russia. The current 
Minister of Defence has plenty of influence in the Russian government, and President Pu-
tin has not publicly commented on his view of these threats, as he did for example regard-
ing Israel when a Russian reconnaissance plane was shot down over Syria in autumn 2018.
No new topics, content or methods have been identified in information influencing 
activities by the Russian government regarding Western countries after the activities in 
2014–2016, which attracted much public attention. Russia’s information influencing activ-
ities continue for the time being, and the reasons why its content and methods have not 
changed are a concern for Western countries.
Russia has usually reacted very strongly to any changes in power in the post-Soviet 
space. In extreme cases, it went to war and modified its own national security threats to 
suit the course of those changes in power. However, the change of power in Armenia in 
2018 resulted in only very mild responses in Russian public debate. The threats to Arme-
nia’s security expressed by Russia have not changed and the conflicts in neighbouring re-
gions have not been settled, so it is likely that the change of power will not challenge the 
basis of relations between Russia and Armenia or Russia’s influence in the region. Howev-
er, the event is worth analysing as a change to the usual model of operations.
As a country and nation, Finland positions itself outside the sphere of Russian language 
and culture as well as the geographical area that comprised the former Soviet Union. How-
ever, Russia pays attention to Finland and tries to influence Finland’s international image 
and actions, as well as its economic decision-making. These attempts are continuous and 
repeatedly include new approaches, in spite of Finland’s relatively small status in interna-
tional and regional politics.
Weak signals related to economy
Private investments make up only a very small proportion of investments in the Russian 
economy. If this situation persists, economic growth will possibly be weaker than the cur-
rent long-term estimates of approximately 1.5%. In order to finance the programmes and 
economic projects specified at President Putin’s inauguration in 2018, raising additional 
revenue through increased corporate income tax was suggested. Due to strong opposition 
19 Shoigu, 2018.
20 Makarov, 2012.
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from Russian industry, this has so far not been done, but the government still needs to en-
courage companies to invest in the areas it has specified.
The Russian economy has recovered very slowly since 2016, in spite of the substan-
tial increase in oil prices. The increasing sanctions imposed by the USA have significantly 
decreased the value of the rouble, and it has not strengthened with increasing oil prices, 
as used to be the case. The weak rouble reduces possibilities for imports and creates in-
flationary pressure. The rapid decline in consumption during the economic recession that 
started in 2014 has not yet affected the president’s popularity, unlike the increase in the 
retirement age announced in 2018. Russia still has a large reserve fund collected from oil 
revenues, and it can be used to overcome brief periods of economic downturn without 
any disasters.
Weak signals related to military
The strategic documents concerning Russian military policy have confirmed the mobilisa-
tion principle concerning both the economy and the formation of military forces. Here, 
“mobilisation” (mobilizatsiya) refers to the state’s centralised management for preparing 
the economy and power structures for possible military aggression.21 The importance of 
mobilisation in producing combat power is in the current and future character of war, 
which is being driven by rapid technological developments generally assessed to be mar-
ginal and supplementary. Reforms in the Russian military have made it possible to increase 
the number of high-readiness troops and facilitate mobility of troops within Russia. The 
implementation, development possibilities and needs of Russia’s mobilisation are not 
clear from the point of Western societies and their prevailing military thinking, but it is ob-
vious that mobilisation is being further developed in Russian military thinking and in the 
way it organises its activities. One factor affecting the development of mobilisation is to 
prepare for weakening of the state and to maintain a mechanism that allows economic re-
sources and citizens to be allocated to overcoming crises and to warfare. In military terms, 
mobilisation produces resilience and capability for long-term combat in low-intensity con-
flicts. From society’s point of view, mobilisation and its implementation maintain the link-
age between society and the armed forces and strengthen social cohesion.
The economic mobilisation mechanism can quickly allocate resources to activities se-
lected by the government. Additional funding is required to implement the programmes 
and projects announced at President Putin’s inauguration on 7 May 2018. This additional 
funding will be just over 1% of GDP per year up to the end of his term in office in 2024. The 
budget is adjusted and implemented by steering companies’ investments into these proj-
ects. When required, defence spending can be increased – even significantly – for exam-
ple, by various actions concerning the state budget. Tax revenues can be slightly increased, 
21 Cooper, 2016, 2. Monaghan, 2016, 7-14.
164
the budget can be slightly less balanced, and other expenditures can be cut. Increasing de-
fence spending by 20%, for example, would currently correspond to just over 0.5% of GDP.
Private military companies have become part of Russia’s use of military power with the 
conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. There are earlier examples of similar activities in the form 
of mercenaries or covert operations by the security and intelligence services in conflicts. 
Different security companies have also had more limited roles in conflict areas. The di-
rect connection between private military companies (i.e. non-governmental military forc-
es) and the use of armed forces by the state is a new feature in Russian military methods. 
These companies do not have any role as independent actors in warfare; in order to oper-
ate, they need at least a covert mandate from the government, as well as the logistical sup-
port of local clients and the government. These companies are also useful in cyberspace, 
where they can be used in influencing activities as actors putatively separate from the gov-
ernment, thus helping to obscure the government’s involvement.
The Russian defence administration and armed forces have put a lot of effort into pub-
licity campaigns to highlight their modern warfare capabilities and their rapid develop-
ment due to their involvement in the conflict in Syria. The underlying reason for this pub-
licity is the considerable defeats and failures suffered by Russian armed forces in combat 
during the past two decades; the intention is to show that the problems with materiel and 
skills (as well as the oft-cited problems of reforms stalling at the start) have been overcome 
and that the armed forces can fight successfully on the modern battlefield. Another mili-
tary factor underlying this is to draw attention away from the war being waged in Ukraine 
– a war that is not officially recognised by Russia. Correspondingly, the Russian authorities 
are drawing attention away from the devastation of the local civilian population and its liv-
ing conditions in Syria by actively communicating the success of strikes at the enemy, who 
are described as terrorists. How the capabilities and skills of the armed forces have devel-
oped in reality is open to question, given the extensive damage to infrastructure, civilian 
casualties and combat losses suffered by Russia’s allies, under the shadows of the infor-
mation campaign.
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4. Russia’s futures
The following section describes four different futures for Russia. Each vision of the future22 
represents the parallel materialisation of factors important for Russia’s development. 
These visions of the future differ in terms of the level of power and capacity of the Russian 
state and the goals or threats that it defines. Russia’s capacities are assessed in relation to 
internal and external developments.
In other words, the changes, trends and events described here could be either negative 
or positive for Russia. Although extreme sequences of events, such as fragmentation of 
the state, are the most unlikely ones, they are nevertheless possible and warrant analysis.
4.1 Continuation of current trends: Russia seeks to regain great power 
status, challenges its Western competitors and adapts to the cooperation 
required in the prevailing situation
For Russia’s current development path to continue, the transition of power at the end of 
President Putin’s current term in office in 2024 would need to succeed in a manner that 
protects the status and interests of the current regime. In practice, the handover of pow-
er will take place behind closed doors, and any power struggles will be obscured. The elite 
who control state-owned companies and their cash flows will further solidify their status. 
The elite will be able to sustain the approval of citizens by directly affecting living standards 
through regulating energy prices as well as directing funding to key areas and redistribu-
tion of income. Russia will exploit tensions between other great powers to pursue its own 
extensive interests. Russia will seek to impose constraints on Western nations and their ca-
pabilities through means both open and covert that exploit their weaknesses.
22 No specific chain of events leading from the present to any of these future scenarios has been defined in this report.
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Main features of the continuation of current trends:
Internal situation The quality of governance and social services is poor and their development modest 
outside major cities.
The political elite have a sufficiently strong position, and coercive measures are not 
directed at the majority of citizens. Society and citizens do not challenge the system 
of governance, and internal struggles within the elite remain within manageable 
limits.
Economy No new growth is developed for the economy outside the energy sector, and oil 
prices remain at a level that maintains economic growth (over USD 50). Over the long 
term, the economy grows at approximately 1.5% a year.
Russia’s regional dominance remains at the current level, and its cooperation in Asia 
does not produce any significant added value, but does develop at the political level.
External relations The perceived national security threats remain unchanged, and neighbouring areas 
remain the focus of its aspirations.
Russia’s influence is sufficient to curb security cooperation between neighbouring 
counties and other great powers.
The resources are sufficient for implementing a foreign policy that takes initiatives 
and for challenging the Western countries globally in areas chosen by Russia.
Military security Strategic deterrent and conventional military forces gradually develop.
Military force is sufficient to maintain the balance of power between great powers 
and to manage local conflicts in the immediate neighbourhood.
Strategic interests can be pursued by limited intervention in specific areas (Middle 
East, Africa).
Poor demographic development in the country and the falling working-age population will 
create pressure to reform the pension system and labour migration, as well as hindering 
Russia’s pursuit of great power status. Russia has already started to react to this by starting 
the process of gradually increasing the retirement age.
Society is likely to stand behind even a government incapable of reform. Centrally man-
aged methods of governance and the position of the security authorities will strengthen. 
However, the authorities will not be able to completely prevent societal and political activ-
ities taking place e.g. via social media. This will enhance “micro-level” civil society in Rus-
sia, organised to address local or individual grievances. At the same time, the third sector 
of society (NGOs and other actors in civil society) will not have much room to manoeuvre. 
Russia’s “foreign agent law” and equivalent actions will effectively limit the operations of 
organisations considered harmful by the state and the elite. Military force will retain a role 
in maintaining the balance and mutual trust in society, as it will remain an important actor 
and employer in underdeveloped areas, helping to maintain the state’s capabilities.
Slow but steady economic growth will maintain a surplus in the state budget and pre-
vent the current buffer reserve from being exhausted – and may even allow it to be grad-
ually increased. The strong dependence on the development of world market prices of oil 
will continue, forcing the economy to adapt at times. Russia has little external debt and 
large foreign currency reserves, which protect it against short-term market fluctuations 
of 1–3 years’ duration. The political risks limiting business operations will not disappear, 
which will make entrepreneurship a less attractive proposition for Russians. State institu-
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tions will reform at a slow pace, if at all, which will slow down overall development in Rus-
sia. If the current trend continues, Russia will be able to compete with the world’s leading 
countries in certain key areas of military technology, such as missile technologies.
According to current forecasts, oil and gas price trends will remain sufficient for Russia 
to be able to finance actions aimed at restoring its position as a great power. Although re-
newable energy is making up an increasing proportion of total global energy generation, 
hydrocarbons will maintain their key position until the 2030s. The global consumption of 
natural gas is expected to increase considerably. Furthermore, economic growth in China 
will require raw materials, which will maintain the resource economy in Russia and support 
cooperation between the two countries. However, there will be changes in the global en-
ergy market, for which Russia will have to prepare. Most forecasts indicate that liquefied 
natural gas will increase its share of the energy market, in which case high-volume imports 
from North America may reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas pipelines.
The armed forces will remain a functional tool for the government and administration. 
The morale and capabilities of the armed forces are currently at a much higher level than 
a decade ago, and they operate in compliance under political guidance, producing the de-
sired effects. Development of the armed forces will continue in keeping with the goals of 
the current reform programme. A considerable part of the defence resources will keep be-
ing used to maintain the strategic nuclear deterrent and for the potential ability to inflict 
considerable losses on any projection of US forces in Europe. Standoff, precision-guided 
weaponry capability will be developed, along with a medium-range nuclear missile ca-
pability now that the INF Treaty has been suspended, leading to the potential for rapid 
increases in missile numbers. The capability of Russia’s ground forces to intervene and 
engage in military operations in neighbouring countries will be maintained. The current 
conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East will continue, but their intensity will remain at a 
level that is manageable from the perspective of deploying resources. Russia will avoid any 
direct armed conflict with other great powers because of the risk it would involve, but will 
promote its interests even through military means while keeping below the threshold for 
armed conflict between great powers.
The current trend towards a weakening of the rules-based international order will re-
duce the possibilities of small countries to influence development paths. The role of power 
politics in global decision-making will increase, and Russia is promoting a multipolar world 
order. The current trend indicates that developments in Western societies will not make 
them substantially stronger or weaker. Russia seeks to influence the decision-making of 
states and communities through traditional diplomatic means and using covert methods, 
but these will be well known in Western countries, and their effects will be more easily pre-
ventable. Other pressures on Western countries – such as immigration, initiatives to leave 
the European Union or change its structure, trade wars and climate change – will constant-
ly cause friction in the West.
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Potential implications for Finland
Membership of the European Union and its shared resources will protect Finland from 
Russia’s most aggressive pressure, but the differing policies towards Russia of EU member 
states and internal political fragmentation within the EU may provide Russia with opportu-
nities to strengthen its position. Russia will try to promote that fragmentation in order to 
gain more room to manoeuvre. Confrontation in Russia–EU relations will continue at least 
in the 2020s. Finland’s current Enhanced Opportunity Partnership with NATO and develop-
ing bilateral defence partnerships and defence cooperation within groups of countries are 
already producing a sufficient deterrent. Such cooperation will maintain the conditions for 
a military alliance, if a clear need is identified and the required political will exists.
Military force will remain a permanent and important instrument of the state in all Rus-
sia’s potential futures, and as such an integral part of the relationship between Finland and 
Russia. Development of the military force and changes in its deployment, capabilities and 
operations in areas close to Finland will communicate the significance of those interests 
that Russia considers to be of key importance to the state. Military force will also serve as 
a channel of communication from Finland to Russia.
For the time being, most of the energy Finland uses is imported from Russia, in addition 
to which other linkages with the Russian energy sector have a major impact on both the Finn-
ish economy and the development of its energy system. Russia’s other impact on the Finn-
ish economy is limited by the fact that Finland’s exports of goods and services to Russia only 
represent about 2% of Finland’s GDP.23 Investments in Russia are still risky due to the unpre-
dictable nature of the business environment and corruption, which makes economic coop-
eration that much more difficult. Some aspects of Russian business operations will remain 
politicized, while other aspects do not follow the principles of a market economy in the way 
that is customary in the West. Creating and maintaining business relationships in the Russian 
business environment still requires special expertise. Over time, there will also be cultural 
alienation if, for example, there is less trade and fewer student exchanges, leaving few other 
incentives besides tourism to study the Russian language and to get to know the culture. It is 
likely that Russia will interest fewer and fewer Finns in the future.
In spite of Russian influence operations, Finland will probably be able to maintain its 
pragmatic, yet challenging, bilateral relations with Russia, provided that the current cir-
cumstances continue. Russia cooperates in the areas it finds useful, but tries to promote 
its own interests in bilateral relations at Finland’s expense. Although Russia’s influence op-
erations are continuous, their intensity is limited by the desire to avoid pushing Finland in-
to a situation where it must choose a military alliance with the West. Russia has resources 
and prerequisites for strengthening and extending its influence towards Finland, should 
Russia deems it necessary. This has a deterrent effect on Finland even without any practi-
cal coercive actions.
23 The share of Finland’s GDP includes the purchases made by Russians in Finland.
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4.2 More favourable future: A stronger Russia defines the degree of 
cooperation with its Western competitors
For Russia, a more favourable outlook would mainly mean an absence of factors that 
threaten its internal unity, as well as Russia being able to keep up with economic and 
technological developments, and a genuine possibility to implement initiatives aimed at 
strengthening its international position. However, Russia still would not have what it takes 
to rise to the same position as the USA or China as a great power capable of changing the 
structures of global geopolitics. Rather, Russia is capable of exploiting tensions associated 
with the change in the world order to pursue its own interests and establish varying de-
grees of economic cooperation and political consensus with European countries. Russia 
will seek to further impose constraints on Western countries and their capabilities utilising 
methods that exploit their weaknesses. However, Russia is not seeking a radical change to 
the world order. Preserving the international treaty system and operational capabilities of 
Western countries is necessary to strengthen the Russian economy and counterbalance 
the growing influence of China. Sino-Russian relations may develop into strategic coopera-
tion that better benefits Russia both politically and economically.
Main features of a more favourable future:
Internal situation The quality of governance and social services improves from the present, and 
development in certain areas of society becomes more rapid then today.
The political elite retains a strong position, and coercive measures are not directed at the 
majority population. Society does not challenge the system of governance, and internal 
struggles within the elite become more moderate.
Economy Growth is developed for the economy outside the energy sector, and oil prices increase to 
a level that allows extensive investments by the state (over USD 80).
Russia’s dominance in the region increases, and its cooperation with Asian nations 
produces significant added value, both political and economic.
External relations The perceived national security threats remain unchanged in the background, but they 
are not raised so much, with the focus being on threats shared with other great powers. 
Russia’s external relations become more predictable.
Cooperation between great powers produces added political value, and military influence 
takes a back seat to economic and political means. The great powers enhance their 
policies for spheres of influence.
Russia is able to persuade its neighbours to commit to Russia politically and economically.
Wider participation in solving international problems is possible using more extensive 
resources.
Military security The strategic deterrent and conventional military force are more rapidly developed. The 
role of conventional military force increases compared to strategic weapons.
Military force is sufficient to maintain the balance of power, and to manage local and 
regional conflicts nearby.
Russia can promote its interest through interventions and operations taking place 
simultaneously in several areas (Middle East, Africa, Asia).
170
The basic pillars of legitimacy of the political system (such as salaries, pensions, services 
provided by the authorities and decision-making at the local level) will start functioning 
better and become more open, and citizens’ trust in decision-makers and the state will im-
prove. There will be scope for strengthening the institutions essential for the predictable 
use of power (democratic representation, the judicial system, the media). Internal strug-
gles within government will become more transparent, and changes of political power will 
not lead to internal or external conflict.
Cross-border migration will become favourable for Russia. Russians who have lived or 
studied abroad will begin to return to their homeland, bringing fresh ideas and expertise to 
science and education. The Russian Orthodox church will maintain its ideological role and 
help to create social cohesion, but at the same time Russia will become more multicultural 
and other religions will proliferate in Russia, reducing regional tensions. Russians will view 
the status of the Russian Orthodox Church to be appropriate, and there will be no deep 
divisions in this regard. Russia will remain a functional multinational state, and will allow 
other religions to operate freely, increasing trust in religious institutions.
In this more favourable outlook, Russia will succeed in strengthening its economic and 
political position in the wake of the emerging China. Russia and China will reach agree-
ment on Russia joining the Silk Road megaprojects. The higher price of oil will ensure that 
services and investments essential for the functioning of the state can be financed, while 
energy production in Russia diversifies in stages. For example, a new production sector 
based on mining and processing rare-earth minerals will become a driver of the economy 
alongside hydrocarbons. Russia is among the few producers in the world in this sector. The 
structure of the economy will diversify, and the Russian market will become more attrac-
tive to the outside world. However, Russia will not become an open economy; instead, the 
government will assume control of new sectors of industry, exploiting them to maintain its 
position and increase the personal wealth of its members.
Russia will be able to generally utilise the potential for a new industrial revolution that 
digitalisation (and especially artificial intelligence and quantum computing) offers for the 
country’s economic development. Foreign investments will increase, the current sanctions 
will be revoked, and the structure of Russia’s exports will diversify. Sanctions will become 
useful for Russia to the extent that they will help Russian companies create new compe-
tencies and find new markets. Russia’s goal of achieving digital sovereignty will be largely 
successful, and Russia will gain the ability to manage digitalisation and the country’s tech-
nological development in line with its own objectives. Structures independent of Western 
financial transaction systems will be created between China, India, Russia and Brazil.
The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria will remain low-intensity conflicts in line with Rus-
sia’s aims. Conflicts of interest between great powers in new conflicts in the Middle East 
and Africa will be managed, with Russia one of the parties involved. European countries 
will adapt to the new situation. Russia will feel that its status as a great power has been 
recognised, and the sphere of influence it is seeking will, in practice, be agreed. Sanctions 
on Russia will be partly revoked, or their impact will decrease as the Russian economy de-
velops. The capabilities and authority of the armed forces and security authorities will im-
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prove with better funding, favourable technological development and increased trust from 
the public.
The United States and Russia will reach agreement on limits to strategic weapons, free-
ing Russian resources to strengthen its conventional military and update its weapon sys-
tems. Russia will be able to maintain a high-readiness military force capable of rapid de-
ployment. Russia will be able to use military force flexibly to control conflicts and crises, 
both within its own territory and outside it.
The West’s position in international politics and the global economy will weaken. The 
development of a multipolar word will lead to a situation where spheres of influence re-
turn to international politics. In these circumstances, the United States will limit its influ-
ence, and possibly also the number of allies it has in Europe. Internal fragmentation with-
in the EU will weaken its external operational capability. The global operational capability 
of Western countries will weaken and Russia will manage to fill the power vacuum, both 
within international institutions and in the area it considers to be its own sphere of influ-
ence. This will deepen the crisis in liberal democracy and strengthen the trend towards 
authoritarianism. Western countries will have less ability to control international financial 
systems, as the significance of the control and regulatory structures that they control will 
decrease. The international treaty system, NATO and the EU will become more fragment-
ed, reducing their effectiveness.
Potential implications for Finland
A more favourable future for Russia would restrict Finland’s freedom in international poli-
tics. A fragmented EU and partnership with a weakened NATO would not provide the cur-
rent added value for Finland’s security solutions. Finland’s relationship with Russia would 
become more significant, and there would be more pressure to adapt to its political in-
terests. Finland would be at greater risk of being left alone in its disputes with Russia. 
Pressure to take Russia’s interests into account more in Finland’s decision-making would 
increase, both in its external relations and its internal affairs. If this more favourable situa-
tion were to continue for an extended period, there is a risk that Russia’s demands would 
increase. Political and economic arrangements advantageous to Russia would become in-
terests that Russia would seek to defend.
A financially stronger Russia would lead to an increase in mutual investments, and 
Russia’s ability to use financial linkages and cash flows as a lever to gain political advan-
tage would improve. The linkages between the energy systems of the two countries would 
probably strengthen, potentially slowing the energy transition in Finland. More predict-
able political decision-making and increased economic growth in Russia would improve 
Finnish companies’ ability to operate there. The business environment would remain cor-
rupt, and operating in it would still require special skills. If Russia were to gain a generally 
more positive image in Finland and there was an increase in low-level connections (such as 
business, study and travel), general interest in Russia might increase in Finland.
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4.3 Less favourable future Russia isolates itself politically and seeks economic 
cooperation
A chain of events less favourable one would threaten to visibly reduce Russia’s status from 
that of a great power, which would constitute a significant loss for the government’s na-
tional legitimacy. Russia’s own potential would weaken, and pressure exerted by external 
actors and the environment would increase. At the same time, there would be pressure to 
engage in economic cooperation to prevent the country’s income flows from collapsing. In 
line with the idea of a zero-sum game, avoidance of the perceived defeat may drive Russia 
to try to compensate for its relative weakness with more active operations, particularly in 
its immediate neighbourhood. Russia would seek to reduce unity between Western coun-
tries by taking a different approach towards different countries and by offering financially 
attractive cooperation opportunities.
Main features of a less favourable future:
Internal situation The quality of governance and social services weakens from the present, but it is 
possible to maintain them at the level required to maintain public approval.
Leadership weakens, and there is more coercion of various elements of the citizenry. 
Society challenges the system, and internal struggles within the elite intensify, resulting 
in visible changes.
Economy The energy transition progresses more rapidly, and the price level of oil falls (to below 
USD 50). Russia enters a prolonged economic recession, and no growth sectors are 
created in the economy outside the energy sector.
Russia’s dominance in the region weakens, and its Asian cooperation does not produce 
any significant added value for Russia, but will continue at the political and economic 
level defined by its partners, particularly China.
External relations There is pressure to modify the perceived national security threats that Russia faces. 
Cooperation between great powers does not produce added value, and other great 
powers become visibly stronger in relation to Russia.
The predictability of external relations weakens. Russia’s relations with other nations 
vary greatly and change more rapidly.
Getting neighbouring countries to commit to cooperation with Russia requires more 
use of a variety of coercive methods. Conflicts in neighbouring regions continue, 
threatening to expand.
Military security Russia’s ability to maintain a strategic deterrent and its defensive capabilities against 
an attack by another great power become questionable, but the public image of 
Russia’s military capabilities is maintained by stressing the importance of nuclear 
weapons.
Russia’s conventional military forces largely remain at the current level. Conflicts in the 
immediate vicinity are managed by concentrating resources on one conflict at a time.
Russia is able to promote its interests through limited intervention in selected areas 
where it has a local partner and allies (the Middle East).
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Uncertainty regarding the handover of political power will increase, and the resulting pow-
er struggles will cause lead to weaken and inconsistent government. Corruption will not 
reduce, despite official anti-corruption programmes. Increased corruption will be more 
strongly associated with the intertwining of organised crime and the state; high-ranking 
civil servants, politicians and business executives with criminal backgrounds will be visibly 
in charge of public procurement, for example.
Internal power struggles within the government may escalate into conflicts or disputes 
visible to the outside. Increasing socio-economic inequality and the inability of the state to 
produce social cohesion for the country’s citizens will increase distrust of the government. 
Consequently, the state will increasingly rely on various coercive methods concerning e.g. 
civil society actors, as well as religious, ethnic and sexual minority groups. The other side 
of the coin of digital sovereignty is that civil rights will be more severely restricted, which 
will lead to dissatisfaction in various social groupings. At the same time, the country will 
fall behind in technological development, and it will become increasingly obvious to peo-
ple that digitalisation is progressing better in other countries than in Russia.
The most important factors threatening internal stability will be economic and cultur-
al diversification in Russia’s regions, which will result in a risk of the country losing its na-
tional unity. The government will probably try to counteract this by increasing its coercion 
of various groups, as well as by increasing subvention in order to gain support. In extreme 
situations, internal instability could lead to the need for a change in the perceived national 
security threats and the government immediately defining a threatening external enemy. 
International politics may become more difficult if Russia abandons international treaties 
it feels are disadvantageous.
If there is weaker economic and military development, Russia will be under pressure 
to seek cooperation, but it may also decide to further isolate itself from Western coun-
tries. If the West were to present a united front, the opposition to Russia’s actions would 
strengthen and the credibility of the rules-based international order would be restored. 
China may also start pursuing political and economic projects bypassing Russia, particu-
larly in Central Asia and the Arctic, which would leave Russia without a strong partner. It is 
essential for Russia’s foreign policy goals that it maintains its influence in the post-Soviet 
space. Besides the increasing influence of China, any success story of a former Soviet re-
public that took place independently of Russia would also weaken Russia’s influence in its 
neighbouring areas.
Weaker development could be triggered by a crisis in the energy sector and financial 
chaos resulting from the weakening situation for the Central Bank of Russia, which would 
require the state to quickly provide investment and business opportunities for the busi-
ness sectors it has classified as strategic. An energy crisis could develop if continuously 
low oil prices, weak investment capabilities and problems in technology lead to a situa-
tion where Russia would find it necessary to  grant foreign energy companies significantly 
more advantageous rights to invest and exploit Russia’s natural resources – oil and gas, ra-
re-earth elements, wood and possibly grain. Such a situation carries major risks, because 
interest in such investments would basically be low due to lower prices of these commod-
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ities. Foreign investments and business operations require sufficient guarantees against a 
number of risks. Development of Russian legislation or implementation of investment pro-
tection compliant with EU directives, for example, would reduce these risks.
In this weaker outlook, Russia’s dependence on Western technology and know-how 
will increase, or it would need to accept becoming dependent on technology from China. 
This course of events would secure the operational capability of central government, but 
it would be unable to produce economic growth or social cohesion. Russia seeks to imple-
ment its innovation policy under government control, with success being very uncertain. 
Financing the activities is not the only problem, because development also needs human 
capital. Russia is also suffering from a flight of human capital, which, if it were to acceler-
ate, would make it difficult to recruit competent people in key sectors. Erosion of the ed-
ucation system could be curbed with additional funding, but the human factor cannot be 
controlled solely by pouring in more money or by more severe coercion. Developments in 
the attitudes of younger people will have a significant impact on Russia’s ability to attain 
its political goals.
This outlook could also be triggered by a significant natural or human-caused disaster, 
or by extensive crisis or conflict in Russia’s neighbouring areas. Russia’s role in conflicts, 
both in potential crisis centres in the post-Soviet space and elsewhere (the Middle East) 
could increase, which would require military resources and funds from the state budget. 
Military tasks can be outsourced to private companies associated with the government 
and organised crime. Failure to control private military and security companies would in-
crease general distrust in the government.
If Russia’s armed forces were unable to maintain their operational capabilities, this 
could lead to uncertainty regarding the global balance of power. The desired level of arma-
ment, capabilities and professional soldiers would have to be compromised, and there are 
no identifiable prerequisites for success in a military conflict between great powers. Russia 
will try to extend the operational life of its existing strategic weaponry, and its non-strate-
gic nuclear weapons would remain a deterrent-enhancing factor. The operational capabili-
ty of the armed forces in Russia’s neighbouring areas will be maintained with modernised 
and legacy (but still useful) conventional weaponry.
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Potential implications for Finland
This weaker outlook for Russia’s economic and military development and its possible at-
tempts to seek economic cooperation with the West would increase links between Eu-
rope (including Finland) and Russian energy and raw material markets, as well as creat-
ing export possibilities for related products and services. However, lower oil prices would 
decrease Russia’s export revenues, which would result in a corresponding reduction in 
imports, and competition for Russian markets would intensify. As long as the West main-
tains a united and consistent attitude towards Russia at the political and security levels, 
Finland’s position in these regards would remain unchanged. However, any increase in the 
economic significance of investments in Russia would provide cause to assess the securi-
ty risk posed by a weaker Russia as having diminished, and individual Western countries 
might put their economic interests before the values-related interests of the Western com-
munity as a whole.
The strengthening of several negative trends would affect Russia’s foreign policy and 
assessments of threats. In turn, if Russia were to become more isolated from the West, this 
would generally result in more uncertainty for Finland, and political and economic pres-
sure on Finland from the Russian government would probably increase, as it would have 
to take more risks. This uncertainty would probably encourage Finland to develop its en-
ergy system so that it would be less dependent on Russia. Increased Russian isolation and 
weaker commitment to international cooperation would make it difficult for the Western 
cooperation partners to act uniformly towards Russia. The continuity in Finno-Russian re-
lations would decrease, the number of asylum seekers would be likely to grow, and coop-
eration between different sectors would become more difficult. If this development were 
to occur, it would probably alienate the cultures of Finland and Russia from each other, as 
tourism between the two societies would also decrease.
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4.4 Internal fragmentation of the Russian state
This outlook describes an economic and political development significantly weaker than 
the current one and regional fragmentation within the country, as well as the weakening of 
its military power. Trends and factors contributing to the process of fragmentation are the 
most extreme of those described in this report, and as such also the least likely.
Internal situation The quality of governance and social services weaken from the present situation 
significantly or very suddenly. It is not possible to keep them at the minimum level to 
retain the support of the populace.
The legitimacy of the ruling regime is questioned, and many social groups are targets 
of coercive measures. Society challenges the system, and internal struggles within the 
elite intensify, resulting in visible changes.
Economy The global energy transition progresses rapidly, and the price of oil falls for an 
extended period below a level that supports economic growth (USD 50). There is no 
end in sight for the economic recession in a situation where no growth sectors have 
been borne in the economy outside the energy sector.
The regional dominance of Russia weakens, and its cooperation in Asia will not 
produce significant political or economic results.
External relations There is obvious new pressure to change the perceived national security threats. 
Cooperation between great powers does not produce added value, and the 
strengthening of other great powers compared to Russia is very obvious.
Russia’s interests or views are taken into account little in international politics, but 
great powers and neighbouring countries seek to support Russia and its regions in 
controlling any process of disintegration. There is a particular focus on preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and increased organised crime.
Russia finds it difficult to persuade neighbouring countries to commit to cooperation, 
and it needs to allocate resources to preventing and managing internal problems and 
conflicts.
Military security Centralised command of the armed forces weakens, and the military is no longer 
credibly perceived as being able to maintain a strategic deterrent and defensive 
capability against a military attack by another great power.
Regarding the nuclear deterrent, resources are allocated to safe management of 
nuclear weapons.
The essential elements of conventional military force are maintained, but it is 
no longer possible to use it in a unified manner to deal with conflicts in Russia’s 
immediate vicinity. The loyalty of military personnel to the government is not 
undivided.
One key factor in such a negative development could be an accelerating power strug-
gle amongst the elite during the next decade. This could be triggered by a failure in the 
smooth handover power at the end of President Putin’s term in office, or a loss of legiti-
macy for other reasons. In such a situation, the operational capability of Russia’s political 
system would be at risk. At its worst, an internal power struggle within the elite would lead 
to a long period of weakness in internal politics, where Russia would lose some of its abil-
ity to implement its long-term strategic goals. Similarly, a visible military disaster causing 
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turmoil in internal politics could trigger or accelerate such a collapse. A military disaster 
taking place abroad, particularly in neighbouring areas, would weaken Russia’s national le-
gitimacy, which is based on its status as a great power. Such trigger factors could rapidly 
erode the legitimacy of the current regime, lead to more widespread demonstrations, and 
make the elite compete for power. At worst, these factors could lead to a level of conflict 
in Russia approaching civil war.
Above all, the disastrous development of several internal trends in Russia could result 
in fragmentation. As that would require a combination of several negative trends and a 
possible disaster, fragmentation is the least likely of the future scenarios described here. 
However, there are factors in the current course of development in the country that could 
promote fragmentation. Strong fluctuations in revenues from energy trade are an every-
day problem, and a collapse in oil prices could lead to a prolonged economic crisis, result-
ing in the government (and companies that depend on the state) being unable to contin-
ue to pay competitive salaries and meet their pension obligations. Fluctuations in income 
could result in repeated waves of discontent, destabilising society. The trend of urbanisa-
tion is fragmenting the state. The power of Russia’s few large cities is increasing at the ex-
pense of smaller “monotowns” that rely on a single industrial employer, as well as of rural 
areas. The country’s regions will continue to become increasingly divided from each oth-
er, giving them opportunities to strengthen their power relative to that of central govern-
ment. Central government will struggle to retain control over regional government actors. 
The brain drain of skilled people will continue, and consequently, no sufficiently large and 
competent generation will grow in Russia to take charge of matters. The higher birth rate 
among the Muslim population will gradually change the demographic structure, while un-
official immigration will erode the economic and political operating environment in Russia. 
The number of people living outside official society will gradually increase.
A prolonged economic crisis, possibly following a collapse in prices of oil and raw ma-
terials, and different development paths in the regions would lead to a weakening of po-
litical capabilities. If there were a serious and long-lasting crisis in public finances, Russia’s 
chances of credibly implementing its armament programme and military operations would 
disappear. If the state-centred innovation policy (i.e. expansion of the structures of econ-
omy) were to fail at the same time, Russia would not be capable of creating new growth 
– even for military technology – meaning that it will be left behind other great powers at 
an accelerating rate.
The other side of coin regarding digital sovereignty (i.e. maintaining control over the 
network infrastructure, logic and data located in Russia) is the weakening of possibilities 
for cooperation. Limited cooperation will also leave Russia relying on its own resources for 
solving problems in this area. International cooperation will produce less added value for 
the fight against malware, cybercrime or hostile operations exploiting the vulnerabilities 
of Russian systems.
If the ongoing gradual deterioration of the environment, e.g. due to climate change, 
were to continue, this would harm the production of food and exploitation of natural re-
sources. A natural disaster amplifying these factors, or a large influx of internal refugees in 
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Russia due to this or other reasons, would have rapid and widespread consequences. In an 
extreme situation, a human-caused or natural disaster would paralyse the state and make 
it partly dependent on external help.
Centralised command over the armed forces will also weaken as central government 
weakens, but fragmentation of the armed forces themselves is not inevitable. Retaining 
joint control over the armed forces and its soldiers would be in the interests of all parties in 
order to avoid armed conflict. It is also very much in the interest of other great powers and 
neighbouring countries to support centralised control over the armed forces for the same 
reason, and in order to prevent the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons 
of mass destruction. In extreme cases, authoritarian regimes supported by military force 
may arise in the fragmenting regions. The state’s monopoly over military force may also be 
lost as a consequence of privatising security services and the military, leading to the emer-
gence of autonomous groups. Mercenaries who have fought in conflicts in neighbouring 
areas and members of terrorist organisations would also return to Russia and join these 
groups, if the state was unable to control them.
Potential implications for Finland
Fragmentation in Russia would have two types of consequences for Finland: serious short-
term threats, but also long-term opportunities. Finland would be under pressure to posi-
tion itself and to define its policy regarding the fragmenting regions, and diplomatic re-
lations between Finland and Russia might be temporarily severed. In an extreme case, 
Finland could be drawn into a civil war in Russia, as a party to it and/or as a recipient of 
a large influx of refugees. Internal chaos in Russia would lead to an increase of unprece-
dented risks, for example in the form of cross-border crime. The security threats currently 
linked with Russia would probably change rapidly and radically.
A fragmenting Russia would become inward-looking, and direct attempts to political-
ly influence Finland would be significantly reduced. Bilateral trade between Finland and 
Russia would decrease, with corresponding consequences for the Finnish economy. There 
might be interruptions in energy trade, but it would be generally in the interest of the 
parties controlling those resources to continue the trade. As a whole, the consequences 
of fragmentation development would probably be negative for Finland in the short term. 
Continued bilateral relations, the ability to draw up binding treaties, and protection of in-
vestments in Russia would all be at risk.
Weaker centralised command of the Russian armed forces, and further the possible 
fragmentation of the state, would create a risk of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction falling into the hands of unstable regimes, terrorist, or private security 
firms. The same could also happen for other materiel and effective weaponry. Russia’s ex-
tensive and advanced defence industry would have to seek new markets if the volume of 
orders from the Russian state were to decrease. The Russian armed forces would still be 
in possession of large amounts of effective, modern conventional weaponry, such as fight-
er aircraft, naval vessels, anti-aircraft and cruise missiles, as well as various types of pre-
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cision-guided weapons, weapons for electronic warfare and cyber-weapons. The Russian 
armed forces would also have masses of the weaponry typically used in current conflicts: 
small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, as well as 
explosives.
Disintegration of the Russian state would significantly increase the Russian population 
in Finland, and the number of refugees coming from Russia would increase. This would 
probably have a strong influence on both Finland’s internal politics and on the public de-
bate in Finland, due to e.g. lack of security and predictability in society. In the longer term, 
an increased Russian population would lead to increased influence of Russian culture in 
Finland.
Finland might also have a much bigger role as a safe haven for Russian businesses and 
capital fleeing unstable conditions. The situation could also lead to temporary disruptions 
in the availability of energy if operators in Russia were unable to supply oil or gas in the 
agreed manner. Before long, new economic possibilities might be created as the parties 
establishing control over resources in Russia became clear.
Disintegration of the Russian state would increase the severity and diversity of threats 
to Finland’s security. There would be strong pressure to make changes to Finland’s security 
and defence, and to increase the resources allocated to them.
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5.  Conclusions on the possible futures for Russia
Foresight work regarding Russia based on current global trends produces a relatively sta-
ble picture of the country. The current trends do not indicate any critical need for change 
in Finno-Russian relations, in the way they are managed, or in the resources allocated to 
them. However, Finland has to be prepared for sudden events that could change the situ-
ation in Russia and require Finland to adapt, even considerably.
The lack of attention paid to climate change and preparations for it in the Russian public 
debate and actions weaken Russia’s ability to prepare for the risks of its potential severe 
and extensive impacts. Russia’s preparations for climate change must be monitored in or-
der to identify the potential for extensive impact, which would also be felt in Finland.
The weak signals in several areas raise the issue of social unrest, which has the potential 
to escalate into conflicts between different groups of Russian citizens and the government. 
Hardly any weak signals confirming the long-term trend of economic growth (growth fore-
cast of approximately 1.5%) have been observed in this study, but several risks of a weaker 
economic future for Russia have been identified. The risk of social unrest and the risk con-
cerning long-term economic growth are key factors that Finland must monitor.
The pressure for Russia to redefine the expressed threats Russia associates with Finland, 
mainly concerns the scenario in which Russia disintegrates. The threats Russia associates 
with Finland are part of the threats associated with the militarily superior USA and its al-
liances. The definitions and descriptions of threats that Russia associates with Finland are 
likely to remain unchanged in the outlooks involving a stronger or weaker Russia. Russia 
can pragmatically adjust the level of threat according to its goals and situational assess-
ments. The military force deemed necessary to prevent and avert the threats stated by 
Russia constitutes a security risk for Finland in all the possible futures for Russia analysed 
in this document.
The prevailing development outlook is the most likely one for Russia, because it is sup-
ported by factors and trends that are permanent in nature. No factors or ongoing process-
es have been identified that would be likely to result in rapid and/or significant changes 
to the prevailing development outlook. In this development outlook, Finland has good op-
erational possibilities in relation to Russia. Adapting to these developments in Russia will 
not require significant changes in Finland’s policies, or in the structures of its economy or 
defence. From the perspective of Finland’s security, continuation of the current situation 
is a better alternative than more favourable economic and military development in Russia. 
In its foreign and internal policy, Finland would also be better able to rely on the European 
Union in its current form and on its cooperation networks than on a European Union that 
could be weaker if the outlook for Russia were more favourable.
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Development weaker than the current outlook is assessed to possible if a combination 
of several negative trends or a shock were to occur. This development outlook would not 
create any significant need for adaptation in Finland. Finland’s opportunities for political 
operations would probably improve, while the economic possibilities in relation to Russia 
(exports of goods and services, import of energy) would remain the same – and in certain 
respects could even expand. On the other hand, the Russian economy (and the export and 
investment opportunities it offers) would shrink overall, meaning that Finland would feel 
pressure to increase its market share. There would be no need for any significant changes 
in Finland’s security or defence structures, but the resources allocated to them would have 
to be more extensively justified.
Development more favourable than the current outlook is also assessed to be possible, 
but this would require the combined effect of several positive trends without any shocks. 
In this development outlook, Finland would have to adapt to Russia’s increased influence 
and more active external operations. Finland’s opportunities for political operations re-
garding Russia would weaken. It is unlikely that there would be pressure to change Fin-
land’s security and defence structures, but international security and defence co-operation 
and activities would probably have to adapt to take Russia’s interests into account. The re-
sources allocated to Finland’s defence would probably need to be increased.
A course of development that sees a fragmenting Russia is seen as the least likely out-
come: It would require the combined effect of a number of negative trends and shocks. 
If Russia were to disintegrate, Finland would have to adapt seriously, though in the lon-
ger term, Finland could have more potential options in such a case. It is likely that Finland 
would have to adapt to extensive, long-term security problems arising from Russia. Con-
siderable changes will probably have to be made in the duties, structures and resources of 
the security authorities.
Only this last scenario would involve events that would significantly expand the securi-
ty risks Finland is exposed to, probably creating extensive pressure for change and require-
ments for increased resources for defence, as well as changes to the concept of compre-
hensive security.
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